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AGDA (M) (16 Mar 70) FOR OT UT 694221

20 March 1970

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 October 1969 (U)

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Kenneth G. Wickham*

**KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General**

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25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
OPERATIONAL REPORT - LESSONS LEARNED  
1 August 1969 - 31 October 1969

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCMH

1 November 1969

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR - 65 (R2)

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Location: Cu Chi Base Camp (XT647153), Cu Chi, RVN.  
Reporting Officer: Major General Harris W. Hollis.  
Prepared By: Captain William D. Watson, 18th Military History Detachment.  
Map References: Vietnam, 1:50,000, Series: L7014, Sheets: 6131 I, II;  
6132 II; 6229 I; 6230 I, II, III, IV; 6231 I, II, III, IV; 6232 II, III,  
IV; 6329 IV; 6330 I, II, III, IV; 6331 III.

1. (C) Section I, Operations: Significant Activities.

A. General: During the previous reporting quarter, the 25th Infantry Division prevented enemy forces operating in Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia Provinces from achieving the goals they had outlined for the Summer Campaign of 1969. The Division had also continued to upgrade ARVN/PF/RF forces with an increased emphasis on combined operations and, at the same time, accelerated pacification efforts. On 26 July, the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, operating in Long An Province, was placed under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division.

In the previous period, the enemy had planned to inflict heavy losses on U.S. and GVN forces, disrupt the pacification program and strengthen the Communist infrastructure, hoping to influence the Paris Peace Talks and discredit the Republic of South Vietnam. A series of highpoints was staged on significant Vietnamese and Viet Cong holidays and in conjunction with events at the negotiations in Paris and President Nixon's meeting with President Thieu on Midway Island. Following the NLF's announcement of a provisional government, the enemy attempted to take over Tay Ninh City with its famous Cao Dai Temple and proclaim the city as the capital of the NLF's shadow government. The enemy felt that controlling and proclaiming the Republic of South Vietnam's fourth largest city as his capital would affect Vietnamese, American and world opinion in his favor, even though he knew he could not retain it.

On 11 and 12 May 1969, friendly forces in the Division's Area of Operations received widespread rocket and mortar attacks concurrent with

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those which occurred throughout South Vietnam . At the same time, ARVN Airborne soldiers turned back the enemy in three contacts southwest of Tay Ninh City. To apply pressure as he prepared for further highpoints, the enemy accelerated his savage terrorist campaign, seeking to intimidate the Vietnamese people into providing him with moral and logistical support. Throughout the remainder of May, the enemy conducted training and resupply missions in preparation for the attack on Tay Ninh City which took place from 5 to 9 June.

Division and ARVN soldiers repulsed this threat to the security of the people of the city with the full power of their military capabilities, resulting in massive losses of enemy personnel and equipment. The highlight of this period was the Division's defense of Fire Support Base Crook, located northwest of Tay Ninh City, during which over 400 of the enemy were killed in two nights of fighting. On 19 and 20 June, the 9th VC/NVA Division again committed its regiments to an attack on Tay Ninh City but with a weakened military force and met with complete failure. Considerably incapacitated by these defeats and still suffering from the losses of the Winter-Spring Offensive, the enemy was not able to muster his forces for the third attack on Tay Ninh City and was forced to abandon the final phase of the Summer Campaign.

In Hau Nghia Province during this period, the Division seriously damaged the Communist infrastructure in COSVN's Sub-Region 1. The capture of several key Viet Cong officials and cadre and the accurate analysis of intelligence information led to a continuous series of targets which were exploited by timely operations. These operations were so effective that they shattered the enemy's supply and communications channels from Phu Hoa to Trang Bang. Enemy losses in these operations and in main force battles were substantial and resulted in the discontinuation of large scale activities. The units operating in Sub-Region 1 were forced to send their units to rear areas to receive training following a decision to revert to sapper tactics.

The lull in activity in July, and the inability of enemy forces to assemble a coordinated offensive move, marked the conclusion of the enemy's ineffective Summer Campaign.

As this reporting period began, reports indicated that the enemy was holding his traditional series of meetings, convened after every offensive, to evaluate the Summer Campaign. A significant change in the enemy's strategy had occurred in planning for the Summer Campaign. COSVN directives no longer promised total military victory but indicated that victory would come with a series of actions over an extended period of time. It was also noted in the previous reporting period that if the Summer Campaign failed to achieve its objectives, a Fall Campaign would be initiated, followed by as many offensives as necessary to bring victory to Communist forces. In late July and early August, intelligence information began to filter through agents and captured documents concerning an Autumn Campaign.

As the month of August progressed, the enemy began to implement his plans and some data was collected about probable enemy maneuvers. One of the most

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important developments in early August was the northeast movement of the 271st and 272nd NVA Regiments, 9th VC/NVA Division units who were involved in the summer attacks on Tay Ninh City, to the Fishhook region of Cambodia (XT5792). A lack of reconnaissance and supply activity along the Cambodia-Vietnam Border west of Tay Ninh was the preliminary indication of these unit's redeployment. The 88th NVA Regiment, also a participant in the Tay Ninh City attacks, relocated two of its battalions southwest of the city and left an unknown number of troops in the Nui Ba Den area where the regiment had deployed following the 19-20 June actions. The northeasterly movement of the 271st and 272nd Regiments continued into Binh Long Province and was confirmed by prisoners-of-war and ralliers. These maneuvers, combined with intelligence from a variety of sources, indicated that a coordinated action was planned by the 7th and 9th VC/NVA Divisions in Binh Long Province against the An Loc/Loc Ninh areas with a supporting, diversionary attack against targets in Tay Ninh Province by the 88th Regiment. The most widely advertised dates for these attacks were 19 August (National Revolution Day) and 2 September (VC Independence Day).

The 25th Infantry Division continued to conduct Phase III of Operation Toan Thang in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces. Planning guidance stressed upgrading of ARVN/RF/PF units, the expansion of the pacification program and operations to preempt enemy activities, interdict main force movement and destroy local forces.

To counter the enemy's dispersed formations, the Division maneuver elements targeted small groups with increased day and night operations, tailoring small maneuver elements (platoons and reinforced squads), oriented towards preempting and destroying the enemy rather than mere reaction to his activity. Also, employment of snipers (in towers at fixed positions and with combat patrols) proved extremely effective in thwarting the enemy's night activities and denying him freedom of movement. More offensive employment of radar, seismic sensors and night observation devices was emphasized and proved to be instrumental in preempting coordinated enemy ground attacks. To insure constant security along the major highways in the TAOR, the Division swept them daily.

In pacification activities, the Division concentrated particularly on the upgrading of contested and Viet Cong villages to include operations necessary to improve security.

The 1st Brigade operated in Tay Ninh Province with five battalions and was responsible for security of Highways 22 and 26, for combined operations with South Vietnamese units around Tay Ninh City and for coverage of the area around Nui Ba Den. The 1st Brigade was given the mission of conducting day and night operations to locate and annihilate enemy main force and local force units in its TAOR; preparing to defend Tay Ninh City against the enemy threat from the north and southwest; coordinating and conducting joint operations with the U.S. Navy north of Go Dau Ha (XT3925) along the Vam Co Dong River; conducting counter VCI operations in conjunction with GVN authorities in Tay Ninh's four districts (Phu Khong, Phuoc Ninh, Hieu Thien, Khiem Hanh); and protecting

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and conducting reconnaissance operations around Fire Support Base St. Barbara (XT272682).

The 1st Brigade was composed of the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry; the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry; the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry; the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor (-). The 1st Brigade was supported by the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery, and Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery.

The 2nd Brigade conducted extensive reconnaissance/search operations in the central portion of the Division TAOR with three maneuver battalions and was responsible for security along sections of Highways 6A, 7A, 19, 5 and 1. The 2nd Brigade was directed to conduct offensive mechanized/infantry/airmobile operations in the Ho Bo Woods (XT6020), Filhol Rubber Plantation (XT6820) and "Citadel" region (XT5025) with emphasis on small unit operations and destruction of Sub-Region 1 units; counter VCI operations in Trang Bang and Cu Chi Districts, and to continue road opening operations on assigned roads.

The 2nd Brigade's maneuver battalions were the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry; the 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry. The 2nd Brigade was supported by the 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery. Enemy units in the 2nd Brigade area included the 1st and 2nd Quyet Thang Battalions, the 101st NVA Regiment and the 268th VC/NVA Regiment along with several local force companies.

The 3rd Brigade, having moved from Dau Tieng in Binh Duong Province to Cu Chi Base Camp in late June of 1969, operated in the southernmost portion of the Division TAOR with two maneuver battalions and was responsible for route security along Highways 7A, 8A and 9A and the pacification program in the Bao Trai area (XT5405) where the brigade's forward headquarters was located. The 3rd Brigade was charged with conducting extensive combined operations with the 25th ARVN Division emphasizing small unit and night operations; conducting counter VCI, military pacification and consolidation operations in Duc Hoa and Duc Hue Districts, establishing temporary patrol bases in the Phuoc Luu area; stationing one company at the Duc Hue CIDG camp to work with and upgrade CIDG forces; coordinating with the Duc Hue and Tra Cu CIDG to conduct periodic Eagle Flights west of the Vam Co Dong River, and conducting joint operations with the U.S. Navy to include combined company sized Eagle Float operations.

The 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry and the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, supported by the 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, were the 3rd Brigade's maneuver units. Enemy units operating in the 3rd Brigade's AO included the 267 VC/NVA Battalion, the 2642 VC/NVA Battalion, the 269 VC/NVA Battalion, the 6 Local Force Company, the DL6 VC/NVA Battalion and the 308 VC Battalion.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division continued to work in Long An Province with four maneuver battalions and was responsible for the security of Highways 4, 18 and 23 and for local pacification programs. Planning

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guidance for the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, included conducting extensive combined operations with Long An ARVN and RF/PF units emphasizing small unit tactics and night operations; counter VCI and military pacification programs; Bushmaster, Checkerboard and mobile operations to detect enemy infiltration; continuing overwatch responsibilities on the main supply routes and coordinating with the U.S. Navy in conducting riverine/Eagle Float operations in its TAOR.

The brigade's maneuver battalions were the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry; the 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry; the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry. The brigade was supported by the 2nd Battalion, 4th Artillery, and Batteries B and C, 5th Battalion, 42nd Artillery. Major enemy units in Long An Province were the 506 VC Battalion, the 508 VC Battalion, the Dong Phu NVA Battalion, the 265 Battalion and the 520 Battalion. Elements of Sub-Region 6, targeted for Saigon, were attempting to use Long An Province as an infiltration route to the capital city. (See Overlay 1 - Enemy Situation) (Page 177)

The 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, operating in AO Saber (Approximate center XT4034) was to conduct combined operations with RF/PF forces, be prepared to move to the southern portion of Tay Ninh City, assume MSR responsibility on Highway 22 from Fire Support Base Hampton (XT417243) to the northwest boundary of AO Saber and on the improved road through the Cau Khoi Rubber Plantation between Highways 22 and 26, and support long range reconnaissance patrol teams in the TAOR.

Enemy activity was generally light throughout the Division TAOR from 1-10 August with the areas of principal action on the southern and northern slopes of Nui Ba Den mountain (XT2858), the Boi Loi Woods (XT4837), the "Citadel" (XT5025) and upper Filhol Rubber Plantation (XT6522), the vicinity of An Ninh (XT4314), the "Sugar Mill" (XT4604), and in Tan Tru (XS6763), Binh Phuoc (XS6155) and Can Giouc (XS8373) Districts. Incidents of mining and the planting of booby traps continued on an upward trend into August. In the 1-10 August time frame, 58 mines and booby traps were detonated resulting in five U.S. soldiers killed and 86 wounded. One hundred and sixty-eight mines and booby traps were destroyed during the same period.

In the 1st Brigade area, the redeployment of the 271st and 272nd Regiments to Binh Long Province left the 88th Regiment in a split configuration southwest and north of Tay Ninh City, the D1 and D14 Battalions securing supplies for attacks on Go Dau Ha (XT385251) and for ambushes of allied road convoys on Highways 19 and 22, and COSVN's artillery elements staging for attacks by fire on Ben Keo (XT2443) and Can Giang (XT2737). The 66th Artillery Regiment was positioned northwest of Tay Ninh City (XT180777) on 4 August.

A series of contacts around Nui Ba Den mountain involving the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, netted a total of 35 enemy killed. On

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2 August, Company A, conducting a reconnaissance operation with a regional force company on the southern foot of the mountain (XT287567), spotted three NVA and engaged them with organic weapons and artillery, eliminating all three of them. On 3 August at 0300 hours, a night combat patrol from Company B, two kilometers southeast of Nui Ba Den (XT315565), killed eight NVA with automatic weapons, helicopter and AC-47 gunships and artillery. At 0800 hours of the same day, a command and control helicopter directed artillery on enemy soldiers in the open on the eastern slope of the mountain (XT298582), killing three. On 5 August, Company B conducted a ground reconnaissance one kilometer east of Nui Ba Den (XT308572) and, at 1124 hours, received two rounds of 60mm mortar fire which wounded two infantrymen. Company B returned fire with their organic weapons, helicopter gunships and artillery, resulting in five NVA killed. On 7 August, just south of the mountain (XT286564), four NVA were killed after Company B gained contact at 1440 hours and engaged them with organic weapons, riot control agent (CS), helicopter gunships and an air strike.

On 8 August, Companies B and C (4-23 Mech) combined with two Regional Force companies to support a six-man recovery team on a mission code-named "Operation Labrador Retriever". The team was to locate and recover the body of an American soldier killed in action on 12 July 1969 during an operation conducted by the 2-2 Inf, 1st Inf Div, which was under the operational control of the 25th Inf Div at that time. The recovery was accomplished without incident but sniper fire was received from several locations as two of the APC's became mired in mud and the recovery team prepared for extraction. Minigun, 40mm "Duster", organic weapons, direct 8 inch howitzer, 4.2" mortar and 90mm tank fire was employed to uproot the snipers and a drop of riot control agent (CS) and napalm and fragmentation bombs were used in support of the ground elements. Nine of the snipers were killed.

A series of firefights with elements of the 2nd Battalion, 268th Regiment, the 83rd Rear Service Group and the 3 Battalion, 101st Regiment erupted in the Boi Loi Woods in locations near traditional enemy base and logistical areas. On 5 August, Company B, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, with elements of the 2nd ARVN Airborne Battalion, conducted a combat assault into the area (XT534355) in reaction to intelligence reports. At 1045 hours, Company B exchanged fire with an enemy squad, resulting in one U.S. killed and one U.S. wounded. Contact was broken by the enemy but reestablished at 1610 hours. A fierce engagement ensued during which four ARVN soldiers were killed and 15 wounded by small arms and RPG fire. Helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes supported the ground action and when the enemy resistance was eliminated, a sweep of the contact site produced 35 enemy killed, four NVA prisoners-of-war and nine individual weapons and some munitions.

On 6 August, Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, accompanied by an ARVN Airborne company, conducted a mounted reconnaissance into the Boi Loi Woods where they uncovered a cache (XT503372) consisting of three RPG launchers, five AX-47 rifles, a 60mm mortar and some munitions and medical supplies. A brief contact followed when an enemy squad was

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engaged near the cache, resulting in one U.S. wounded. At 1305 hours, two miles from this contact (XT522361), Company C (2-22 Mech); Company B, 4-9 Inf, and elements of the 2nd ARVN Airborne Battalion engaged an enemy platoon with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, riot control agent (CS) and artillery, resulting in 10 NVA killed, one NVA prisoner-of-war, the loss of seven AK-47 rifles, an M-79 grenade launcher, two pistols, a heavy machine gun, and 23 82mm mortar rounds. Allied losses were one U.S. killed, six U.S. wounded; one Kit Carson Scout wounded and one armored personnel carrier destroyed.

On 7 August, Company B (2-22 Mech) established a night laager (XT502-362) and at 1900 hours began to receive sniper fire. Company B returned fire with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and artillery, resulting in four enemy killed. Two days later (9 August) still in this same area (XT502-362), Company B met with an unknown number of enemy in a sharp clash, exchanging small arms and automatic weapons fire. Helicopter gunships and artillery were directed on the enemy fortifications and a search of the area located 25 enemy killed and a destroyed RPG launcher. U.S. casualties were one killed and four wounded.

Friendly initiated actions forced a series of contacts on enemy elements avoiding open confrontation in preparation for the Fall Campaign in the 2nd Brigade area. Ha Van Het, commander of the 1st Battalion, Quyet Thang Regiment, rallied to GVN forces on 6 August and confirmed earlier reports that the regiment had been broken down into two separate battalions training for sapper and guerrilla tactics. Het revealed that the morale of his men was low and that enemy supply lines had been severed completely causing a shortage of munitions. He estimated that the 1st Quyet Thang Battalion was incapable of presently initiating attacks.

A directive from the Current Affairs Committee of Sub-Region 1, captured in late July, provided an insight into the current political direction of the Viet Cong. The document gave guidance for the establishment and strengthening of the revolutionary administrative machinery in an effort to counter GVN pacification efforts. The addressees were told to oppose the accelerated pacification program and friendly military and psywar activities by strengthening the revolutionary councils. Viet Cong forces in Sub-Region 1 were to augment the National Revolutionary Councils of northern Gia Dinh, Ben Cat, Trang Bang, Cu Chi and Hoc Mon Districts. The revolutionary councils discussed in these documents were believed to be the local political arm of the NLF which the VC/NVA had been attempting to establish throughout South Vietnam. They are basically designed to foster the image of a legal government entity which the VC/NVA negotiation teams at Paris can cite as the basis for their claim to political control of South Vietnam.

In the Ho Bo Woods (XT515275) on 1 August, Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, conducting a dusk patrol, engaged eight enemy at 2130 hours with automatic weapons and artillery, resulting in seven enemy killed. On 2 August, Companies A and D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, OPCON to the 1st

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Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, were airlifted into an area north of the Ho Bo Woods (XT582304) where they made contact with an estimated enemy platoon at 1515 hours. An artillery preparation and a drop of riot control agent (CS) preceded the insertion and an air strike was employed to uproot the enemy force with helicopter gunships covering possible escape routes. The infantrymen engaged the enemy with small arms and automatic weapons in close combat. The enemy returned fire with hand grenades and individual weapons, killing one Division soldier and wounding four others. Thirteen NVA were killed. A bomb damage assessment in the same general area (XT530-300) the next day disclosed a destroyed bunker complex and munitions.

In the "Citadel" area north of Trang Bang on 2 August, Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, on an aerial reconnaissance mission, killed 15 enemy (XT507218) with artillery and air strikes. Company B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, swept the location and found eight AK-47 rifles and some medical supplies.

On 6 August, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, OPCON 1-5 Mech, conducted a combat assault into another area in the "Citadel" (XT572230) where enemy forces had been located by intelligence information. An artillery preparation had preceded the insertion and Company D, having linked up with the 2-49 ARVN Regiment, found 11 enemy KIA. Further search of this area led to a contact with an estimated reinforced enemy platoon. Helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes leveled the enemy fortifications, resulting in 17 enemy killed and 10 AK-47 rifles destroyed. There were no friendly casualties. A read-out of documents captured after the engagement identified the 2 Battalion, 268th Regiment and medical elements of northern Cu Chi District.

Three caches were discovered in the "Citadel" on 8 and 9 August. Company A, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, on a ground reconnaissance west of Trung Lap (XT546216) on 8 August, located eight tons of rice. Company C, exploiting prisoner-of-war information on 9 August northwest of Trang Bang (XT520243), evacuated a Thompson sub-machine gun, a German-made light machine gun, a flame thrower and munitions. The Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon, 1-5 Mech, exploiting Hoi Chanh information the same day, destroyed 35 cases (7000 rounds) of .51 caliber ammunition, 42 RPG rounds and 20 RPG boosters in an area south of Trang Bang (XT568195).

There were two contacts with enemy forces near the Filhol Rubber Plantation. On 4 August, the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoons, 2-14 Inf and 1-5 Mech, with the support of the 116th Assault Helicopter Company engaged 15 enemy seven kilometers northeast of Cu Chi (XT628179) in close fighting with organic weapons, hand grenades, artillery and air strikes, resulting in 12 enemy killed and the loss of 11 AK-47 rifles. Documents removed from the bodies identified the 1st Quyet Thang Battalion. On 9 August, the 116th Assault Helicopter Company with elements of the 2-14 Inf, on reconnaissance operations, killed a total of nine enemy in several scattered incidents (XT6221-XT6423).

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Activity was light in the 3rd Brigade area from 1-10 August. The enemy continued to move supplies and troops into Sub-Region 2 from Ba Thu, Cambodia (XT2703).

On 3 August, the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, operating along a canal in the "Sugar Mill" south-east of Hep Hoa (XT454052), evacuated 37 RPG rounds, one AK-47 rifle, 32 82mm mortar rounds, 40 hand grenades, one claymore mine, 76 60mm mortar rounds and destroyed two sampans.

On 8 August, an artillery aerial observer, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, engaged an estimated enemy squad with artillery six kilometers north of Hiep Hoa (XT433143) at 1155 hours. The enemy returned fire with organic weapons, hitting the light observation helicopter and forcing it to land. Company C, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, secured the helicopter and engaged eight enemy with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes. At 1610 hours, contact was gained with 10 enemy in the same general area (XT432-148) and supporting fires were again massed on the enemy position. The encounter cost the enemy 17 killed while two U.S. soldiers were wounded.

Moderate activity was experienced by the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division as Sub-Region 2 and Sub-Region 3 personnel continued movement of supplies and infiltration of replacements into Long An Province. The enemy also persisted in his efforts to counter GVN pacification programs. A 60-man unit, possibly from the 520 Battalion, was reportedly targeted against Revolutionary Development cadre and ARVN's in New Life hamlets and planned to shell Tan Tru Subsector (XS684625). Elements of Sub-Region 6, attempting to infiltrate to Saigon, were frustrated in their efforts to reach their destination. Prisoners-of-war and Hoi Chanh stated that allied preemptive actions were effectively disrupting the infiltration.

On 3 August, Company A, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, conducted an Eagle Flight near the "Parrot's Beak" (XS345943) and made contact with an estimated two enemy platoons. Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, and the Raider Platoon (5-60 Inf) were flown in to support the engagement. The enemy returned fire with a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire and a light observation helicopter was shot down and destroyed. Artillery and air strikes were employed to break the enemy's resistance. Sweeping the battlefield, Company A located 42 enemy killed, eight AK-47 rifles, one SKS rifle, a light machine gun, three RPG launchers, a radio and 40 RPG rounds. Five Viet Cong prisoners-of-war were captured. They stated they were members of the C2 Company, 308 Battalion, and were enroute to Thu Thua District to conduct reconnaissance and undertake operations. The contact marked the return of the 308 Battalion after a period of refitting in Cambodia. The captured weapons were new. Six Americans were wounded in the fighting.

That same day at 0740 hours, the Raider Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, on a search north of Tan Tru (XS649645) evacuated five SKS rifles, two Remington 30-30 rifles and 100 rounds of small arms ammunition. Company

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A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry, on an Aquabush operation south-east of Binh Phuoc (XS630530), made contact at 2110 and 2255 hours, resulting in seven enemy KIA.

On 10 August, Team 21, Company E, 75th Infantry (Ranger), engaged six enemy moving in sampans along the Bo Bo Canal (XS518523), a major supply route leading into Long An Province. They killed all six enemy soldiers with small arms and automatic weapons and destroyed two sampans and 66 RPG rounds, evacuating an AK-47 rifle and five 107mm rockets. The enemy was identified as elements of the rear service section of Sub-Region 2.

In other scattered contacts in Long An Province, the 3rd Brigade, 9th Inf Div, killed seven NVA on 2 August and destroyed a bunker complex; killed 11 enemy on 4 August and captured three prisoners-of-war and a small ammunition cache (2100 small arms rounds); killed 21 NVA on 6 August; captured one prisoner-of-war and eliminated 11 enemy on 7 August, and killed 14 enemy, captured a prisoner, one 60mm mortar, seven 107mm rockets and other munitions on 9 August.

The enemy's move to initiate the first phase of the Autumn Campaign was highly reminiscent of the strategy employed in the opening of the Summer Campaign when widespread publicity was given to 19 May (Ho Chi Minh's birthday) as a highpoint of the offensive and, instead, a violent series of attacks by fire were launched on 11-12 May throughout Vietnam. Having suggested 19 August (National Revolution Day) as a probable date for the beginning of the Fall Offensive, the enemy launched the first highpoint of the campaign on 11-12 August with a coordinated series of attacks by fire and ground actions throughout Vietnam. In the 25th Infantry Division TAOR, however, this attempt was feeble compared with earlier actions. In contrast to the Summer phase of activity, the enemy concentrated his ground forces in the An Loc/Loc Ninh (XT7588-XU7309) areas of Binh Long Province, though continuing to mount limited supporting actions in the vicinity of Tay Ninh and throughout the sub-regions. Although there was a slight increase around 19 August, the expected highpoint on that date did not materialize.

The 9th VC/NVA Division (271st and 272nd Regiments) and the 1st NVA Division were delivered massive defeats by the 1st Air Cavalry Division, 1st Infantry Division and 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Binh Long Province and northern Tay Ninh Province. In one of these actions in upper Tay Ninh Province, elements of the 1st NVA Division attacked LZ Becky (XT375-810), manned by elements of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, resulting in 17 enemy killed. Fire Support Base St. Barbara (XT272683), defended by Company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry (1st Brigade, 25th Inf Div), and the firing site for Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery (175/8") and Battery A, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery (105mm), provided fire support for LZ Becky. At 0340 hours when the battle was most intense, FSB St. Barbara received 40 rounds of 82mm mortar fire, 40 rounds of 60mm mortar fire, 10 RPG rounds, 10 rifle grenades and bangalore torpedoes which preceded a sapper attack aimed at cutting off the support of LZ Becky. The sappers killed one

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Division soldier, wounded five others and destroyed a 105mm artillery piece, a quarter ton truck and a UHF generator. Four of the sappers were killed.

At 2315 hours on 13 August, the 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion at Ben Co Noi (XT141434) southwest of Tay Ninh City and just west of the Vam Co Dong River, came under heavy enemy attack. During the attack, the 1st Brigade rendered assistance by providing U.S. air assets and artillery support. Close coordination was maintained and plans were effected to react at first light. At dawn, Company A, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry was inserted and established a blocking position while ARVN Airborne elements swept from their defensive positions. Seventy-one bodies were located. The ARVN installation was attacked again on the night of 14 August and Company C (3-22 Inf) reacted with elements of the 2nd ARVN Airborne Battalion. The allied contingent engaged an estimated reinforced enemy platoon on 15 August with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, riot control agent (CS), artillery and air strikes, resulting in 31 enemy killed and two .51 caliber machine guns destroyed. Enemy return fire consisting of small arms, automatic weapons and mortars killed one American soldier and wounded another. In the same general area (XT112428) the next day (16 August), an artillery aerial observer from the 7th Battalion, 11th Artillery, in support of Company C, located seven enemy who had been killed by artillery fires. At 1352 hours, a 3-22 Inf C&C ship, in the vicinity of the previous day's contact (XT095-433), engaged an estimated enemy platoon with helicopter gunships and artillery, killing 19 NVA and destroying an AK-47 rifle and 500 small arms rounds. The 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion fought off an estimated enemy company in the early morning hours of 17 August, killing 15 more NVA (XT142434). Although no positive identification was made of the enemy elements involved in these actions, they were believed to be forces of the 88th NVA Regiment.

With the exception of the attacks on FSB St. Barbara and on the ARVN installation at Co Noi, the attacks by fire in the 25th Infantry Division's area of operations were not accompanied by coordinated ground actions. Throughout the week following 11 August, Division installations received over 50 attacks by fire, ranging from light to heavy shellings, and resulting in 41 Division soldiers wounded. Numerous contacts were reported by RF/FF elements on the night of 11-12 August, and there were several shelling incidents directed at Bao Trai, Duc Hoa and the Duc Hue Special Forces compound. Many of the shellings involved a small number of rounds that failed to reach their objective, often impacting several meters outside the wire obstacles. From 11-24 August, Division night combat patrols and sniper teams made a total of 38 contacts, killing 40 of the enemy and receiving a Hoi Chanh at a cost of one American killed.

Several incidents of enemy terrorist activity were recorded. On 13 August, nine civilians were killed when the Lambretta in which they were riding detonated an anti-tank mine off Highway 6A northwest of Trung Lap (XT504256). A Viet Cong detonated a claymore mine in a coffee house located in a hamlet west of Cu Chi (XT608138), wounding four civilians on 16 August. A time bomb was set in the Duc Hoa market (IS596963) on 17 August, wounding six GVN soldiers and killing two and wounding 16 civilians.

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In addition, villagers (XT515025) told elements of the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, that the Viet Cong had threatened to rocket their village if they associated with Americans. A MEDCAP team with the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, learned that the young men of a village located near Trang Bang (XT473-189) were forced to move out of the village at night to avoid being abducted by the Viet Cong. There were also numerous instances of Viet Cong rocketing and mortaring hamlets and villages, resulting in death and injury to several civilians.

The number of mines and booby traps were at a high rate in the Division area. From 11-24 August, Division soldiers destroyed 211 mines and booby traps and detonated 61, resulting in four U.S. killed and 97 wounded.

Viet Cong attempts to gain the support of the populace in the Autumn Campaign became more widespread and intensified with the tempo of military activity. Documents found on Highway 1 (XT608138) by the 6th Psyops Battalion on 16 August included VC propaganda slogans urging the people to participate in upcoming attacks on 19 August and 2 September. A rallier revealed that a movement was underway to penetrate Chieu Hoi centers in an attempt to initiate sabotage and instigate insurrections within the centers once the offensive had begun. Other Viet Cong were assigned to rally and, upon being assigned to ARVN units, were trained to act as undercover agents, proselyting men within the ARVN ranks who exhibited low morale.

Documents captured by the U.S. Navy south of Tan Tru (XS695625) revealed the enemy's intentions following the withdrawal of two brigades of the 9th Infantry Division. The documents included a statement which read, "This is a favorable opportunity for friendly (VC) forces to intensify their attacks in Sub-Region 3." The Current Affairs Committee of Sub-Region 3 directed all areas to initiate tactical operations in rural and urban areas, coordinate tactical operations with political efforts, particularly with military proselyting actions, kill pacification personnel, GVN officials and civilian cadre as well as attack military posts controlling rural areas, propagandize the (VC) Ten Point Plan, establish the Provisional Revolutionary government and motivate the people to participate in the development of an armed political force. The directives expressed in these documents were diametrically opposed to the position taken by the Communists in their propaganda efforts. According to the Communists, any troop withdrawal would be met by a cessation of their hostilities in an area where the troops were withdrawn.

On 20 August, an unusual sighting was made by U.S. forces at Duc Hue. Ten enemy were engaged with artillery (XT302125) and fled to Cambodia in the vicinity of XT3014. At 1845 hours, two helicopters landed in the areas to which the enemy personnel had escaped. Helicopters were reportedly sighted in the "Angel's Wing" earlier in 1969 but their manner of employment and ownership remained undetermined.

In addition to the actions at Ben Co Noi and FSB St. Barbara, the 1st Brigade experienced moderate activity from 11-17 August which generally continued at a steady pace from 18-24 August. During these periods, Tay

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Ninh Base Camp (XT1551) received attacks by fire on 12, 14, 15 and 24 August, resulting in three Americans wounded and damage to four helicopters and four structures. Attacks by fire were also received by Fire Support Base Sedgwick II (XT245313), FSB St. Barbara (XT272683), FSB Crook (XT055595), and Patrol Base Hunter (XT369242).

On 11 August, the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor (-) left the 1st Brigade and came under the operational control of the 3rd Brigade.

To the north of Nui Ba Den mountain, FSB St. Barbara (XT272682), manned by Company C, 4-9 Inf, received another attack at 0325 hours on 17 August. The attack was supported by mortar and RPG fire from the north and northwest followed by a ground assault which reached the berm but did not penetrate the perimeter. The attack was held off with organic weapons, claymore mines, a Night Hawk helicopter and artillery. Twenty-one of the enemy were killed and two AK-47 rifles and three RPG launchers were captured. Three Americans were killed and eight wounded in the defense of the base. Battlefield litter and its proximity suggested that the unit was probably a sapper element of the 1st NVA Division.

Three kilometers southeast of Nui Ba Den on 20 August, Company B, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, received two RPG rounds in their night offensive position (XT300553) at 0606 hours and returned fire with organic weapons and artillery, killing three NVA. Still occupying this position on the morning of 21 August, Company B received small arms, automatic weapons and 82mm mortar fire from an estimated enemy company at 0150 hours followed by a ground assault. The initial shelling of the camp wounded six Division soldiers and inflicted minor damage to two armored personnel carriers. Fire was returned with organic weapons, a Night Hawk helicopter, an AC-47 gunship and artillery. A sweep of the battlefield at daybreak uncovered 41 NVA KIA and three prisoners. The enemy also lost four AK-47 rifles and three RPG launchers. Interrogation of the prisoners disclosed that COSVN artillery elements and possibly a force from the 88th NVA Regiment were involved.

The 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, operating in the eastern portion of Tay Ninh Province against elements of Sub-Region 1, made several contacts with enemy forces and located small caches of enemy supplies. Small actions from 11-18 August accounted for nine enemy killed, a 60mm mortar, six AK-47 rifles and two RPG launchers.

Company A (2-22 Mech) conducted a mounted reconnaissance on the southeastern edge of the Boi Loi Woods (XT520337) on 19 August and made heavy contact with a well entrenched element of the 83rd Rear Service Group at 0930 hours. The initial burst of enemy fire killed five Division soldiers and wounded six others. A drop of riot control agent (CS), helicopter gunships, artillery and air strikes were massed on the bunker complex and an assault on the objective area resulted in 25 enemy killed and one PW.

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Enemy activity from 11-17 August in the 2nd Brigade area generally consisted of a higher level of harassment in the form of attacks by fire and booby traps and remained at a moderate level from 18-24 August with action centering in the upper "Citadel" (XT5070) and Trang Bang (XT4519) areas. In the 18-24 August time frame, main force units continued their efforts to avoid contact while proceeding with training and resupply. The numerous attacks by fire, directed against U.S. bases in Cu Chi and Trang Bang Districts, were efforts on the part of the enemy to maintain a show of strength while being relatively inactive. Beginning on 8 August, the 1st Infantry Division had assumed responsibility for most of Phu Hoa District and the Phu Cuong and Ba Bep Bridges (See Overlay 2--Division TAOR 8 August 1969).

The interrogation of a captured aspirant from the Y28 Signal Section of Sub-Region 1 disclosed that food supplies had been particularly scarce in recent weeks because most of the normal supply routes had been blocked. The prisoner stated that Sub-Region 1 units away from food producing areas had been eating barely enough to survive.

Attacks by fire in the 2nd Brigade area struck Cu Chi Base Camp (XT65-15), PB Hunsley (XT595270), PB Dees (XT551224), and the compound of the Combined Reconnaissance/Intelligence Patrol, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, near Trung Lap (XT518256).

In the "Citadel" area, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, on a ground reconnaissance on 11 August, located two caches (XT5224-XT5123) consisting of seven individual weapons, 700 small arms rounds, 46 mortar fuzes, 100 pounds of explosives, 11 RPG rounds and 1500 feet of communications wire. Company A (2-12 Inf) captured four Viet Cong who were members of the Trang Bang Rear Service Group while on a reconnaissance of the same area on 16 August and recovered two AK-47 rifles and two pistols.

A 2-14 Inf sniper team, outposted off Route 7A, eight kilometers northwest of Cu Chi (XT570175) with a regional force element, killed five enemy on 17 August after receiving small arms and 60mm mortar fire. Not far from this contact at 2200 hours, elements of the 2-14 Inf killed four more enemy with small arms. A night combat patrol from Company D (2-14 Inf) located near the vicinity of these two contacts the next night (18 August) engaged 15 enemy (XT565171) with organic weapons, helicopter and AC-47 gunships and artillery, resulting in an additional five enemy killed.

On 21 August, Company C (2-14 Inf) and the Reconnaissance Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, on a mounted reconnaissance four kilometers east of Trang Bang (XT533190) engaged an estimated enemy platoon in a bunker complex hidden in a hedgerow with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and artillery, resulting in 15 NVA KIA and a loss to the enemy of 10 AK-47 rifles and one RPG launcher. Enemy RPG fire struck an armored personnel carrier during the firefight, wounding four Division soldiers.

North of the Ho Bo Woods (XT624304) on 12 August, Company D, 2nd Battalion,

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14th Infantry, conducted a combat assault, secured an LZ for the 1st ARVN Airborne Battalion and searched the area before making contact with an enemy squad at 1120 hours. The resulting firefight was covered by helicopter gunships and five enemy were killed. One AK-47 rifle, an M-16 rifle, an M-2 carbine, two watchtowers, five bunkers and 20 pounds of clothing were destroyed.

Companies A and D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, combat assaulted into the woods near Ben Suc north of the Ho Bo Woods on 13 August where they operated in an abandoned enemy base area. At 1500 hours, Company D engaged seven enemy who were hiding in the vegetation near the base camp (XT553336). The small arms and automatic weapons fire from Company D was so intense that the enemy soldiers were unable to return fire. All seven were killed and Company D retrieved four AK-47 rifles and one cluster bomb unit.

On 16 August, Company A (2-14 Inf), on a ground reconnaissance in the Ho Bo Woods (XT634225) uncovered a cache which contained a 60mm mortar, a light machine gun, an SKS rifle, one Browning Automatic Rifle, 30 pounds of medical supplies, 3000 small arms rounds, 30 60mm mortar charges, 91 60mm mortar rounds, 35 rifle grenades, 60 blasting caps and 20 inner tubes. In the Sa Nho area of the Ho Bo Woods on 21 August (XT585179), a night combat patrol from Company A, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, engaged an unknown number of enemy with mortars and helicopter gunships, killing six enemy.

On 24 August, Company D (2-14 Inf) conducted a combat assault into the Ho Bo Woods in an area where the 1st Quyét Thang Battalion was reported to have been training in sapper tactics (XT640247). The infantrymen engaged an estimated reinforced enemy company with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, artillery and an Air Force fighter plane, resulting in 48 enemy killed and one NVA prisoner-of-war from the 2 Company, 1st Quyét Thang Battalion. The enemy also lost 23 AK-47 rifles, an RPG launcher, some explosives and hand grenades. Heavy enemy small arms and RPG fire killed two Division soldiers, wounded four others and caused minor damage to two UH1H helicopters.

In the 3rd Brigade area from 11-17 August, enemy activity remained at a moderate level with several shelling incidents. Trail activity continued to be observed on traditional lines of communication between Cambodia and the inner areas of Sub-Region 2 with the lower Angel's Wing-An Ninh (XT4013) and Ba Thu (XT2502)-My Hach (XT4502) corridors being most prominent. The D16 Battalion was the only main force unit contacted during the period. The level of activity dropped to a lower pace during 18-24 August as enemy troops confined themselves to reconnaissance and troop movement.

Most of the shellings of 3rd Brigade installations did not result in casualties or damage. In addition to the numerous attacks by fire received by ARVN forces in Duc Hoa and Duc Hue Districts and by the Duc Hue Special Forces camp, enemy gunners fired mortars or rockets at the 3rd Brigade Headquarters at Bao Trai (XT525043), FSB Chamberlain (XS554984), PB Rittgers (XT354145), FSB Jackson (XT423168) and PB Houston (XT440068).

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On 12 August, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, being airlifted into an area four kilometers east of the Cambodian Border near the "Angel's Wing" (XT363147) to establish Patrol Base Rittgers, met immediate resistance upon landing by an estimated reinforced enemy company. The enemy laid down a heavy base of small arms, automatic weapons, RPG and .51 caliber anti-aircraft fire. The close combat on the ground was supported by helicopter gunships, an AC-47 gunship, Cobra gunships, artillery and air strikes. The fighting continued throughout the day and subsided as darkness approached and the enemy broke contact. Sweeps of the area on 12 and 13 August produced 57 enemy killed, 13 AK-47 rifles, 10 RPG launchers, two .30 caliber machine guns, 105 RPG rounds, 2100 small arms rounds, a radio and SOI, a pistol and five pounds of medical supplies. Division losses in the sharply contested encounter were seven killed, 18 wounded, light damage to four UH1H helicopters, moderate damage to two UH1H helicopters and heavy damage to one UH1H helicopter. Documents recovered from the enemy bodies identified the enemy force as an element of the D16 Battalion. An analysis of these documents indicated that the D16 Battalion was preparing to launch operations in the immediate area of contact and the resulting loss in personnel would probably force abortion of the mission. The documents also added credence to the belief that elements of the D16 Battalion were operating in conjunction with the 269 Battalion, Sub-Region 2. Another document indicated that members of the C3 Company, D16 Battalion, had received training in the use of 107mm and 122mm rockets sometime in July.

The civilian populace in several villages near the Vam Co Dong River north of the "Sugar Mill" (XTh513-XTh512) pointed out several booby traps to elements of the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor (-) (OPCON 3rd Brigade) from 18-20 August. This was a new development in that the villagers in this area had not previously displayed pro-GVN sympathies. On 22 August, the 2-34 Armor was returned to the operational control of the 1st Brigade and established its command element at FSB Buell III (XT217535).

In Long An Province, enemy activity was low to moderate from 11-17 August and increased steadily from 18-24 August. In the 11-17 August period, counter-pacification and harassment attacks were the chief enemy activities. Reports indicated that the enemy was active along the infiltration routes leading to Sub-Region 3 from Cambodia. The preponderance of activity from 18-24 August took place in southern Tan Tru and Rach Kien Districts. Activity generally consisted of attacks by fire against prominent targets in the Sub-Region 3 area, including Tan An (XS5464), Tan Tru (XS6861) and Rach Kien (XS7369). There were also several contacts with reconnaissance and terrorist groups operating in the districts. The enemy persisted in his efforts to disrupt pacification and Phoenix activities conducted in the sub-region. The continued apprehension of Sub-Region 6 personnel indicated that the enemy was still determined to strengthen his capability in Saigon. An unusually large number of ralliers and prisoners from Sub-Region 6 were received from 18-24 August. Information gained from these personnel revealed that sapper actions were planned for the 5th, 7th and 8th precincts of Saigon. Documents captured by the U.S. Navy revealed that the allied pacification

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program was seriously disrupting the VC revolutionary movement in Long An Province.

Elements of the 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, engaged an estimated enemy platoon on 14 August seven kilometers southeast of Can Giouc (XS884673) with organic weapons and an air strike. Thirteen enemy were killed in the contact and three individual weapons were located. A prisoner captured in the battle stated that he was a member of the A-1 Protection Squad of Long An Province. He claimed that his mission was to protect an individual named UT who was a province level cadre member and who was killed in the action. It was found that a man named UT was listed in II FFV files as an assistant Chief of Staff, Sub-Region 3.

On 16 August at 0445 hours, Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, flying in an area five kilometers southeast of Ben Luc (XS666733), killed four enemy with automatic weapons fire. This contact was exploited by an airmobile assault consisting of elements of Companies B and D, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, who were airlifted and supported by the 240th Assault Helicopter Company. At 1025 hours, Company B received two Hoi Chanh (XS670738) and captured a prisoner-of-war. Further contact in the area resulted in 11 NVA killed.

On 18 August, this area was again assaulted and several contacts with elements of the K14 Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment, and N-16 and N-19 Battalions of Sub-Region 6 (XS6669). At the end of the day, Company C, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, and Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, had accounted for 19 enemy killed, a prisoner-of-war and a Hoi Chanh. Three kilometers southwest of this action (XS620702), ARVN forces killed 22 enemy who were members of the 1st NVA Regiment.

The major action of the 18-24 August period in Long An Province came on 20 August in actions around Phuoc Lam Village (XS767689) seven kilometers southwest of Can Giouc. A pre-planned airstrike was employed to destroy suspected enemy positions in the area and an aerial bomb damage assessment reported 11 enemy killed. At 1112 hours, Companies B and C, 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, made contact with an estimated reinforced enemy company (XS768689). Company B, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, was inserted by air and Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, flew overhead in support. The enemy returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons, killing one American and wounding two others. Artillery and air strikes were employed to smash the entrenched enemy and the ground elements overran the fortifications. Thirty-five enemy were killed and two of the enemy rallied. One of the Hoi Chanh stated he was a member of the K75 Company, 3rd Artillery Battalion, Sub-Region 3. A prisoner captured on 24 August stated that he was a member of the Dong Phu NVA Battalion and that the Battalion Commander and 2 Company Commanders were killed in the air strikes that preceded this action.

At 1315 hours on 24 August, Team 16, Company E, 75th Infantry (Ranger),

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engaged three enemy in the northwest corner of Long An Province (XS363863) with automatic weapons, killing two of them and capturing a prisoner-of-war and two individual weapons. One of the dead, Hai Tram, was tentatively identified as the Commanding Officer of Sub-Region 3.

During the final week of August, enemy activity dropped to a low level with intelligence sources predicting the occurrence of the second highpoint of the Fall Campaign in the first week of September. There was a continuation of efforts in the sub-regions to indoctrinate enemy personnel in regard to the objectives of the Fall Campaign and to prepare the infrastructure for support of the coming highpoint. The major thrust of the heightened activity was indicated again for Binh Long Province with action in the 25th Infantry Division being confined to attacks by fire, limited ground action and acts of harassment.

In the 1st Brigade area, Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551) received three 107mm rockets on 25 August with no resulting casualties or damage. On 31 August, the base received small arms fire which was followed by a possible reconnaissance/sapper probe of the base's bunkerline on the night of 31 August. Helicopter gunships strafed an estimated enemy squad attempting to pass through the wire obstacles, killing one NVA.

There was only one significant engagement in the Boi Loi Woods during the week where the 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, conducted mounted reconnaissance missions. On 28 August at 1305 hours, Company C met with a well-fortified enemy platoon. Riot control agent (CS), an air strike and artillery were employed to rout the NVA from their bunkers and destroy the complex. No Americans were killed in the firefight but the enemy force, believed to have been an element of Sub-Region 1, lost 15 KIA. A translation of documents captured by the 2-22 Mech earlier in August revealed that the chief of the 268th VC/NVA Regiment's Political Section and the assistant regimental Political Officer had been killed by allied operations in this area.

More documentation was compiled on the deterioration of Sub-Region 1 as an effective political and military entity. The testimony of documents, ralliers and prisoners contributed to the growing body of evidence which pointed to low morale, shortages of food and materiel, losses of large numbers of personnel and attempts to restructure the remnants of Sub-Region 1 forces. One report suggested that the 83rd Rear Service Group, previously a highly effective force of hard-core enemy personnel, may have undergone some degree of reorganization.

In the 2nd Brigade, scattered small contacts were experienced in the "Citadel" and around Trang Bang and Trung Lap.

Considerable troop movement was monitored in Sub-Region 2 with heavy trail activity between the Cambodian Border and the "Sugar Mill". Clandestine enemy activity was increased with the emphasis being placed along the Vam Co Dong River.

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In the only contact of note in the 3rd Brigade area, Team 21, Company F, 75th Infantry (Ranger), engaged 6-8 enemy six kilometers southeast of Hiep Hoa in the "Sugar Mill" (XT474003) with automatic weapons and helicopter fire teams, killing three NVA. Company D, 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, swept this area and destroyed 29 bunkers, four M-79 rounds, a sampan and a hand grenade.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, operating against Sub-Region 3 and Sub-Region 6 forces, continued to uproot scattered groups of enemy during the week. The 3rd Battalion, 7th Infantry, was trucked to Long Binh to rejoin the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and was replaced by the 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry, a 9th Inf Div battalion who had been covering the close-out of Dong Tam.

Company D, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, conducted a combat assault to a location near the Vam Co Dong River south of Ben Luc (XS6371) on 29 August and in a series of contacts killed nine of the enemy and located 24 RPG rounds, 6500 small arms rounds, 34 RPG boosters, 19 107mm rocket motors and two 107mm rocket warheads. That same day, Companies A and C (2-60 Inf) met with enemy resistance in several actions five kilometers south of Tan An (XS5459), with gunships from the 240th Assault Helicopter Company providing overhead cover. In one contact at 1100 hours, the gunships accounted for eight enemy killed and, at 1555 hours, Company A located nine NVA who had been killed by artillery. Fifteen more NVA were killed on 31 August six kilometers north-northwest of Tan Tru (XS5469) by Companies A, C and D, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry in day-long operations.

The month of August closed with a relative decline in the number of mine and booby trap incidents. In the week from 25-31 August, Division elements detonated 22 mines and booby traps, resulting in two soldiers killed and 33 wounded while 77 mines and booby traps were destroyed. The 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, killed a total of 1228 enemy during the month, captured 58 prisoners and accounted for 298 members of the Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure. There was a significant increase in the number of combined operations with ARVN/PF/RF units in the expanding effort to improve their combat efficiency.

The enemy attempted to launch the second highpoint of the Fall Campaign on 5 and 6 September with small, ineffective attacks by fire. The only exception to this pattern was an intense assault against Patrol Base Rittgers in the 3rd Brigade area. At the same time, the Division generated several actions on and around Nui Ba Den mountain and in the Boi Loi Woods.

In the 1st Brigade area during the first week of September, Tay Ninh Base Camp received rocket attacks on 5 and 6 September, resulting in one Division soldier wounded. Patrol Base Bragg (XT343580), FSB Crook (XT055-595), PB Rock Crusher (XT270564) and FSB St. Barbara (XT272683), all were targets for enemy stand-off attacks during this period.

The first engagement with the enemy on the mountain came at 1320 hours

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on 3 September when tankers from Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, sighted a group of enemy evading towards a cave entrance on the southern slope (XT273565). Automatic weapons fire and direct fire from the main guns caught the enemy in the open, killing 18 of them. At 1524 hours the same day, elements of the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor at Patrol Base Rock Crusher again spotted enemy soldiers in this same area (XT270564) and killed three of them with 40mm "Duster" fire. Another sighting (XT289565) at 1600 hours resulted in six more enemy killed as the armor unit engaged the enemy soldiers with 4.2" mortars and 90mm tank guns.

The enemy paid heavily for indiscriminate mortar attacks against the Division's superior mechanized and armored forces operating around the mountain on 5 September. At 0630, 0850 and 1500 hours, an enemy 60mm mortar engaged Patrol Base Rock Crusher from a point east of the base, wounding three U.S. soldiers. The 2-34 Armor returned fire with artillery following the first incident, with undetermined results. The second shelling was answered with helicopter fire teams, riot control agent (CS), and an air strike with a confirmed body count of one NVA KIA. Having moved the mortar position further east, the enemy was met with accurate artillery fire after his third shelling. A sweep of the enemy location produced 17 enemy killed, five AK-47 rifles and the 60mm mortar.

As Company C, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry, approached the mountain from the southwest at 0909 hours, 5 September, on a reconnaissance mission, the enemy dropped in ten 82mm mortar rounds which caused no casualties or damage. Company C turned its tracks to the west in the direction of the enemy's mortar position and, at 0945 hours, engaged an estimated enemy company (XT292563). Company C bombarded the enemy with the full range of the Division's firepower, calling in a drop of riot control agent (CS), mortar and artillery fires, and an air strike. Thirty of the enemy were killed. Enemy small arms fire killed one Division soldier.

In the Boi Loi Woods on 4 September, elements of Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, three tanks from the 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, and a company sized force from the 12th ARVN Airborne Battalion, conducted a reconnaissance of an area (XT519348) which was scarred by bomb craters and densely vegetated. As the lead tank toppled a large tree in its path, the driver of the tank was killed by an RPG round fired from an enemy position no more than 20 meters away. Unable to maneuver through the heavily cratered area, the column pulled back and requested helicopter gunships, riot control agent (CS), artillery and air strikes. Fifteen enemy were killed while the friendly forces suffered another ten Americans and one ARVN soldier wounded. With darkness rapidly approaching, the allied forces deployed and established a night offensive position (XT491356). At 0345 hours (5 September), the position received a heavy volume of small arms, RPG and .51 caliber heavy machine gun fire. Organic weapons and artillery were used to engage the enemy RPG positions and, at first light, a sweep of the area produced eight enemy KIA, three AK-47 rifles and some RPG ammunition. Two Americans were killed and six wounded.

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On 7 September, Company C (2-22 Mech), on a reconnaissance mission in the Boi Loi Woods (XT508349), made contact with an estimated reinforced enemy platoon. The initial burst of enemy RPG and small arms fire wounded six Division soldiers and heavily damaged an armored personnel carrier. Company C engaged the enemy with a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire and then pulled back as artillery was placed on the enemy position. Twenty-six enemy soldiers were killed.

Enemy activity remained at a moderate level during the first week of September in the 2nd Brigade area with a slight increase from 4-6 September in the form of stand-off attacks against U.S. bases in the "Citadel". Sources indicated that Sub-Region 1 units were still plagued with shortages of supplies and replacements, with no relief to be expected in the near future. Having lost the ability to launch full-scale military operations, Sub-Region 1 was now confronted with the rapid advances being made in the area of pacification, and struggled to recoup its deteriorated influence in such traditional Viet Cong strongholds as Cu Chi District. Sub-Region 1 directives tended to reflect this reorientation, stressing security, propagandizing the people against the GVN, reorganization of components and the elimination and screening of GVN sympathizers and personnel.

In the 2nd Brigade area, attacks by fire were received by the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry (XT530193), PB Dees (XT554227), PB Lorence (XT551218) and FSB Pershing (XT518256).

On 1 September, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, on a combat assault four kilometers southeast of Trung Lap (XT632200), captured all seven members of an enemy squad hiding in a bunker. The prisoners, from the 268th Regiment, stated that they were waiting to receive sapper training.

In the Ho Bo Woods northeast of Trung Lap (XT626237) on 7 September, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, sweeping an enemy tunnel complex, located 11 enemy who had been killed by artillery fires.

The 3rd Brigade was the scene of hard fighting centering around Patrol Base Rittgers (XT357147), manned by the 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, where the Division had twice encountered stiff enemy resistance. The base sat astride the An Ninh infiltration corridor. The action was the only major engagement of the week in this area as the remainder of Sub-Region 2 forces, operating in platoon and squad sized elements, managed to avoid a confrontation with Division forces.

The S2, 3rd Brigade, had received intelligence which indicated that the base would receive a ground probe in the first few days of September. The PPS-5 radar gave the first warnings of an impending attack at 0010 hours on 5 September when a group of 15 enemy were detected northeast of the base. At 0223 hours, the base began receiving intense small arms fire and incoming mortar and RPG rounds. Battery A, 2-77 Arty, immediately began firing pre-planned "Killer Junior" around the perimeter. At 0230 hours, the sappers made their first charge and were able to penetrate the outer wire obstacles

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without tripping any of the flares. The 2-77 Arty Executive Officer called for additional artillery support and directed it upon the onrushing enemy. Helicopter gunships and an AC-119 aircraft soon arrived on station.

The main thrust of the attack came from the east-southeast towards the base. The "Killer Junior" fire repulsed the enemy element approaching from the southeast but the enemy regrouped and joined the force on the east. During the attack, two of the base's gun pits took direct hits, one from a mortar round and the other from a satchel charge. Despite damage to a 105mm artillery piece and wounds received by the gun crews, the artillery in the base continued to fire while the additional supporting fires were being adjusted on the estimated reinforced enemy company. When the enemy withdrew, he left behind 17 bodies, a wounded prisoner, five RPG launchers, four AK-47 rifles, an NVA radio, 111 hand grenades and 31 RPG rounds. The enemy harassed the patrol base with sporadic shelling the next day and night. Companies C and D (2-27 Inf) located four enemy KIA on 6 September along with an AK-47 rifle 1.5 kilometers west of PB Rittgers (XT343143). At 1900 hours, an enemy soldier rallied at the base and surrendered his AK-47 rifle.

Two ralliers received on 10 September stated that 150 men from the 269 Battalion had assaulted the base but only 50 were not killed or wounded. The prisoner captured after the battle had also stated he was a member of the 269 Battalion.

Activity in the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division's area of operations was relatively light during the week. Main and local force units persevered in their efforts to disrupt pacification throughout Sub-Region 3. Their primary activities consisted of attacks by fire and the movement of troops and supplies.

On 1 September, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, inserted by air on a combat assault three kilometers east-northeast of Tan Tru (XS6963), made contact with three enemy at 1300 hours, killing two and capturing a prisoner-of-war. Continuing in this area until 1915 hours, Company D killed six more enemy and lost one man wounded to small arms fire. The enemy force was identified as an element of the K4 Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment.

With the widespread reversion to guerrilla and sapper tactics, and the corresponding fragmentation of enemy main force units, the Division initiated programs designed to upgrade the maneuver battalion's intelligence capabilities. The concept of this program was to enable the battalion to gain a capability of generating and reacting immediately to locally acquired intelligence in order to successfully engage small enemy units. This program included a one-day training period to familiarize the Battalion S-2 in effective combat intelligence, proper resources management and specialized collection; the dissemination of a handbook on the subject; an intelligence contact team to assist commanders on request, to identify weaknesses and provide on the spot recommendations, and to analyze available statistical information gained from all intelligence gathering activities; and providing the Battalion S2 with a roster of personnel within his unit who had previous intelligence training or experience.

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The events of the second week of September centered around the death of Ho Chi Minh and the subsequent three-day cease fire on 8-11 September. Enemy activity during the cease fire was restricted to minor, scattered incidents. The lull in enemy action during this period, however, was virtually unprecedented. A slight increase in activity, resembling a "minor" highpoint, was noted in the latter portion of the week just after the cease fire and seemed to be generated more by the death of Ho Chi Minh rather than the result of prior planning. The effects of this action upon the timing of the proposed 23 September highpoint were not determined but any coordinated enemy-initiated attacks seemed unlikely until that date due to the resources which the enemy had expended.

From 11 to 14 September, the enemy renewed attacks by fire against the Division bases north of Tay Ninh City. No casualties or damage resulted from these attacks, most of which failed to reach their targets. Tay Ninh Base Camp received rockets on 11 and 14 September; FSB St. Barbara (XT272-683) on 11, 12 and 13 September and PB Rock Crusher and FSB Washington (XT146-568) on 11 September.

The tempo of activity in the vicinity of Nui Ba Den mountain (XT2858) continued at a steady rate as the 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd Infantry's campaign to eliminate enemy elements there produced another series of successful engagements. The largest of these battles began at 0950 hours on 11 September in an area heavily forested with banana groves at the southeastern foot of the mountain (XT299569) where the 4-23 Mech had previously decimated large enemy units. Company A engaged an estimated enemy battalion who returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons, 60mm and 82mm mortars. Elements of the 7th ARVN Airborne Battalion and Company A fixed the enemy in place while 2669 rounds of artillery from six batteries were directed into the enemy's position. A tactical drop of riot control agent (CS), air strikes, five helicopter fire teams and direct fire from an 8 inch howitzer also supported the ground elements. Smoke was employed as a screening device for fire and maneuver. A sweep of the area when enemy resistance was eliminated produced 47 NVA killed, one NVA prisoner and two AK-47 rifles. Two U.S. soldiers were killed and five Americans and four ARVN soldiers were wounded.

The following day at 1142 hours, Company A again made contact in this location (XT300566) and accounted for five NVA who were killed by artillery fires. On 13 September, Company A combined with the 7th ARVN Airborne Battalion on a reconnaissance into this area (XT289564) and, at 1030 hours, engaged 3-5 well entrenched enemy with organic weapons, riot control agent (CS), helicopter fire teams, artillery and air strikes, resulting in four enemy killed. A sharp engagement followed at 1335 hours. The enemy returned a heavy volume of small arms, automatic weapons and RPG fire and 20 60mm mortar rounds. Helicopter fire teams and artillery again supplemented the unit's organic assets and eight enemy were killed. There were no Division casualties in either contact.

In the Boi Loi Woods on 12 September, Division elements located two weapon caches. The first was uncovered by Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry.

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Troop C was led to the site by a Hoi Chanh (XT513309). The cache consisted of one light machine gun, one Browning Automatic Rifle, four AK-47 rifles, one M-1 rifle, six RPG rounds and six hand grenades. Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, on a ground reconnaissance with the 309th Regional Force Company, found the second and larger cache (XT502357) at 1650 hours. Company B evacuated 53 SKS rifles, 14 AK-47 rifles, two carbines, three RPD light machine guns, two Soviet-made machine guns, one 12.7 caliber machine gun, one 82mm mortar and one 75mm recoilless rifle sight.

Enemy activity was virtually non-existent in the 2nd Brigade area early in the week but a series of small contacts was gained as the week progressed, the majority of which were friendly initiated. There were a number of minor engagements around Division bases in the Trang Bang-Cu Chi areas. Sources indicated that Sub-Region 1 units were curtailing their movement due to the critical shortage of food reported previously, and would most likely remain in relatively secure areas.

A sharp increase in body count was generated from radar initiated contacts in the "Citadel" and Ho Bo Woods due to the improved capabilities of the Division's radar operators who had received technical assistance and training in the previous reporting quarter, and continued emphasis on the imaginative use of radar. Secondly, with extensive land clearing operations, severance of communications-liaison channels and the acute shortage of food and equipment, the enemy was forced to move more frequently during the hours of darkness.

On 10 September, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, working in the Ho Bo Woods (XT628223), destroyed 59 RPG rounds and evacuated three SKS rifles. The location of the cache was provided by a Hoi Chanh.

Company A, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, conducting local patrols and a ground reconnaissance on 11 September in the vicinity of Fire Support Base Pershing (XT555288), located 23 NVA who had been killed by artillery fires initiated by seismic sensor activations.

On 12 September, gunships from Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, and the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, covering operations of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, and the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, on reconnaissance missions in the "Citadel" region, killed a total of 35 enemy in 18 separate contacts. The enemy soldiers, wearing blue, green and brown uniforms, were attempting to evade observation and avoid contact. This area, with a center mass of XT5423, is a known coordination point for VC/NVA forces and the populace is infiltrated with members of the Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure. The first contact was made at 0720 hours with the largest of the firefights resulting in eight enemy killed. There were no U.S. casualties in any of the contacts. No reason has yet been determined for this widespread daylight movement of the enemy who also lost 11 AK-47 rifles in the fighting.

On 13 September, Company C, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, with the 167th Regional Force Company seven kilometers west of Cu Chi (XT546143), engaged 10 enemy at 0910 hours with small arms and automatic weapons, killing

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six NVA, capturing two prisoners-of-war and receiving one Hoi Chanh. That night, Company C, in a night offensive position (XT668145), received a ground probe by two enemy hurling hand grenades, killing two Division soldiers and a Popular Force soldier. One of the NVA soldiers was killed with small arms fire.

At 2300 hours on 14 September, Cu Chi Base Camp (XT6515) engaged two enemy outside the perimeter with a Night Hawk helicopter firing a minigun, resulting in two NVA KIA.

The 3rd Brigade experienced a low rate of enemy activity from 8-14 September. Most of the enemy action in Sub-Region 2 took place around Patrol Base Rittgers (XT3514) which was the target of an attack by fire on 11 September as enemy elements in the area persisted in their attempts to open the An Ninh corridor. There were indications that Sub-Region 2 was diverting its resources to accomplish this goal. On 10 September at 0015 hours, a night offensive position established by Company B, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, four kilometers northwest of the base (XT344186), detected an estimated 20 enemy with radar and engaged them with helicopter fire teams, an AC-47 flareship, four artillery batteries, mortars and an AC-119 gunship which accounted for five NVA KIA. At 1500 hours that day, Company B received two Hoi Chanh and, at 2235 hours, a combat patrol from Company B, captured a prisoner-of-war. The prisoner, who claimed to be a member of the 269 Battalion, stated that this unit was to conduct a coordinated attack against Patrol Base Rittgers along with unidentified anti-aircraft, recoilless rifle and sapper companies. This information was borne out by radar surveillance around the base that night which conformed to the attack plan the prisoner had outlined. The attack was effectively preempted by radar directed artillery.

Political action and harassment were the main forms of enemy activity during the second week of September in the 3rd Brigade, 9th Inf Div, area of operations, with the Bo Bo Canal being used frequently as a Sub-Region 3 supply route. No contact was made with Sub-Region 6 forces.

On 12 September, the Raider Platoon, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry, conducting a combat assault in an area of heavy radar activity five kilometers northwest of Binh Phuoc (XS579568), located 22 NVA from the K6 Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment, who had been killed by small arms and artillery fire.

At 1615 hours on 14 September, Team #21, Company E, 75th Infantry (Ranger), five kilometers south of Tan An (XS529592), killed four enemy with small arms and automatic weapons, destroyed two hand grenades and evacuated a quarter pound of documents.

On 12 September, a program was initiated by the Division for the 10th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN) involving combined training with the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry. The combined operations consisted of an ARVN troop working with a 3-4 Cav troop in a variety of missions to expose the ARVN's to all the operations that the U.S. cavalry troop performs. Concurrent training was also given in special areas, i.e., medical and communications. The troops of the 10th Cavalry Regiment (ARVN) were also given two operations to perform

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on their own with U.S. advisory personnel accompanying them.

On 15 September, Major General Ellis W. Williamson, who had commanded the 25th Infantry Division during one of its most successful periods in the Vietnam conflict, completed his tour of duty, and Major General Harris W. Hollis, former commander of the 9th Infantry Division, assumed command of the Division.

From 15 to 21 September, the major actions in the Division area originated as a result of US/GVN interference with enemy resupply and troop movement and from exploitation of intelligence information. Overt enemy activity remained at a low level with the exception of the emplacement of mines and booby traps, primarily in the "Citadel" region (XT5025). The booby traps were constructed from recovered US/GVN dud ordnance and caused an increase over the previous week in the number of wounded personnel; but the majority of them were detected and destroyed. Documents captured by the 1st Infantry Division east of the Ho Bo Woods (XT658265) revealed that a large number of mines and booby traps were manufactured in villages in Trang Bang and Ben Cat Districts. Some mines were planted in probable allied landing zones. The use of a large number of mines and booby traps in Sub-Region 1 was indicative of the enemy's intentions to revert to small units and guerrilla tactics in order to prevent heavy casualties while maintaining a presence.

Companies C and D, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, patrolling along the Cambodian Border on 21 September, engaged in the only significant action in the 1st Brigade area during the week. Company C conducted an Eagle Float operation with the U.S. Navy along the Vam Co Dong River, and made contact at 1125 hours near Ap Long Phu Hamlet 20 kilometers northwest of Tay Ninh Base Camp (WT979-585) with an estimated 10 enemy. Company C exchanged small arms and automatic weapons fire with the enemy and employed helicopter gunships and artillery in support, killing eight NVA soldiers and destroying a sampan. Two Division soldiers were wounded. Company D was airlifted with a Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) element to an area 15 kilometers southwest of Tay Ninh (XT070401) where they engaged an estimated enemy platoon with organic weapons, helicopter gunships and artillery. The enemy returned fire with small arms, automatic weapons and mortars, but Company D suffered no casualties. Six of the enemy were killed.

The 2nd Brigade had several contacts in enemy base camps in the "Citadel" and Ho Bo Woods. On 15 September, gunships from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company conducted a visual reconnaissance of a deserted hamlet 3.5 kilometers northeast of Trung Lap (XT597227), which was suspected of being heavily infested with members of the Vietnamese Communist Infrastructure, and NVA soldiers. The area around this "hamlet" was seeded with booby traps. Information indicated that the hamlet was used as a center for food procuring activities. As the gunships proceeded to carry out their mission, they received small arms fire from the vicinity of the suspected enemy location and engaged an estimated reinforced enemy platoon with organic weapons, air strikes and artillery. Elements of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, swept the contact site and discovered 38 NVA bodies, 12 AK-47 rifles, 20 bunkers and 17 huts

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destroyed, and evacuated two K54 pistols and some documents.

At 1000 hours that day, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, airlifted into an area eight kilometers north of Trung Lap in the Ho Bo Woods (XP554295) for a reconnaissance operation, evacuated 5300 pounds of rice.

On 16 September, a platoon from Company A, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, and a platoon from the 3 Company, 2-49th ARVN Regiment, departed their night offensive position in the Ho Bo Woods to perform a reconnaissance mission towards the northwest. Fresh trail activity was encountered and at 1208 hours enemy bunkers and a food cache were discovered (XT612245). At 1250 hours, still proceeding to the northwest, the allied element received automatic weapons, small arms and RPG fire from an estimated enemy platoon. After firing the initial volley, the enemy withdrew to the north and were engaged by a Company A machine gun position. Helicopter fire teams were requested and Company A and the 2-49th ARVN's moved to establish a circular defensive perimeter. Artillery and air strikes were soon delivered to destroy the enemy in place. A sweep of the area (XT609247) was then undertaken and met with no resistance. Thirty-six bodies and 15 AK-47 rifles were located.

On 19 September, a contact was developed with elements of the 1st Quyet Thang Battalion only three kilometers northwest of Cu Chi Base Camp (XT6116). Gunships from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, supporting the 2-12 Inf, were returning from the Boi Loi Woods to Cu Chi Base Camp to refuel when they received small arms fire from an estimated two enemy platoons. On an immediate reconnaissance of the area, several NVA soldiers were spotted, attempting to disperse to avoid contact. The gunships engaged these individuals with automatic weapons fire, again receiving small arms fire from the ground. The gunship pilots began noticing several other groups of enemy and called for supporting fires. The gunships were soon joined in the air by the Executive Officer of the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, and the S3, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery, who began directing artillery fires from their light observation helicopters. Fire Support Bases Devin, Patton and Pershing poured 735 rounds in the battle area during the engagement and two tactical air strikes by the USAF were also employed.

While the enemy was being hit with bombs and artillery, Companies A and B, and the Scout Platoon, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, the 132nd Regional Force Company, and elements of the 2-12 Inf were deployed to the contact site. One company (1-5 Mech) established a blocking position to the west while another blocking position was established to the south. Company A and the 132nd Regional Force Company were positioned to the east.

As the offensive fires were lifted, Company A and the RF element began a sweep of the area. The only resistance met by these forces was two NVA soldiers who were hiding in spider holes. The two soldiers refused to surrender, and grenades were dropped into the spider holes, killing them. An AK-47 rifle and an RPG-2 launcher were evacuated from the spider holes.

The sweep was completed at 1845 hours. The enemy lost a total of 23 of

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their soldiers killed, 12 AK-47 rifles, the RPG-2 launcher and a light machine gun.

In addition, two prisoners-of-war were captured within 700 meters of each other. One of the prisoners claimed to be from the 1st Quyet Thang Battalion and stated his platoon was in the area waiting for orders. The second prisoner was an 18-year-old recruit who had been in South Vietnam for only a few days. He was to be a replacement with the 3rd Battalion, 268th NVA Regiment. Immediate field interrogation was made possible by the presence of the Cu Chi District Chief who had joined the task force (1-5 Mech) as it had passed through Cu Chi Sub-Sector.

Due to the swift reaction to the contact, the accurate placement of supporting fires and the concentration of friendly forces around the area, the enemy was defeated without a single allied casualty.

While these battles were taking place, Company A and Company B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, were conducting operations near the Boi Loi Woods in an area known as "The Thumb" (XT5534). The targeted area was developed over a period of two weeks by the 2nd Brigade from interrogation of PW's, document read-outs and visual reconnaissance. The 2-12 Inf operations on 18 and 19 September earned the battalion, and supporting gunships and artillery, an enemy body count of 19 KIA in several scattered actions without any friendly casualties.

At 2150 hours on 19 September, Patrol Base Dees (XT554227) engaged an estimated 10-12 enemy detected by radar (XT547217) with a mortar and artillery, resulting in four NVA KIA. FSB Patton (XT582195) detected 3-4 enemy with radar surveillance at 2110 hours on 20 September and killed two of them with artillery (XT623309). PB Hunsley (XT583275) killed three enemy with artillery at 0019 hours on 21 September (XT583275). At 1905 hours that night, Patrol Base Lorence (XT517218), manned by Company B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, killed two enemy with small arms and automatic weapons.

Company A, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, combat assaulted to an area six kilometers northwest of Trung Lap (XT5323) on 21 September to exploit another target developed from intelligence information. The specific area of the operation was believed to be occupied by the C4 Company, Trang Bang Local Force Battalion, with a strength of 30 men, conducting reconnaissance and sapper training. Caught by surprise with the swift insertion of Company A, the enemy soldiers attempted to run or hide rather than fight. At 1047 hours, Company A killed two enemy with small arms fire and, at 1230 hours, gunships from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, engaged five enemy with automatic weapons, killing another. The ground troops moved to a bushy area nearby where the gunships had spotted the five enemy and conducted a three hour detailed search. As a result of the search, Company A killed an additional six enemy, captured six prisoners and evacuated or destroyed seven AK-47 rifles and two pistols. One of the prisoners stated that when the U.S. troops arrived in the area, the C4 Company Commander and Executive Officer had dropped their weapons and fled. The CO's pistol and company guidon were captured along

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with what appeared to be most of the company's records, including the company roster. There were no Division casualties.

At 2045 hours on the night of 21 September, a combat patrol established by Company A, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, outside of an ARVN "hardspot" (XT619217), occupied by one U.S. Company and a company of the 2-49th ARVN Regiment on a rotating basis, engaged a 10-12 man enemy patrol with organic weapons, helicopter fire teams, a Night Hawk helicopter, an AC-119 gunship and artillery, resulting in four NVA KIA. The enemy returned mortar fire but there were no friendly casualties. It was believed that the enemy patrol was on a rice procuring mission. This "hardspot", however, has impeded enemy movement in the area and it is possible that the enemy was on a mission to harass the outpost.

The 3rd Brigade had no major encounters with the enemy from 15-21 September. Main force units of Sub-Region 2 operated on the east side of the Vam Co Dong River in the "Sugar Mill" area. A large portion of these main force units, however, remained in their Cambodian sanctuaries.

On 18 September, the 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, aerial observer, operating from the Duc Hue CIDG Camp engaged 15 enemy with artillery two kilometers from a portion of the Cambodian Border known as the "Parrot's Beak" (XT313050). The CIDG's swept the contact site and found seven enemy killed and located an AK-47 rifle and three claymore mines.

There was a series of small engagements throughout Long An Province initiated by the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division.

On 15 September, Team #21, Company E, 75th Infantry (Ranger) made contact five kilometers southwest of Tan An (XS529592) in an operation with the U.S. Navy. Four of the enemy were killed. At 1115 hours, the 190th Assault Helicopter Company gunned down four more enemy four kilometers east of Rach Kien (XS783693), while covering the 5-60 Inf on a reconnaissance operation. At 2000 hours, Team #14, Company E, 75th Infantry (Ranger), working along the Bo Bo Canal eight kilometers northwest of Thu Thua (XS499783), killed six enemy with organic weapons and artillery, destroyed one sampan and evacuated two AK-47 rifles and some documents. Also at 2000 hours, a night combat patrol established by Company C, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, five kilometers southeast of Ben Luc (XS635715), engaged 10-12 enemy with organic weapons and artillery, killing 10 NVA, evacuating two AK-47 rifles, one RPG light machine gun and some documents and destroying seven RPG rounds.

On 16 September, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, on a "Bushmaster" operation with the 1-50th ARVN Regiment five kilometers southwest of Tan Tru (XS614590), initiated a firefight with an estimated enemy platoon with helicopter fire teams in support. The 1-50th ARVN's killed nine of the enemy, captured five prisoners-of-war and evacuated four AK-47 rifles, an RPG launcher and a 60mm mortar. Company C killed seven of the enemy and captured two AK-47 rifles and a K54 pistol. Three ARVN soldiers were wounded by enemy small arms fire. Interrogation of the PW's indicated that they were members of the 3rd Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment.

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At 1050 hours six kilometers northwest of Tan Tru (XS623666), the 240th Assault Helicopter Company killed six enemy with automatic weapons fire. Company B, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, inserted five kilometers southwest of Tan Tru (XS635512) at 1455 hours, met with sharp resistance from six enemy. Two Americans were killed and two wounded by automatic weapons fire. Company C eliminated all six of the enemy with small arms fire.

Also on 16 September, Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry, on a "Jitterbug" operation four kilometers east of My Tho (XS574571) killed a total of nine enemy in three contacts in a 40-minute period.

The most significant contact of the week in Long An Province developed on 17 September when Companies A and B, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, engaged 30-40 enemy at 0729 hours while on a ground reconnaissance five kilometers southeast of Ben Luc (XS665735). Helicopter fire teams and artillery reinforced the ground fighting and a sweep of the area resulted in 22 NVA KIA and four prisoners-of-war. The prisoners identified the 4th Battalion, 1st NVA Regiment and included the Battalion's Assistant Political Officer and the 1st Sergeant of the rear service section.

On 18 September, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, on a reconnaissance mission six kilometers southeast of Ben Luc (XS647710), located 12 NVA who had been killed by artillery fires.

During the final week of September, there were some signs to indicate that the enemy was repositioning his elements north of Tay Ninh. A rallier and a CIDG contact at Thien Nhon raised the possibility of a return of the 272nd Regiment, 9th VC/NVA Division, from operations in Binh Long Province for renewed attacks on targets in Tay Ninh Province. In addition, previous reports had suggested a possible resubordination of the 101D Regiment to the 9th VC/NVA Division. The fighting around Thien Nhon (XT082818) was attributed to the 101D Regiment. The testimony of the rallier and the CIDG contact, taken into account with other information, suggested that the 9th VC/NVA Division, now consisting of the 88th, 272nd and 101D Regiments, was being targeted against Tay Ninh Province for a future action period.

In the 1st Brigade area, Tay Ninh Base Camp received four 122mm rockets on 22 September. No casualties or damage resulted from the attack. North of Tay Ninh on 23 September, Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, on a reconnaissance operation with the 547th Regional Force Company, engaged an estimated enemy squad on the northeast side of Mui Ba Den mountain (XT290-590). In addition to the small arms and automatic weapons fire delivered by the tank crews, helicopter fire teams, "Flame Bath", riot control agent (CS), and air strikes were employed to destroy the enemy in place. Eleven enemy were killed and seven AK-47 rifles destroyed. On 29 September at 2103 hours, Patrol Base Buckner (XT132668) engaged 20 enemy who had been detected by radar with mortars and artillery, resulting in seven NVA KIA.

Radar surveillance was used in another role in the Renegade Woods eight kilometers northwest of Go Dau Ha (XT308280) where Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, had a mission of interdicting enemy east-west movement. The

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company established a base area and four night combat patrols but had no contact on the first night. The Company Commander decided that the helicopter air lifts and movement of the 81mm mortar and AN/PPS-4 radar warned the enemy of Company A's location. He decided to shift his positions further east with all movement by foot. On 25 September, the Company Commander gathered Company A in an assembly area northeast of the original base for resupply and orders. Two squads were left as stay behind ambushes. A company base was then established in the new area, manned by a rifle platoon, the command group, an 81mm mortar and a radar operator (AN/PPS-4). Four night combat patrols were established. At 2045 hours, personnel at the company base detected an estimated 60 enemy moving 100 meters southwest of the position. This movement was engaged with small arms and 81mm mortar fire. The enemy returned fire with AK-47 rifles.

Ten minutes later, the radar operator detected groups of 5-6 enemy personnel each at 500 meters south, southwest and southeast of the base. The mortar section leader was located with the radar operator with a plotting board and converted each radar plot to a grid. This information was passed to the forward observer for engagement with artillery. Several targets were engaged, and as the disorganized enemy fled, they met with the combat patrols. A Night Hawk helicopter, also in pursuit of the confused enemy, strafed several targets. A sweep of the target area at dawn uncovered 15 enemy killed and a wounded prisoner of war.

At 1155 hours on 29 September, Company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, waiting to be extracted after a reconnaissance in the Straight Edge Woods (XT143322), observed a five-man reconnaissance element moving into an open area. Fire was held and soon afterward 25 more enemy followed. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, helicopter fire teams, an Air Force Forward Air Controller, "Flame Bath" and artillery. The enemy returned fire with small arms and an RPG launcher as they withdrew. Six enemy bodies were located along with two AK-47 rifles, an RPG launcher, four RPG rounds and two hand grenades.

During the week, there were several instances along the Cambodian Border of U.S. aircraft monitoring beeps on their FM radios, posing the possibility that they were being tracked by enemy radar.

The 2nd Brigade area was an exception to the predominance of light enemy activity. Rear service elements and enemy local force units, especially the Trang Bang Local Force Battalion, moved critically needed supplies to main force units who remained in base areas. Movement around the 2nd Brigade's fire support and patrol bases was moderately heavy. A further indication of Sub-Region 1's predilection for sapper tactics was given by the commanding officer of the C-10 Local Force Company who was captured near Phu Hoa Dong (XT714206) on 16 September. The prisoner revealed that local force personnel were also receiving training in sapper techniques against bridges and infantry. This was the first evidence that this training was being conducted at the local force level.

There were numerous groups of enemy detected by radar surveillance and

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night combat patrols during the week near PB Hunsley (XT596270) in the Ho Bo Woods, ranging from estimated groups of 2-3 personnel to groups of 40-60 personnel. The base engaged these targets with mortars and artillery, resulting in 26 enemy killed. At 0156 hours on 26 September, a night combat patrol from Company B, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, detected several enemy through a night observation device. The enemy movement was also detected by the radar operator at the base who estimated an enemy force of 40-60 personnel. The enemy was engaged with mortars and artillery, resulting in 18 enemy KIA.

Several other bases, also utilizing radar, successfully engaged targets during the week. FSB Devin (XT549175) accounted for 28 enemy known dead; FSB Patton (XT582195) killed 10 enemy; PB Dees (XT554227) killed five enemy on 22 September and PB Lorence (XT517218) killed three enemy on 27 September.

Division snipers presented yet another obstacle in the path of this increased enemy movement. The most significant of such contacts occurred along Highway 1 in actions by snipers from the 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry. At 2115 hours on 22 September, the 1-5 Mech Snipers, positioned five kilometers northwest of Cu Chi (XT585158), killed two enemy with M-14 rifle fire, and, at 2310 hours, still in the same location, the snipers shot four more enemy soldiers. On 23 September, seven kilometers northwest of Cu Chi (XT578161), the 1-5 Mech Snipers engaged 25 enemy with their accurized M-14's, an M-60 machine gun, a Night Hawk helicopter, helicopter fire teams and artillery, resulting in five enemy killed.

On 23 September, a command and control helicopter (2-14 Inf), flying over a small contact in the Ho Bo Woods (XT633261), engaged 10 enemy at 1845 hours with artillery. The artillery set off 22 secondary explosions and destroyed four bunkers. Nine enemy bodies were located.

A night offensive position established in the Ho Bo Woods (XT656262) by Company C, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, and the 10th ARVN Cavalry Regiment on the night of 23 September received an attack from an unknown number of enemy at 0150 hours on 24 September. The enemy fired small arms, automatic weapons, RPG's and mortars at the position, wounding two Division soldiers. The main thrust of the attack was directed at the portion of the perimeter guarded by the 10th ARVN Cavalry Regiment. While the ARVN soldiers engaged the enemy with organic weapons, supporting fires were employed. A search of the area produced 10 enemy KIA, four AK-47 rifles evacuated and 10 hand grenades and three RPG rounds destroyed. The kills and enemy equipment were credited to the 10th ARVN Cav.

That night (24 September), a night combat patrol from Company A, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, departed PB Dees to a position 4.5 kilometers northeast of Trung Lap (XT540228). The movement of the combat patrol was monitored by an AN/PPS-5 radar operated from PB Dees. After a position had been established, the patrol spotted 10 enemy through a "Starlight Scope" and killed three enemy with automatic weapons. Having compromised their position, they proceeded to return to the base, till directed by

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the radar. The radar detected north-south movement in their vicinity, and the patrol stopped, waited and then engaged four enemy who had been trailing them. Two more enemy were killed. The radar operator then guided the patrol back to PB Dees.

Another combat patrol was making contact at about the same time three kilometers northeast of Trung Lap (XT618216). The patrol, set out by Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, was near the site of a contact made on 21 September close to a 2-49 ARVN Regiment "hardspot". The patrol engaged 25 enemy with helicopter fire teams, an AC-47 flareship, and artillery, killing 17 enemy.

On 26 September, a helicopter gunship flying to the front of a ground reconnaissance by elements of Companies A and B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, six kilometers west of Ben Suc in the lower Boi Loi Woods (XT515335) spotted several enemy on the ground and opened fire on them. The estimated reinforced enemy platoon in well-fortified positions then returned fire with small arms and RPG's, killing one American and wounding four others. Companies A and B then called for the "full package", including helicopter fire teams, drops of riot control agent (CS), "Flame Bath", air strikes and artillery. Thirty of the enemy were killed and 10 AK-47 rifles destroyed.

On 27 September, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, and the 132nd Regional Force Company employed a Combat Tracker dog team to pursue an enemy force which had been engaged by the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon at 0510 hours. The allied elements caught the enemy at 1040 hours three kilometers west of Cu Chi (XT590124), engaging them with a helicopter fire team, small arms and automatic weapons. Nine of the enemy were killed and five AK-47 rifles were destroyed.

A command and control helicopter from the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, gunned down five enemy in the open six kilometers north of Trung Lap (XT581-270) at 0235 hours on 28 September near Patrol Base Hunsley.

The 3rd Brigade again experienced minor activity during the week with the enemy avoiding contact by remaining in his Cambodian sanctuary.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, engaged in numerous small contacts throughout Long An Province with all enemy units being identified. The major contact of the week occurred on 26 September three kilometers northwest of Can Duoc (XS746639). Company A, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, on a "Jitterbug" operation, made contact at 1545 hours with an estimated reinforced enemy platoon. Twenty-six enemy were killed in the fire-fight and an AK-47 rifle, an M-16 rifle and a Browning Automatic Rifle were evacuated. Enemy small arms fire wounded two U.S. personnel.

As the month of September ended, it was expected that the enemy would continue to replenish his supplies, reposition his forces and plan for an offensive action sometime in late October. In the 3rd Brigade, 9th Inf Div, area of operations, there were indications that the enemy would attempt to give the impression of a major, active presence.

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The 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, killed 1412 of the enemy during September, accounted for 379 individual weapons, 31 crew served weapons and 12 tons of rice (captured or destroyed). The Chieu Hoi Program in the TAOR received 639 Hoi Chanh, an increase over the previous month, with a sharp rise in Hau Nghia Province. Division soldiers destroyed 542 booby traps and mines while detonating 83, resulting in three U.S. soldiers killed and 136 wounded. In the area of pacification, the Division conducted 2546 broadcast and 4069 leaflet missions and treated 59,393 patients. Combined operations increased to a total of 1684.

As October began, the Division searched out the enemy in a series of small unit actions with the intention of preempting his efforts to rearm and reorganize for the Winter-Spring Campaign and to destroy the remnants of main and local force units which had been dealt serious defeats earlier in 1969. Unlike the staging period prior to the Summer Offensive when enemy documents and information culled from prisoners, ralliers and agents forewarned the Division of the enemy's intentions, little was known at this point of what strategy the enemy might employ or which targets he had selected for attack. The opening of the Winter-Spring Offensive, however, was not considered imminent during the month of October. In this regard, rallier Tran Minh Dao, a former high-ranking officer of Sub-Region 1, in further debriefing, maintained that the VC/NVA would take into consideration the demonstrations planned by U.S. groups opposed to the Vietnam conflict. He also estimated that North Vietnamese political objectives centering on the Paris Peace Talks would be supported by military action.

From 1-7 October, the enemy initiated a harassment campaign comprised of small shelling incidents and acts of terrorism. During the week, the Division destroyed 96 mines and booby traps while detonating 25 which wounded 35 soldiers.

In Tay Ninh Province, the 1st Brigade encountered very little ground action while receiving several attacks by fire. Main forces continued to remain close to the Cambodian Border and north of Tay Ninh City.

On 2 October, three 122mm rockets impacted on the bunkerline at Tay Ninh Base Camp (XT1551), killing one soldier and wounding another from the 1st Air Cavalry Division. FSB St. Barbara (XT272683) received 15 rounds of 82mm mortar fire on 3 October but all the rounds impacted outside the perimeter. On 5 October, a single 122mm rocket wounded two Division soldiers at Tay Ninh Base Camp. The heaviest shelling of the week at Tay Ninh Base Camp came on 6 October when the base received 20 60mm mortar rounds throughout the day. The most damaging attack came at 0205 hours when a UH1H helicopter was destroyed, two UH1H helicopters were heavily damaged and three UH1H helicopters received minor damage.

The only significant ground activity in the 1st Brigade area occurred at the southern base of Nui Ba Den mountain (XT268564) in the early morning hours of 6 October. The Scout Platoon, 4th Battalion (Mechanized), 23rd

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Infantry, engaged an unknown sized enemy force with small arms, automatic weapons, helicopter fire teams and artillery, resulting in 17 NVA killed. Not far from this contact at 0915 hours, the Scout Platoon engaged an estimated 20 enemy in the dense banana groves at the foot of the mountain and accounted for two more enemy bodies.

On 2 October, the 984th Land Clearing Company, 62nd Engineer Battalion (Land Clearing), began operations in the Boi Loi Woods to deny the enemy use of the cover provided by the dense vegetation and to facilitate ease of maneuver for Division units operating there. As previously noted, the Boi Loi Woods have long been a base of operations for Sub-Region 1 forces and a storage area for enemy food supplies and materiel. The 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, was given the mission of providing security for this effort which was scheduled for completion by 27 October 1969.

Sub-Region 1 forces in the 2nd Brigade area shelled most of the U.S. installations in the "Citadel" during the week but the previously heavy movement around the Division's bases decreased. The attacks by fire were believed to have been an exhibition staged by the enemy to show that he still had the potential to carry out attacks within the sub-region. Most of the attacks failed to hit their targets. One attack against FSB Patton (XT582195) on 1 October resulted in two U.S. wounded and another on 7 October against FSB Pershing (XT518256) left nine Division personnel WIA.

No major actions were initiated by the 2nd Brigade's small unit reconnaissance forces but determined pursuit of intelligence targets and exploitation of contacts continued the pressure on the enemy's refitting activities.

On 2 October, Companies A, B, C, D and the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, executed a daring raid of a targeted building complex in Cau Xe (XT5330) and Bau Cum (XT5528) Hamlets in the northern portion of the "Citadel". A rallier to the 2-49 ARVN Regiment in late September had provided the intelligence which led to the operation. The rallier had stated that a group of about 50 Viet Cong operated around these hamlets. Several of them were high-ranking Sub-Region 1 cadre. In addition, many personnel of the Rear Service Element of Sub-Region 1 often spent the night there. The targeted hootches were verified from aerial photographs and by a prisoner from the rallier's unit. An artillery preparation and helicopter gunship fires preceded the assault. Using a cemetery for a release point after their approach march and a Night Hawk helicopter to identify the targets with a Xenon searchlight, the ground elements stormed the objectives and engaged several enemy as they attempted to escape. Caught by surprise, the enemy returned only sporadic and ineffective fire. The only serious friendly casualty resulted from fragments of an exploding RPG round. An extensive, detailed search was undertaken and the friendly elements located 10 enemy killed and captured seven prisoners-of-war, two of which were from the C15 Local Forces Company and another from the 268th NVA Regiment.

Exploitation of another intelligence target on 4 October led to the capture of an Assistant Chief of Staff, Sub-Region 1, in the northern "Citadel" three kilometers east of the Cau Xe action (XT549279). The information was divulged by a detainee being processed by the 2nd Brigade. He claimed

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he knew the location of a Viet Cong tax collector and his two assistants, and would lead a unit to the site. The target was a hedgerow with a hut in the center and several bunkers on the perimeter. The operation was executed by a 4-ship lift of 31 personnel from the Aerorifle Platoon, Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, who surrounded the hedgerow where the enemy personnel were allegedly living. The ground elements swept through the objective and caught Major Phan as he was attempting to escape from a bunker. Another enemy soldier, possibly the major's body guard, was flushed out of hiding with small arms fire. In addition, the operation netted several maps and other papers. During interrogation, Phan, who later rallied, revealed that his special duties were the administration of Rear Service activities within the sub-region. He also described the organization of Sub-Region 1, its operations, identified some of its key personnel and located its headquarters.

On 5 October, the 2nd Brigade conducted a series of heliborne operations in the "Citadel" which resulted in numerous small contacts throughout the day. The 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, was again the principal unit involved. Gunships from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company and Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, provided close air cover and gunned down several enemy flushed out of hiding by the infantrymen. When the day ended, 45 enemy soldiers had been killed and nine prisoners-of-war captured. Two Hoi Chanh rallied to the reconnaissance patrols. The infantrymen also evacuated or destroyed a total of 13 AK-47 rifles, 100 pounds of fresh fish, 1900 pounds of rice, 600 pounds of salt, 30 pounds of medical supplies, 25 pounds of clothing and three pistols.

That night at 2030 hours, a night combat patrol established by Company D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, 1.5 kilometers northeast of Cau Xe (XT531-283), engaged an estimated 20 enemy with small arms, automatic weapons and helicopter gunships, resulting in 15 enemy killed.

In the 3rd Brigade area, there were no significant engagements during the week but there was considerable movement and several ralliers testified that they had guided enemy personnel, primarily from the 2642 Battalion, into the "Sugar Mill" area (XT4605). A series of mines was discovered north of the "Sugar Mill" (XT4212 to XT4413). The mines appeared to have been planted to act as a southern screen for movement through the An Ninh infiltration corridor.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, encountered very little enemy resistance in saturation reconnaissance efforts during the week. A prisoner captured on 2 October northwest of Can Giouc (XS7974) from the 265 Battalion revealed that his unit was to move to the "battlefield" south of Saigon and that it would attack Saigon during the Winter-Spring Offensive.

On 4 October, an Airborne Personnel Detector mission was flown just north of the "Pineapple" five kilometers southeast of Duc Hoa (XS619922) to survey an area where a preplanned troop insertion was targeted. An "A" reading was recorded in the vicinity of XS608920. Troops from Company A, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, received ground fire as they landed to exploit the Airborne Personnel Detector readings. Gunships from Troop B, 3rd Squadron, 17th Air Cavalry, and the 190th Assault Helicopter Company reacted and

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killed 10 NVA. A wounded prisoner-of-war was captured by Company A as they swept the contact site.

Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry, on a ground reconnaissance with National Police on 5 October five kilometers north of Binh Phuoc (XS601587), engaged an estimated ten enemy with small arms at 2150 hours, resulting in four enemy killed. The following night, Company B established a night combat patrol in this same area (XS599585) and at 2215 hours killed five enemy with small arms and automatic weapons.

In the second week of October, the Division continued to force its way into enemy supply channels. Small unit enemy initiated incidents increased by one third over the previous week but none of the enemy attacks proved to be significant. On the night of 11-12 October, heavy movement was monitored by radar surveillance in the "Citadel" east of the "Angel's Wing" and south-east and southwest of the "Sugar Mill". Overall, however, the tempo of enemy activity continued to decline.

Mining incidents increased slightly during the week. On 12 October, FSB Devin (XT549175) engaged three suspected booby trapped areas with mortars, resulting in 22 secondary explosions (XT552195-XT555188-XT558187). Division soldiers destroyed a total of 126 mines and booby traps and detonated 33 which killed one Division soldier and wounded 33 others.

The Division's convoy to Dau Tieng received its first attack since the Winter-Spring Offensive of 1968-1969 but the feeble attempt reflected the enemy's greatly deteriorated capabilities. On 12 October six kilometers southwest of Dau Tieng (XT430450), the convoy received scattered small arms and automatic weapons fire and seven 82mm mortar rounds. The enemy was engaged with organic weapons, helicopter fire teams and an Air Force Forward Air Controller, with undetermined results. There were no casualties or damage.

In the 1st Brigade area, both Tay Ninh Base Camp and FSB St. Barbara (XT278678) were the targets of inaccurate shelling during the week.

On 11 October, an element of Company A, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, securing a repair crew from Company B, 65th Engineer Battalion on TL4 one kilometer northeast of Nui Ba Den (XT284619), received RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy at 1440 hours. Two Americans were killed and three wounded. Company A reacted to the enemy fire with small arms and automatic weapons and received support from helicopter gunships, "Flame Bath" and artillery. Four enemy bodies were located.

At 0940 hours on 13 October, Company A, 4-23 Mech, discovered a cave on the east side of Nui Ba Den (XT297577) which concealed a cache of 4900 small arms rounds, an 82mm mortar base plate w/bipod, 13 RPG rounds, 12 RPG boosters, 50 pounds of rice and small amounts of other munitions. Documents found in the cave contained overlays of the signal installation on Nui Ba Den, Regional and Popular Force outposts in the area and Tay Ninh City. The documents supported other indications that enemy forces in Tay Ninh Province were engaging in reconnaissance activities in that area.

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In the Boi Loi Woods, land clearing operations met with several enemy mines and attacks against night offensive positions. In one incident on 14 October, the 984th Land Clearing Company received RPG fire from an unknown number of enemy at 1420 hours which wounded three engineers (XT514304). Company C, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 22nd Infantry, providing security for the operation, returned fire with undetermined results. At 1510 hours, Company C engaged four enemy with automatic weapons and rockets fired by an Air Force Forward Air Controller, resulting in four NVA KIA.

In the 2nd Brigade area, Major Phan, an assistant chief of staff, Sub-Region 1, in further debriefing, revealed that Sub-Region 1 received 600 replacements in the summer of 1969. Preceding these replacements, COSVN sent a message to Sub-Region 1 stating that the replacements were the last that COSVN would supply and that further replacements would have to be recruited locally.

Further evidence of the effectiveness of Division operations and the deterioration of Sub-Region 1 was provided by Major Phan and documents captured by the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry in early October. Major Phan commented on the varying degrees of dissension between VC and NVA personnel both among officers and enlisted men. The documents revealed that subordinate battalions were submitting false after action reports and pointed out a number of weaknesses, including a lack of determination, poor leadership, lack of discipline during attacks and withdrawals, ineffective raid tactics and inadequate combat support. Emphasis was also placed on the failure of the Regimental leaders to commit their units in US/GVN controlled areas and to conduct sweep operations. In addition, the documents mentioned disagreements between infantry and artillery units. Cadre and personnel at lower levels were charged with ignoring their assigned fire missions. The documents suggested that these personnel, especially VC elements in southern Cu Chi District, might defect.

At 0100 hours on 12 October, a night combat patrol from Company D, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, established in the "Citadel" six kilometers west of Trung Lap (XT527208), killed four enemy with small arms and automatic weapons. At 1630 hours that day, an Air Force Forward Air Controller engaged an unknown number of enemy in the Boi Loi Woods with air strikes resulting in 19 NVA killed (XT528339).

South of the Boi Loi Woods, Troops B and C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, exerted considerable pressure on the enemy during the week. The enemy reacted with an attack on Troop B's night offensive position on the night of 9-10 October. At 0410 hours on 9 October, Troop B had received RPG fire which wounded three cavalrymen (XT502305). That night at 2020 hours, a combat patrol engaged eight enemy with undetermined results (XT518318). Then, at 2340 hours, Troop B killed two enemy outside their position with fire from automatic weapons and the main guns on their "Sheridans". At 0120 hours, another firefight ensued with Troop B engaging the enemy with organic weapons, main gun fire, an AC-47 flareship, helicopter fire teams and an air strike. During the engagement, the enemy fired a 120mm mortar at Troop B's position. One American was killed and another wounded. The following day, a Hoi Chanh who had surrendered to the 2-49 ARVN Regiment led them to a complete 120mm

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mortar, possibly the weapon fired against Troop B.

Troop C located a large ammunition cache in the same general area (XT514307) on 12 October. The cache contained 153 cases (44,450 rounds) of AK-47 rifle ammunition. An enemy soldier was killed not far from the cache at 1500 hours (XT513304). Still apparently attempting to relieve the pressure, the enemy mined Highway 6A, the 3-4 Cav's only route into the Boi Loi Woods, on 14 October. In the early afternoon, Troop B destroyed five mines (XT5227) and later in the day destroyed 10 more mines in a 200-meter stretch of the highway (XT5430). At 1320 hours, Troop C surrounded a tunnel complex (XT508298) in this general area and captured nine enemy soldiers who were recovering from wounds. Seven of the prisoners identified all three battalions of the 268th Regiment and two were local guerillas. Troop C also found a cache at the site which contained 90 82mm mortar rounds, 105 rifle grenades, seven RPG rounds, 14 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, a cooking stove and some medical supplies.

The 3rd Brigade generally met with light resistance during the week but the 267 Battalion made another futile attempt to harass PB Kotrc (previously Patrol Base Rittgers) (XT357147), manned by elements of Company D, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry and "Killer Junior" teams from Battery A, 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery, hoping to facilitate infiltration from the "Angel's Wing" of Cambodia through the An Ninh corridor to Sub-Region I. Early warning of the impending attack was developed following an engagement by a night combat patrol positioned by Company B (2-27 Inf) three kilometers northwest of the base (XT331161) on 12 October. The radar at Company B's night position began monitoring movement not far from the patrol's location. The artillery forward observer at the base notified the patrol of the enemy's presence and decided to "walk" the enemy soldiers into the patrol by engaging them with artillery.

The plan was successful and drove the enemy directly into an M-60 machine gun position. When the enemy ran to within five meters at 2225 hours, the patrol began firing and dropped four enemy soldiers. One prisoner, fatally wounded, was evacuated by a Night Hawk helicopter to Cu Chi Base Camp and, during interrogation, revealed that he was to transport munitions to a hamlet near Patrol Base Kotrc for an attack. Air assets were immediately dispatched to support the base but as they arrived at 0100 hours on 13 October, the base received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire, five RPG rounds, 25 82mm mortar rounds and three 122mm rockets. Fire was returned with organic weapons, helicopter gunships, artillery, an AC-47 flareship and a Night Hawk helicopter.

A sweep at first light produced seven enemy bodies, a wounded prisoner-of-war and a small quantity of abandoned munitions. The prisoner evacuated from the first contact and the prisoner captured near the base both identified the 267 Battalion. The second prisoner was the executive officer of the battalion. There were no Division casualties.

The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, also experienced generally light

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activity from 8-14 October, with no Sub-Region 3 or Sub-Region 6 units being identified in contact. Harassment of the pacification program and political actions continued to be the prominent feature of enemy activity in Long An Province.

On 11 October, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, operating along a canal two kilometers northwest of Tan Tru (XS506643), killed three enemy soldiers at 1015 hours and destroyed a sampan, 17 rifle grenades, 25 blasting caps, 50 small arms rounds and six RPG boosters.

At 2045 hours that evening 4.5 kilometers northwest of Ben Luc on the Vam Co Dong River (XS590789), the Raider Platoon, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, engaged an unknown number of enemy with helicopter gunships, killing nine NVA.

In the Boi Loi Woods and "The Thumb" during the third week of October, the enemy attempted to disrupt the 1st and 2nd Brigade's invasion of his traditional rear areas but his efforts cost him 81 KIA, two prisoners and a Hoi Chanh.

In "The Thumb" at 0010 hours on 15 October, a Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, night combat patrol engaged 12 enemy who had fired RPG rounds into Troop C's night offensive position (XT529308). The enemy crossed the patrol's killing zone (XT517316) and three of them were killed with claymore mines. At 1302 hours northeast of "The Thumb" (XT543347), an airborne personnel detector mission located an enemy base camp and a visual reconnaissance verified the readings. Artillery and air strikes were placed on the fortifications and Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, found 25 enemy bodies in a search of the destroyed bunker complex.

1st Brigade units operating with land clearing efforts in the southern Boi Loi Woods on the night of 16 October received RPG and mortar fire while several night combat patrols made contact nearby. In one action (XT495320), Company A, 4-9 Inf, engaged an estimated 30 enemy at 2145 hours with small arms, automatic weapons, a Night Hawk helicopter and artillery, resulting in nine enemy killed. Two prisoners were captured on 17 October, one outside Company A's (4-9 Inf) night offensive position where three NVA had been killed in an attack that night (XT495320) and one by engineers from the 984th Land Clearing Company (XT509352). Both prisoners were members of the 268th Regiment.

The next night, 17-18 October, a combat patrol from Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, made contact twice. At 1934 hours, Company A accounted for six enemy killed and at 0610 hours called in mortar and artillery on 10 enemy killing four NVA (XT492317).

At 1840 hours on 21 October, Company B, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, engaged 15 enemy with helicopter fire teams, an AC-47 flareship and artillery, and located 12 NVA KIA (XT499324).

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In an action on the northeastern base of Nui Ba Den mountain (XT297-596) on 21 October, Company A, 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor, with the 160th Regional Force Company, engaged an enemy force with fire from their main guns, a helicopter fire team and organic weapons at 2045 hours, resulting in 15 NVA KIA.

In the 2nd Brigade area on 16 October, a visual reconnaissance of an area north of the Ho Bo Woods (XT625294), where an airborne personnel detector recorded Class "A" readings, sighted six enemy in fighting positions and at the entrance of spider holes. The enemy soldiers were engaged with organic weapons and artillery. Company D, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, was inserted at 0950 hours and located seven enemy killed (XT625294). After a day-long search, Company D killed five more enemy at 1745 hours with small arms and evacuated four AK-47 rifles.

On 17 October, the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, covering several 2nd Brigade ground actions in the "Citadel" (XT5025), killed a total of 14 NVA.

In a night raid on 20 October in the upper "Citadel" eight kilometers northwest of Trung Lap, Company B, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, with elements of the 8th ARVN Reconnaissance Company, shot three enemy soldiers at 0137 hours with small arms (XT539282). At 0255 hours, Company B killed 11 NVA with organic weapons and minigun and rocket fire from helicopter fire teams. Two prisoners, one of them a nurse, were captured at 0600 hours (XT523284), identifying the 268th Regiment. At 0645 hours, the 8th ARVN Reconnaissance Company killed six more enemy and apprehended four detainees (XT518290).

In the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division area, a combat patrol established by Company A, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry, along Highway 21 eight kilometers northeast of Binh Phuoc (XS680562), engaged an estimated reinforced enemy platoon at 2000 hours on 17 October with organic weapons, an AC-119 gunship, helicopter gunships and artillery. Returning to this area on 19 October, Company A located 12 enemy bodies.

Near a canal 8.5 kilometers northwest of Tan An (XS467687) at 0630 hours that day, Team #14, Company E, 75th Infantry (Ranger), killed six enemy with small arms and automatic weapons fire. Along the Vam Co Dong River four kilometers northwest of Ben Suc (XS591788) at 2052 hours, the Raider Platoon, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, operating with the U.S. Navy, engaged an estimated 10 enemy with organic weapons, helicopter fire teams and artillery, killing all of them.

At 1745 hours on 21 October, the Raider Platoon and Company D, 5-60 Inf with the 179th Regional Force Company, made contact with an estimated two enemy platoons three kilometers northwest of Can Duoc (XS742642) with small arms, automatic weapons, helicopter fire teams and an AC-119 gunship. Heavy enemy small arms and automatic weapons fire killed one American soldier. A sweep the following day produced 15 NVA KIA.

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As the month drew to a close, intelligence information indicated that the enemy planned a highpoint from mid-November to mid-December 1969, including plans for the celebration of National Resistance Day (19 December), Birth of the NLF/DRV (20 December) and Formation of the NVA (22 December). A secret VC directive captured in the Boi Loi Woods also revealed that desertion had become a serious problem for the 268th Regiment. The document disclosed that every subordinate unit of the regiment had recorded numerous desertions in the recent past which not only resulted in the loss of weapons and equipment, but also affected the combat spirit of the entire regiment.

In the last week of October, the Division developed several contacts with dispersed enemy elements, especially in the 2nd Brigade and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, AQ's. Enemy casualties from 22-31 October constituted 40% of the enemy's losses for October.

Early in the week, action in the 1st Brigade area northwest of Tay Ninh and near Nui Ba Den mountain accounted for 30 enemy killed. On the morning of 22 October at 0810 hours, Company D, 3rd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, located four enemy bodies at the southeastern base of Nui Ba Den (XT295575). At 0850 hours 400 meters north of the bodies, Company B (3-22 Inf) killed five more enemy with organic weapons and helicopter gunship fire. At 1620 hours, another contact was gained in this same area (XT290-568) when Company D (3-22 Inf) engaged 20 enemy with small arms, automatic weapons, a helicopter fire team, an Air Force fighter and artillery, killing seven NVA.

That night, a combat patrol from Company B, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, operating in the Boi Loi Woods (XT519349), engaged an estimated 20 enemy with gunships, artillery and small arms, killing nine NVA. At 0345 hours, another patrol from Company B killed seven more NVA southwest of the initial contact (XT488313).

The 2nd Battalion, 34th Armor at FSB Suell (XT225535) had continued to exploit the civilian information gained through the Volunteer Informant Program (VIP) with considerable success. In a nine-day period, civilians showed the 2-34 Armor the location of 82 105mm rounds, 21 rounds of mortar ammunition, 17 2.75 inch rockets with 10 warheads and 23 rounds of other types of high explosive ordnance.

The heaviest fighting of the week took place in the southern Boi Loi and Ho Bo Woods and in the "Citadel" between the 2nd Brigade and elements of Sub-Region 1.

At 1630 hours on 23 October, Company C, 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, conducting a ground reconnaissance northeast of the Ho Bo Woods (XT642-301), killed ten NVA with small arms, automatic weapons, helicopter gunships and artillery. Company C also captured two prisoners from the 83rd Rear Service Group, four AK-47 rifles, a K54 pistol and five pounds of

documents.

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Helicopter gunships from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company investigating Class "A" readings detected by an Airborne Personnel Detector in the northern Ho Bo Woods on 24 October (XT576304) spotted three enemy at 1240 hours. The enemy soldiers were engaged and an unknown number of enemy soldiers returned fire on the gunships. Five platoons were air assaulted into the area to engage the enemy force (two from A/2-12 Inf, one from B/2-12 Inf, and two from A/2-14 Inf). Troop C, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, was moving along Highway 1 toward Cu Chi Base Camp for a maintenance period when the contact developed. One platoon from Troop C was ordered north along Highway 6A from Trang Bang to join the contact. The "whole package" including five tactical air strikes was called in to support the infantrymen and by dark 47 enemy had been killed. The enemy fired small arms, automatic weapons and RPG's from well fortified locations and killed nine Division soldiers and wounded 12 others. Twelve AK-47 rifles and three RPG launchers were evacuated. The friendly troops established a night offensive position on the battlefield but the enemy did not continue the battle. A PW captured by Company A (2-12 Inf) during the fight identified the 2nd Battalion, 268th Regiment.

On 26 October at 0825 hours, elements of the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry with elements of the 2-49 ARVN Regiment and gunships from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company engaged an unknown number of enemy in the western sector of the Ho Bo Woods (XT651283) with small arms, automatic weapons, helicopter gunships and air strikes resulting in 16 NVA KIA. One prisoner-of-war was captured along with an AK-47 rifle and an M-16. U.S. losses were two wounded. Interrogation of the prisoner identified the B-8 Transportation Company which supplied rice to elements of the 268th Regiment.

Later that day at 1110 hours, Company A, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry, with Company E, 65th Engineer Battalion and the 132nd Regional Force Company, on land clearing operations, engaged an unknown number of enemy four kilometers south of Trung Lap (XT580172) with organic weapons, killing seven enemy soldiers and capturing seven others. Documents identified the C15 Local Force Company and Cu Chi District Forces.

Gunships from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, working with elements of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, engaged and killed nine enemy soldiers in six separate engagements in the northern "Citadel" (XT5127) between 1202 hours and 1641 hours on 30 October.

There was only one significant contact in the 3rd Brigade area in the last week of October. It came on 23 October when Company A, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, engaged an estimated 30 enemy 2.5 kilometers east of the "Angel's Wing" (XT332171) at 0910 hours while on a reconnaissance. "Flame Bath", helicopter fire teams, 1491 rounds of artillery fire from four batteries and nine air strikes supported Company A's small arms and automatic weapons fire. The enemy lost 18 soldiers killed and Company A captured a wounded prisoner and two AK-47 rifles. One Division soldier was killed.

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The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division experienced several firefights in the last week of October.

On 22 October at 1030 hours, elements of Company B, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, uncovered a cache 3.5 kilometers southwest of the "Pine-apple" (XS494790), and evacuated 114 82mm mortar rounds, 14 107mm rockets and 13 rounds of 75mm recoilless rifle ammunition.

Fifteen enemy were killed after being engaged by a night combat patrol of Company B, 2nd Battalion (Mechanized), 47th Infantry at 2200 hours on 23 October three kilometers southeast of Binh Phuoc (XS539541). The patrol called for helicopter gunships and artillery to support their organic weapons fire.

East of Ap Tan Thuan on the east bank of the Vam Co Dong River (XS7465), Company D, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry combat patrols accounted for a total of eleven enemy killed on the night of 26-27 October.

A prisoner captured by a combat patrol from Company B, 6th Battalion, 31st Infantry on 26 October following a light contact which resulted in two NVA killed revealed there was a severe shortage of medical supplies in Sub-Region 3 and many of the wounded had died as a result.

At 1425 hours on 29 October, Company D, 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry, while conducting a "Jitterbug" operation southeast of Tan Thuan engaged an unknown number of enemy (XS704613) with small arms, automatic weapons and helicopter gunships, resulting in 12 enemy killed and one prisoner-of-war. There were no U.S. casualties. An M-1 carbine, one AK-47 rifle and a 9mm pistol were evacuated.

Eight NVA soldiers were killed as a result of a contact with the Raider Platoon, 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry, on the evening of 31 October in southern Dinh Trong Province (XS663682). The Raiders evacuated an AK-47 rifle and destroyed four hand grenades.

During the last week of October, Division troops destroyed 109 mines and booby traps and detonated 26, resulting in 52 wounded and six U.S. soldiers killed, representing an increase over the previous week, with 86 incidents reported in the 2nd Brigade AO. During the entire month, Division soldiers had destroyed 317 booby traps and mines while detonating 78 which killed nine soldiers and wounded 116.

On 26 October, the Division's sniper program exceeded a 100 body count. In the final week of October, 24 enemy were killed as a result of the sniper program which continued to improve as a result of command emphasis.

During October, the 25th Infantry Division, and 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division killed 1207 enemy soldiers, captured 114 prisoners-of-war, and captured or destroyed 275 individual weapons, 19 crew served weapons and 11.85 tons of rice. The Chieu Hoi Program in the Division area received 714 Hoi Chanh, an increase over the previous month. In pacification

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efforts, the Division conducted 3948 broadcast and 8098 leaflet missions and treated 65,135 patients. Combined operations increased to a total of 1808.

The end of the reporting quarter (312400 October 1969) marked the conclusion of Phase III of Operation TOAN THANG and the beginning of Phase IV.

The quarter from 1 August to 31 October 1969 was a period of success for the 25th Infantry Division and the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. Through the aggressive employment of small unit tactics, imaginative use of electronic surveillance, snipers and combat patrols and the swift pursuit of targets developed from intelligence information, every enemy plan was preempted and 3847 of his soldiers killed. Through combined operations, training and close coordination, South Vietnamese soldiers were assisted to undertake a larger role in the defense of their homeland. The pacification program had continued to expand and to strengthen the bonds between the Vietnamese people and their government. The failure of the enemy to launch a significant coordinated offensive during the quarter attested to the success of these programs.

The 1st Brigade had preempted all attempts to initiate an offensive on Tay Ninh City, worn down the enemy units around Nui Ba Den mountain and south-southwest of the city, and invaded his rear areas in the Boi Loi Woods. Of particular significance during the period in the 1st Brigade area was the naval patrol of the Vam Co Dong River. Navy forces operating from Ben Keo (XT2343) and Go Dau Ha (XT382250) effectively restricted enemy infiltration of men and supplies into Tay Ninh from Cambodia.

The 2nd Brigade (and 1st Brigade units operating in the Boi Loi Woods) had contributed greatly to the collapse and destruction of Sub-Region 1 as an effective military and political force. Combat power of Free World forces increased significantly in the 2nd Brigade AO due to the heavier concentration of forces in a smaller area of operations and insertion of the 49th ARVN Regiment at Trung Lap. The increased combat power within the 2nd Brigade coupled with the increase in combined operations limited the enemy's use of his traditional base camp areas in the "Citadel" and Ho Bo Woods. During the period, the VC/NVA were forced repeatedly to disperse which rendered them incapable of conducting coordinated offensive operations. The dispersion of main force units allowed the 2nd Brigade to intensify its efforts against Cu Chi and Trang Bang District local force units and the Viet Cong Infrastructure which resulted in the rapid deterioration of these enemy forces. Additionally, the 2nd Brigade became increasingly adept at developing highly perishable intelligence information, evaluating it at a local level and reacting immediately for maximum exploitation.

The 3rd Brigade had restricted use by Sub-Region 2 of the infiltration corridors leading into their area of operations, blocked movement across the Cambodian Border, and undermined the local force logistic and communications structure which the main force units who remained in Cambodia had

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planned to use as a base to launch attacks. An example of the 3rd Brigade's small unit operations was the neutralization of the Hau Nghia City Company, a local Viet Cong force. Quick reaction to intelligence and coordinated psychological operations directed at individual VC and VC elements completely eliminated the unit as a fighting force.

The small unit tactics of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, accounted for 1201 enemy KIA, effectively disrupted Sub-Region 6's efforts to stage for attacks against Saigon in Long An Province and prevented Sub-Region 3 forces from reinforcing its local infrastructure. The 3/9 Inf also killed or captured many prominent Viet Cong personalities and furthered the pacification program in their area of operations. Sniper teams and combat patrols and operations along canals and rivers prevented the enemy from replacing his losses, resupplying his soldiers and implementing his political objectives.

Prisoner-of-war interrogation and the large number of Hoi Chanh since mid-August clearly indicated the low morale of the enemy. This was due primarily to the relentless pursuit and destruction of enemy units, and enemy inability to resupply his units or to evacuate wounded due to denial operations and population and resource control measures. The enemy had continued to sustain heavy casualties, was driven from many of his "secure" areas and was critically short of food and supplies. Preemption through saturation surveillance, reconnaissance and immediate reaction of massed fires had dealt the Communist insurgency in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces another one-sided defeat.

### B. (C) Personnel:

(1) During the months of August, September and October 1969, the aggregate Division personnel strength averaged 17,811 of 17,626 authorized, or 101%. Enlisted personnel strength for this period averaged 16,468 of 16,329 authorized, or 100.7%, while officer personnel for the period averaged 1,343 of 1,297 authorized, or 103.6%. A sudden drop of some 1574 enlisted men (9.08%) was experienced in August as the result of USARV-directed accelerated DEROS programs to meet reduced strength ceilings. Personnel shortages continue in Infantry Captains and Field Artillery Lieutenants, but the shortage of Infantry Lieutenants was alleviated. There continued to be a shortage of noncommissioned officers in the grades E-6 through E-9 in 11B, 11C, 12B, 17B, 17K, 31G, 63A, 63C, 76Z and 94B MOS.

(2) During the period 1 August through 31 October 1969, the Division had 87 KIA's (12 officers and 75 EM), and 1107 WIA's (85 officers and 1022 EM), excluding OPCON units. There were 18 nonbattle deaths, 27 nonbattle injuries, and no personnel missing in action. Officer gains for the period numbered 482, while administrative losses of officers totalled 443. Enlisted gains were 4867, while administrative losses of EM totalled 4641.

(3) Principal Command and Staff: The identification of principal command and staff personnel of the 25th Infantry Division for the reporting

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period is as follows:

Commanding General	Major General Ellis W. Williamson (1 Aug - 14 Sep)
	Major General Harris W. Hollis (15 Sep - 31 Oct)
Assistant Division Commander (B)	Brigadier General David S. Henderson
Assistant Division Commander (A)	Brigadier General Edwin F. Black (1 Aug - 31 Aug)
	Brigadier General Thomas J. Camp, Jr. (1 Sep - 31 Oct)
Chief of Staff	Colonel Robert L. Fair (1 Aug - 12 Aug)
	Colonel James M. Connell (13 Aug - 31 Oct)
ACofS, G1	LTC Robert W. Hampton
ACofS, G2	LTC Edmund R. Thompson (1 Aug - 14 Sep)
	LTC Paul A. Brinkman (15 Sep - 31 Oct)
ACofS, G3	LTC William J. Cummings (1 Aug - 13 Oct)
	LTC Robert A. Kurek (14 Oct - 31 Oct)
ACofS, G4	LTC John D. Smith
ACofS, G5	LTC Robert B. Carmichael (1 Aug - 26 Sep)
	LTC John R. Randolph (21 Oct - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 1st Brigade	Colonel Charles W. Hayward (1 Aug - 23 Aug)
	Colonel John E. Tyler (24 Aug - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Brigade	Colonel Homer S. Long, Jr. (1 Aug - 3 Oct)

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Commanding Officer, 2nd Brigade (cont)	Colonel Ennis C. Whitehead, Jr. (4 Oct - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 3rd Brigade	Colonel William J. Maddox, Jr.
Commanding Officer, DIVARTY	Colonel Daniel D. Stedham
Commanding Officer, DISCOM	Colonel John L. Kennedy, Jr.
Commanding Officer, 725th Maint Bn	LTC Maxie O. Redic, Jr.
Commanding Officer, 25th S&T Bn	LTC William R. Strong
Commanding Officer, 25th Med Bn	LTC James E. Dill
Commanding Officer, 125th Sig Bn	LTC Bernard F. Matthey, Jr.
Commanding Officer, 65th Engr Bn	LTC Edward C. Gibson
Commanding Officer, 25th Avn Bn	LTC Robert R. Gosney
Commanding Officer, 4th Bn, 9th Inf	LTC John R. Resdolph (1 Aug - 20 Oct)
	LTC Forest S. Rittgers, Jr. (21 Oct - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 14th Inf	LTC Constantine Blastos (1 Aug - 11 Sep)
	LTC Donald O. Crutchley (12 Sep - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 4th Bn (M), 23rd Inf	LTC George E. Taylor (1 Aug - 27 Sep)
	LTC James E. Coggins (28 Sep - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 27th Inf	LTC William L. Martin
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 27th Inf	LTC William E. Ebel (1 Aug - 11 Aug)
	LTC Richard D. Moore (12 Aug - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 1st Bn (M), 5th Inf	LTC Robert A. Kurek (1 Aug - 9 Oct)
	LTC Frederick C. Delisle (10 Oct - 31 Oct)

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Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 12th Inf	LTC John E. Mann (1 Aug - 11 Aug)
	LTC Burton J. Walrath, Jr. (12 Aug - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn (M), 22nd Inf	LTC John C. Eitel (1 Aug - 10 Aug)
	LTC Bruce F. Williams (11 Aug - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf	LTC Jefferson K. Rogers (1 Aug - 6 Oct)
	LTC Warren A. Jones (7 Oct - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 34th Armor	LTC Tommie G. Smith
Commanding Officer, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav	LTC Robert S. McGowan (1 Aug - 3 Aug)
	LTC Joseph R. Paluh (4 Aug - 31 Oct)
Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 8th Arty	LTC Charles A. Crowe
Commanding Officer, 7th Bn, 11th Arty	LTC Carl M. Mott, Jr.
Commanding Officer, 3rd Bn, 13th Arty	LTC Joseph C. Butler
Commanding Officer, 2nd Bn, 77th Arty	LTC Lewis W. Wright
Adjutant General	LTC Edward L. Shirley
Division Chaplain	LTC Charles F. Powers (1 Aug - 7 Sep)
	LTC Gene M. Little (8 Sep - 31 Oct)
Finance Officer	LTC Milton A. Jones
Information Officer	MAJ John C. Fairbank (1 Aug - 31 Aug)
	MAJ Warren J. Field (1 Sep - 31 Oct)

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Inspector General	LTC Bernard F. de Gil, Jr.
Staff Judge Advocate	LTC Fred Bright, Jr.
Provost Marshal	LTC William E. Gregerson
Division Surgeon	LTC Robert L. Reid (1 Aug - 12 Aug)
	LTC Bruce F. LaFollette (13 Aug - 31 Oct)
Division Chemical Officer	CPT Ray W. Bills (1 Aug - 18 Aug)
	MAJ James D. Knipp (19 Aug - 31 Oct)
Headquarters Commandant	MAJ Richard L. Gaffney (1 Aug - 20 Oct)
	MAJ Wilfred W. Hasstedt (21 Oct - 31 Oct)

C. (C) Intelligence:

(1) (C) Summary of enemy activity.

(a) During the first week of August, it became apparent that the Summer Campaign had ended without the anticipated third highpoint. Sources revealed that the planning and reconnaissance for the first autumn action period had begun during the last two weeks in July. Preliminary data regarding the autumn activity pointed to a continuation of the strategy which emerged from the Summer Campaigns using short bursts of offensive action to maintain pressure for political objectives. Binh Long Province was singled out as the main pressure point for the first activity period of the fall, with a secondary effort to be mounted in Tay Ninh Province. The enemy initiated the expected highpoint during the second week of the month (11-17 August) prior to the anticipated date of 19 August by executing a coordinated series of attacks by fire and ground actions throughout South Vietnam. Allied installations in Binh Long Province received the brunt of enemy ground action. Activity in the 25th Infantry Division TAOI generally consisted of widespread attacks by fire and several limited ground confrontations, with the exception of heavy engagements between the ARVN Airborne and 88th NVA Regiment southwest of Tay Ninh City. Activity declined during the last two weeks of the month and sources indicated that the enemy was devoting his efforts to preparing his infrastructure and military forces for renewed activity in September. The COSVN forces withdrew into secure bases in proximity to the Cambodian border in Tay Ninh and Binh Long Provinces, while the sub-regions conducted political indoctrination, established further goals for the fall period of activity, and attempted to improve the capability of their security and

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intelligence nets. Available intelligence at the end of the month indicated that the second highpoint of the fall would likely occur during the first week of September.

(b) During the first week of September, the enemy did attempt to continue his Autumn Campaign with a series of incidents throughout the TAOI. The enemy's emphasis on economy of force prevented this action period from becoming a significant highpoint. Following the death of Ho Chi Minh, a three day NVA cease fire was announced which brought all activity to a standstill for the period of 8-11 September. During this period, the first indications of a potential shift in VC/NVA strategy surfaced. Meetings between cadres from various units occurred throughout the rest of the month and were discussed by PW's and outlined by captured documents. While these sessions were going on, enemy offensive activity decreased and the movement of troops and supplies increased. This movement confirmed the hypothesis that the enemy was entering a period of low activity to permit the implementation of his new plans requiring the repositioning of troops, the reinforcement of units and the conversion of many subregional units to sapper units. SR-1, SR-2, and SR-3 units may all be involved in overall tactical conversion to sapper and special action doctrine. The COSVN forces shifted to the west, ending the month with five regiments in an arc from the Straight Edge Woods to the Fish Hook. Mention of political statements and the greater emphasis on small unit tactics, coupled with the radical shift of COSVN units, may result in a less violent Winter/Spring Campaign than those experienced in the past.

(c) Enemy activity in October was negligible and most contacts were with rear service elements attempting to establish the logistical buildup necessary for the Winter/Spring Campaign. The only significant incident was the 18 October sapper attack on the RF outpost vic XS666628. This was the first indication of the shift to special action/sapper doctrine in SR-3. The shift is indicative of the overall change in COSVN policy and strengthens suspicions that large scale ground assaults will no longer represent the main thrust of COSVN offensive efforts. Activity initiated by the VC/NVA dropped to an almost negligible level by the third week of October and almost ceased the last week. COSVN forces were withdrawn and thought to be engaged in an extensive reorganizational phase, moving and resubordinating regiments, and possibly centering COSVN's threat in III Corps along the northern boundary of Tay Ninh Province.

(2) (c) During the quarter, the Source-Liaison/VCI Team of the CI section initiated or participated in 14 combat operations through targets developed utilizing Hoi Chanhs and Kit Carson Scouts. As a result of these operations 41 Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers were killed in action and 34 prisoners were captured, of which five were VCI ranging from hamlet to province level. - One raid resulted in the capture of an NVA Major, the Assistant Chief of Staff of Sub-Region 1. Nine individual and one crew-served weapons were captured or destroyed and 19 pounds of medical supplies were confiscated. The team employed a new method of insuring the most effective timing of its raid operations. An agent in the target area is given

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a small easily hidden transmitter. When the targeted individuals have gathered in the area the agent turns on the transmitter. Use of this technique initiated a raid which was executed 30 minutes after the signal was received at Cu Chi Base Camp. Throughout this period, notable operations were:

Cau Xe Operations	1 October 1969
The Muoi That Operation	26 September 1969
268 Regimental Supply Route	14 October 1969
Cau Xe II Operation	22 October 1969
Duc Hoa Operation	27 October 1969

(3) (C) The Interrogation, Prisoner of War Section, 25th MID processed 693 detainees during the quarter. This included 142 VCG/VC/NVA PW's, 1 VCI-PW, 51 Returnees, 140 VCSCD, 107 Civil Defendants, and 252 Innocent Civilians.

(a) Debriefing of a Hoi Chanh, the former assistant Chief of Staff of Sub-Region I, revealed the location of the Staff Office Section of Sub-Region I. The target was in 1st Division TAOR and the division was informed. On 12 October 69, elements of the 1st Division conducted an operation against this target which resulted in the destruction of the base camp.

(b) Questioning of a rallier resulted in an operation on 29 October in which the Hoi Chanh led elements of the 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division to a large rice cache in Trang Co. The cache contained 4800 pounds of rice.

(4) (C) The G2 Air Section produced an increased number of area studies for brigades and battalions. The increase is undoubtedly the result of recent Intelligence Seminars conducted by the G-2 which made S-2's aware of available products. The Imagery Interpretation Section completed training of selected interpreters in aerial photo reading. This has made the debriefing of PW's and Hoi Chanhs simpler and more effective. A detailed interpretation of choke points along the road between Duc Hoa and Ben Luc was commenced. The completed study will describe the condition of the roadbed and detail bridge and crater interdictions to aid planning and measure progress of the rebuilding effort. The study will consist of a strip mosaic (annotated), hand held photos and an overlay at 1:25,000 scale of all choke points, bridges and culverts. A summary of G2 Air Activity is shown below:

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
AREA STUDIES	25	23	23	71

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	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
MOAICS	23	34	37	94
READOUTS	40	47	55	142
ARMY PHOTO MISSIONS	53	52	69	174
AIR FORCE PHOTO MISSIONS RECEIVED	10	17	8	35

(5) (C) The Target Information Center (TIC) was placed under the control of the G2 Operations section in August. The move placed the TIC in the midst of the Division Tactical Operation Center where it is able to receive current information directly. At the same time it became more accessible to tactical planners. As the reliance on intelligence targets increased, the TIC concept was spread to the brigades and battalions of the division. During the quarter, the TIC developed targets resulting in 24 enemy killed, 2 PW's, 11 AK-47's captured or destroyed and 800 lbs of rice captured. In late October the TIC combined data from Red Haze, agent reports, and imagery interpretation to point out the sudden increase in enemy use of the Bo Bo Canal in Long An Province.

(6) (C) Sensor devices continue to be successfully employed in the 25th Infantry Division TAOR in both a target acquisitions and intelligence role, monitoring enemy LOC's, base areas and routes of infiltration.

(a) Decentralization of the Duffel Bag Program has contributed significantly to the overall success of the program, with individual unit commanders maintaining an active interest in the planning and engagement of sensor fields. On 14 Oct, the 25th Inf Div assumed overall staff supervision of the 3rd Brigade, 9th Inf Div's Duffel Bag Program.

(b) During the reporting period, 2,058 targets were acquired through Duffel Bag Operations, 1,825 of which were engaged with 55,311 rounds of artillery. Operations have been credited with the elimination of 335 enemy KIA (BC) and numerous enemy weapons and equipment captured or destroyed. Significant Duffel Bag activities for the period are as follows:

1. On 5 Sep, heavy activations in sensor fields SE of Nui Ba Den were instrumental in troop insertion resulting in 30 NVA KIA (BC).

2. On 11 Sep, A/2-12 Inf vic XT5528 located 23 VC/NVA (BC) killed by Arty initiated by Duffel Bag activations.

3. On 11 Sep, A/4-23 Inf reacting to heavy Duffel Bag activations SE of Nui Ba Den eliminated 47 NVA KIA (BC). Also captured were 1 PW and 2 AK-47 rifles.

4. On 17 Sep, during a ground sweep of a sensor field in the Citadel vic XT5322, 2-12 Inf located 8 NVA KIA (BC) killed by Arty

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initiated by Duffel Bag activations. Troops also located an enemy hospital and numerous documents and equipment.

5. On 13 Oct, D/2-27 Inf at PB Kotre (formerly PB Rittgers) engaged an estimated enemy company, resulting in 7 NVA KIA (BC) after receiving initial indications of enemy movement by Duffel Bag activations in the area. Later Duffel Bag devices utilized in perimeter defense detected enemy personnel attempting to breach the wire.

6. On 24 Oct 69, A/2-14 Inf, and A and B/2-12 Inf vic XT5730 eliminated 47 NVA KIA (BC). Heavy sensor activity in the Duffel Bag field vic the Mushroom was one intelligence indicator leading to ground operations in the area.

(c) During the latter part of the reporting period the division received the Battle Area Surveillance System (BASS) for test and evaluation. This system extends the range and operational flexibility of the local monitoring sites and in addition, provides for selective monitoring over a wide area by higher headquarters. The evaluation is being conducted in 5 phases, with the final evaluation phase anticipated to be completed in 60-90 days.

### D. (C) Operations.

(1) The G3 Section developed plans and executed operations to preempt VC/NVA operations and to destroy VC/NVA forces. DTOC Forward was closed 31 July 69.

(2) Doctrine, organization and training were coordinated by G3 DOT. All schools operated during the previous quarter remained in operation. Refresher training was initiated for the ARVN 10th Cavalry Regiment. Training of US personnel has emphasized airmobile operations, small unit patrolling and ambushes, and day and night marksmanship techniques. G3 DOT continued to coordinate evaluation of research and development projects. Fifty-one projects were in process during the period. Fourteen evaluations were completed. Significant projects include the XM191 Multishot Flame Weapon, Foliage Penetration Radar, and the Night Hawk system. In a reorganization of G3 (DOT) a reports and evaluations section was created. This was divided into two sections; current statistics and computer analysis. The computer analysis section has continued with development of computer programs to provide evaluations of statistical data for use by commanders and their staffs. During this period the following units were reorganized: all Infantry, mechanized infantry, 105mm artillery battalions, the cavalry squadron, the support, maintenance and medical battalions, and the administration company. The provisional unit securing the signal facility on Nui Ba Den was also reorganized.

(3) The G3 Plans Section coordinated all friendly operations conducted in the 25th Division TAQI. The section coordinated areas of operations with the 5th ARVN Division, 25th ARVN Division, and adjacent US

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Divisions. It also coordinated combined operations and provided planning guidance and mission assignments to maneuver units of the Division and the OPCON 3rd Bde, 9th Infantry Division. The maintenance of all G3 maps in the TOC and the preparations of all charts/art work used in numerous briefings were accomplished by the section.

(4) The G3 Air Section coordinated the Division tactical air support and B-52 strikes. The USAF TACP assigned to support the Division was responsible for controlling tactical airstrikes, visual reconnaissance, assisting the development of B-52 targets and B-52 target bomb damage assessment. There were 2803 tactical air sorties flown in support of the Division. The air strikes were in support of troops in contact, landing zone preps, prestrikes and harassing and interdiction strikes, bomb damage assessment was:

Killed By Air (Body Count)	386
Killed By Air (Possible)	109
Bunkers destroyed	4,400
Structures destroyed	337
Secondary Fires	17
Secondary Explosions	167

During this period there were 7 B-52 strikes in support of Division operations. Bomb damage assessment was:

Bunkers destroyed	170
Trench destroyed	400 meters
Secondary explosions	6
Tunnels destroyed	10
Fighting positions destroyed	35

(5) The Division Chemical Section and the 9th Chemical Detachment continued to support Division operations by employment of persistent and non-persistent riot control agents and by conduct of airborne personnel detector and defoliation missions. During the reporting period a total of 722 E-158 CS canister clusters or cluster equivalents were dropped in flushing operations and in support of troops in contact. A total of 106,680 lbs of micropulverized CS powder was dropped from CH-47 aircraft to restrict known or suspected enemy infiltration and supply routes. A total of 5885 gallons of defoliant and 52,030 gallons of diesel fuel were sprayed around base camp/fire support base perimeters and on approved defoliation projects

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in the Division TAOI. During the reporting period airborne personnel detector missions accrued 170 hours of flying time. On 2 October a change in operating procedure for the personnel detector was instituted permitting more positive exploitation of personnel detector readings. This method has proven successful, with reactions to readings during the last 30 days of the reporting period resulting in 67 VC/NVA killed, 6 persons apprehended and 10 weapons captured. During this period the Chemical Section and 9th Chemical Detachment began participation in the evaluation of the XM191 Multishot Flamethrower, and continued participation in the evaluation of both the Personnel Marking and Identification System and Retroreflector program.

(6) The Fire Support Element worked under the general staff supervision of the ACoS, G3. The FSE coordinated the fire support for the maneuver elements of the Division and supervised the Artillery Warning Control Centers. Each maneuver brigade was provided direct support by a light artillery battalion. Although there were some attachments and detachments, normally support was provided as follows:

<u>BRIGADES</u>	<u>DS BATTALIONS</u>
1st Brigade	7th Bn, 11th Artillery
2nd Brigade	1st Bn, 8th Artillery
3rd Brigade	2nd Bn, 77th Artillery

The 3rd Bn, 13th Artillery (155/8") provided general support for the Division. Expenditures of artillery ammunition by the Division Artillery were:

<u>CALIBER</u>	<u>AUGUST</u>	<u>SEPTEMBER</u>	<u>OCTOBER</u>
105mm			
total rds	103,619	109,380	108,858
rd/tube/day	61.9	63.8	65.0
155mm			
total rds	22,760	21,695	33,037
rd/tube/day	40.8	40.2	39.5
8"			
total rds	2,591	2,356	2,473
rd/tube/day	20.3	19.6	19.9

(7) Army Aviation:

(a) During the period of 1 August to 31 October 1969 the Army Aviation Element was responsible for aviation support for the Division and was under the direct staff supervision of the Division G3. During

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the period 1 August to 31 October 69, the Army combat aviation support was provided to the 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Bde, 9th Infantry Division by organic and nonorganic aviation units. Organic aviation units providing support include the 25th Aviation Battalion, D Troop, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Bde aviation sections, Division Artillery aviation section, E Company, 725th Maint Bn, and the aviation section, 3rd Bde, 9th Infantry Division. Non-organic air support was furnished to the 25th Infantry Division by units of the 12th Combat Aviation Group, Assault Helicopter companies and CH-47 aircraft were provided primarily by the 269th Combat Aviation Battalion whose units include the 116th Assault Helicopter Co, 187th Assault Helicopter Co, and the 242nd Assault Support Helicopter Co. Additional non-organic air support was provided the 3rd Bde, 9th Infantry Division from the 240th Assault Helicopter Co, 222nd Combat Aviation Battalion and the 190th Assault Helicopter Co, 145th Combat Aviation Bn.

(b) During the stated period the 12th Combat Aviation Group flew the following support for the 25th Infantry Division and 3rd Bde, 9th Infantry Division: 281,054 passengers airlifted, 103,871 sorties flown, and 15,124 tons of cargo airlifted. Additional non-organic air support was provided to the 25th Infantry Division from 1 August to 15 October 1969, by A Co, 229th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1st Cav Division (AM). Aerial surveillance and reconnaissance missions were flown through the TAOI by B Troop, 3rd Sqdn, 17th Cavalry of the 12th Combat Aviation Group, the 73rd Surveillance Airplane Company (Mohawk) and the 74th and 184th Reconnaissance Airplane Companies (Bird Dog). Primary aero-medical evacuation was provided to the Division by the 159th Medical Company.

(c) During the quarter, the 25th Aviation Battalion continued to support the Division in Operation Toan Thang III. On 26 September 1969, Troop D, 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry became OFCON to the 25th Aviation Battalion. Due to the increased requirement of mission support hours flown in support of the 25th Infantry Division during this reporting quarter, the following flying hour program by type and model of aircraft was established:

OH-6A	115 hours per aircraft per month
UH-1C	105 hours per aircraft per month
UH-1H	105 hours per aircraft per month
AH-1G	100 hours per aircraft per month

(d) Normal daily aircraft requirements include 7 UH-1H's for command and control, 1 standby command and control, 1 for administrative courier, 3 for general support, 2 for standby, and 1 UH-1H for general support. In addition 3 OH-6A LOH aircraft were provided daily for command and control and general support missions. Two light fire teams consisting of AH-1G "Cobra" or UH-1C aircraft were on continuous 24 hours alert in support of contact missions, while additional gunships were provided for escort and cover type missions. Two U6-A aircraft were utilized for administrative courier, general support missions and maintenance part runs. Beyond normal daily support missions airmobile operations were conducted including movement of ready reaction forces, and the insertions and extractions of

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Division maneuver elements. Many pre-planned and hasty airmobile operations were conducted which normally required 5 UH-1H lift ships, 1 command and control ship, 1 light fire team and 1 UH-1H smoke screening ship. The capability to conduct and support night operations was continued. Night missions included 1 UH-1H for flare drops in support of ground units, and recurring night light fire team scrambles, countermortar missions, command and control and general support missions. The "Night Hawk" program continued, however the 6 "Night Hawk" aircraft were reduced to 3 "Night Hawk" and 1 "Night Squawk" aircraft (psychological speaker equipped aircraft). These aircraft now also carry 13 flares in a quickly jettisonable barrel on the right side of the aircraft to increase the Battalion's "Night Hawk" support capability. The left side mounts the 7.62mm mini-gun, the Xenon searchlight and the TVS-4 night observation device. Special missions for the Battalion consisted of chemical drops, psychological operations, personnel detectors, defoliation, search and rescue, emergency resupply, emergency aeromedical evacuations, smoke screening, aerial delivery of flammables and ranger insertions and extractions.

(e) Statistical Summary of Combat Performance Data  
(1 Aug to 31 Oct 69)

	August	Sep	Oct	Total
Flight Hours	4600	4320	4425	13345
Sorties	6000	7040	7361	20401
Passengers Carried	6043	6992	6959	19994
Cargo Carried (Tons)	256	268	363	887
Enemy Killed (BC)	19	47	38	104
Enemy Killed (Poss)	19	36	61	116
Enemy Structures (Dest)	14	16	101	131
Enemy Structures (Dam)	2	3	18	23
Enemy Sampans (Dest)	6	0	3	9
Enemy Sampans (Dam)	2	4	1	7
Aircraft Hits	15	5	4	24

(f) A significant change in the operational concept of the Division's air assets was affected during this quarter. It was desired to initiate a light war concept within the Division by which small sized troop elements would be continually deployed on successive limited area sweeps. To accomplish this, aviation assets were organized to provide each of the three brigades of the Division an air cavalry package and an assault helicopter company packaged on a daily basis. The air cavalry package would consist of 2 UH-1H lift ships operating with a light scout team consisting of 1 OH-6A LOH and 1 AH-1G "Cobra". The Assault Helicopter company would be reduced to five UH-1H lift ships and a light fire team consisting of 2 AH-1G or UH-1C gunships. The 187th AHC which habitually supported the 1st Bde would provide both the air cav package and the assault helicopter company to the 1st Bde. The 14 aeroriflemen would come from the 1st Bde's assets. Included in this total would be 1 Kit Carson Scout and an infantry 1LT with combat experience. The 116th AHC would provide the assault helicopter company package to the 2nd and 3rd Bde. They would be augmented

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with a light fire team from the 25th Avn Bn. Troop D, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav would provide the two air cavalry packages to the 2nd and 3rd Bde. These mini-cav packages are on strip alert from 0700 hours to 1800 hours daily to react to intelligence targets, light scout team sightings, provide security for downed aircraft, establish blocking forces for larger sweep elements and to raid targets of opportunity. D Troop in addition provides 6 visual reconnaissance teams consisting of 1 OH-6A LOH and 1 AH-1G "Cobra" on the basis of 2 to each of the 3 brigades. One team from the 2nd Bde and 1 VR team from the 3rd Bde become part of the air cavalry packages during the insertion, sweep and the extraction. When available the CO, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav is provided an OH-6A LOH command and control aircraft and a UH-1H resupply aircraft. The night missions of the troop consist of 1 light fire team consisting of 2 AH-1G "Cobra" aircraft and 2 UH-1H aircraft on strip alert for night ranger extractions.

(g) Statistical summary of combat performance data for D Troop, 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cavalry: (26 Sep to 31 Oct 69)

	Sep	Oct	Total
Flight Hours	439	2434	2873
Sorties	713	4761	5474
Passengers Carried	465	2426	2891
Cargo Carried (Tons)	2	62	64
Enemy Killed (BC)	10	46	56
Enemy Killed (Poss)	0	0	0
Enemy Structures (Dest)	6	40	46
Enemy Structures (Dam)	1	15	16
Enemy Sampans (Dest)	8	4	12
Enemy Sampans (Dam)	1	0	1
Number of Detainees	0	8	8
Number of PW's	0	11	11

(h) The Battalion experienced 5 major accidents during the reporting quarter. The accidents were caused by: over reaction on the controls by the pilot (2), main rotor blade strike, engine failure, and a tail rotor strike with another aircraft. During the same period the Battalion had 4 aircraft incidents. The Battalion lost 1 aircraft to enemy ground fire.

(9) Engineer Operations:

(a) During the period 1 August to 31 October, the 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Infantry Division provided combat engineer support to the Division. In addition to the normal combat support, the 65th Engineer Battalion continued Land Clearing operations with the use of assigned dozers and anchor chains. A total of 4,936 acres of hedgerows and light jungle were cleared during this period. In addition, the 65th Engineers emplaced a total of 24 fixed span bridges throughout the Division area to overcome trafficability problems incurred by the rainy season.

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(b) During this reporting period Company A provided direct combat support to the 1st Brigade in Tay Ninh. Daily minesweep of the MSR's in the 1st Brigade area of operations coupled with combat engineer demolition team in support of the 1st Brigade's Battalions were an extremely important part of the combat engineer support provided.

1. The fire support bases in the Brigade area of operation required continuous maintenance. This included upgrading the access roads to Fire Support Bases Rawlins, Crook, Buell, Stoneman, Wood III, St. Barbara and Hunter. Other work included the upgrading of interior roads at Rawlins, Crook and Buell and filling of pot holes with rock. Work at Fire Support Bases Crook and Buell included rehabilitation of the berm. Numerous sumps were dug at Wood III.

2. Other work included the construction of two (2) boat ramps on the river at FSB Crook, rehabilitation of the mess hall and construction of a 330 foot chain link and concertina wire fence at FSB Buell, dismantling of two (2) gun pads at FSB Stuart and reassembling them at FSB Stoneman, and construction of 110 meters of corduroy road and installation of 200 feet of assault treadway at FSB Sedgwick.

3. Company A constructed three (3) new patrol bases. Work included pushing up a berm and clearing fields of fire at Patrol Base Harsard in early July and Patrol Bases Bragg and Crocker in September.

4. Company A continued to upgrade and repair roads throughout the 1st Brigade area of operations during this quarter. In late July and early August TL13 from FSB Washington to FSB Crook was upgraded with use of rock, laterite and sections of corduroy. Since mid-August grading, filling holes, culvert maintenance and draining of LTL 26 has been in progress. Company A also graded and repaired Highway 239 from FSB Hunter to Dau Tieng as well as repair work on TL 4. Upgrading of QL 22 from Tay Ninh Base Camp to FSB Washington with rock and laterite was started in late September.

5. Miscellaneous projects included the construction of four (4) helicopter pads in the 1st Brigade area of operations, the clearing and burning of rubber tree stumps along the Big Rubber Road and the clearing of fields of fire on Nui Ba Den which has continued throughout the quarter and is now 77% complete. Explosives are being used to clear around the signal installation on top of the mountain.

6. In addition, with the assistance of Company B, Company A constructed a combined fire support center at Tay Ninh East which was completed on 21 October 1969. The bunker type facility was started on 14 September 1969, and will be used by US Artillery, Air Force, and Navy as well as ARVN Artillery and Air Force.

(c) During this reporting period, Company B was involved in a variety of tasks while furnishing general support to the 25th Infantry

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Division. Company B also provided direct support in the form of sweep and demolition teams to the 3-4 Cav and 2-34 Armor.

1. During August, Company B was busy upgrading TL 253 and constructing three (3) turn-arounds on the Big Rubber Road. Other maintenance included installing a 36" X 38" culvert at CP 117. Since October, Company B has been upgrading LTL 19, LTL 26, Route 239 and the Big Rubber Road. Without Company B's effort on LTL 19, the road would have become impassable in early October due to the heavy traffic from the Rome Plow unit clearing in that area.

2. Company B also constructed a new access road into FSB Hampton, in addition to constructing and placing a 20' observation tower at FSB Buell for the 2-34 Armor.

3. Work was completed on the Waikiki East stand down area. In addition Company B has been rehabilitating the 65th Engineer Battalion swimming pool.

4. One platoon from Company B was OPCON to Company A from early September until late October for construction of a combined fire support control center in the ARVN compound at Tay Ninh East. This bunker was completed on 21 October 1969.

(d) During the entire reporting period, Company C continued to provide direct support to the 2nd Brigade. This combat support consisted of minesweep teams on the MSR's and roads leading to the 2nd Brigade's maneuver battalions.

1. Company C maintained Fire Support Bases Pershing, Patton II, and Devin in the 2nd Brigade area of operations. Heavy rain necessitated constant upgrading of the interior roads and improvement of drainage.

2. Company C also performed extensive and continuous road maintenance on TL 6A North, TL 7A North, and TL 7A South. Work included grading, filling and shaping of roadways, installation and maintenance of culverts, corduroy construction and surface treatment with peneprime.

3. Company C closed Patrol Base Dragon and built Patrol Bases Dees and Venice East. Three radar and observation towers were constructed for use by the infantry. Two SEA huts were erected at fire support bases.

4. In addition to normal engineering activities, Company C assisted the ARVN's with combat support and performed numerous civic action projects in the "Citadel".

5. The 25th Infantry Division Sniper School was rehabilitated by Company C to include the construction of a firing range.

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(e) During this reporting period Company D continued to provide direct support to the 3rd Brigade with minesweep and demolition teams.

1. The repair and upgrading of the roads in the 3rd Brigade area of operations was a continuous operation. Company D had a particularly important and difficult mission keeping these roads open due to the heavy rains in their area of operations. The primary roads included 7A South, 8A South and TL 10. 8A South is of particular importance because of the traffic which moves on it to resupply Fire Support Bases Chamberlain, Houston and Jackson. At present Company D is upgrading 7A South north of TL 10.

2. Company D also continued to maintain the fire support bases in the 3rd Brigade area of operations. AT FSB Chamberlain, Company D constructed both an access and interior road. Constant traffic and heavy rainfall made the upgrading of the access road a difficult job. The use of assault trackway and used MBAL matting in the roadway to increase stability was particularly helpful. A final layer of laterite was placed over the assault trackway and MBAL matting with two coats of peneprime on the laterite as a sealer. Company D also relocated the access road to FSB Jackson. Damage to the original access road was so extensive repair was not feasible.

3. Land clearing was another task which occupied Company D during this reporting period. The overall aim of the land clearing missions was to pacify specific areas by opening routes to the Vam Co Dong River. A team of two D-7 bulldozers cleared 100 meters of vegetation on both sides of 6A from FSB Jackson to the river. Trafficability was poor and explosives had to be used in several areas. The same problem was encountered to a greater extent on 6 $\frac{1}{2}$ A and explosives were used extensively in lieu of the heavy engineer equipment. Company D also cleared fields of fire at Patrol Base Harris with the use of explosives.

4. Company D completed several projects on Cu Chi Base Camp in addition to their work in the 3rd Brigade area of operations. A concrete block blast wall was constructed around the Commanding General's quarters. Extensive ingenuity and effort contributed to the successful relocation of a mobile home trailer behind the Division Headquarters. In addition, Company D built new revetments and constructed a new roof on the 3rd Brigade TOC.

(f) During the reporting period Company E provided general support to the 25th Infantry Division.

1. The beginning of the period found Company E on the Ann Margaret Dam project. Company E's biggest problem on this project was the placing of five 5500 lb culverts six feet in diameter and fifty feet in length. Mastering this problem, by use of airlift, Company E completed the dam and performs continuous maintenance to prevent erosion of the soil on the steep slopes of the dam.

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2. Company E also placed 14 dry spans during this period. Most of the dry spans were air lifted to the job site by CH-47 and CH-54 helicopters. The use of these dry spans was of great benefit, for the roads would have been impassable for days without them. Company E also keeps roads inside the various fire support bases passable with the use of assault trackway.

3. Company E continued land clearing operations during the month of August, part of September and again in October. The use of D-7 bulldozers dragging a 100 foot section of Naval anchor chain, proved to be an efficient and safe method for removing hedgerows which were heavily mined and booby trapped. Land clearing was limited to certain areas due to the heavy rains which made most areas impassable to the dozers.

4. AVLB's were used throughout the Division area of operations during this reporting period.

5. Another project Company E completed was the construction of three (3) BOQ buildings on Cu Chi. This project consisted of construction of a combined concrete block and wood siding wall and construction of interior partitions. Company E also completed a partially erected BOQ building and constructed a water tower, sump, and reservoir tank for the showers.

(g) The 588th Engineer Battalion (Combat) with the 362nd Engineer Company (Light Equipment) and the 544th Engineer Company (Construction Support) attached, located at Tay Ninh, provided engineer support in the northern part of the Division TAOI. Some significant projects included observation towers in eight key positions throughout the TAOI; water support to FSB St. Barbara; airfield rehabilitation, Tay Ninh; aircraft maintenance ramps, Cu Chi; and hospital revetments, Tay Ninh. Two companies of the 588th Engineer Battalion moved to Cu Chi to provide engineer support, picking up the slack as the 554th Engineer Battalion (Construction) commenced their move to the 1st Division's area. Company C arrived on 17 August from Dau Tieng and Company A arrived on 14 September from Tay Ninh. The 554th Engineer Battalion (Construction) with the 515th Asphalt Platoon, located at Cu Chi, provided engineer support in the 2nd and 3rd Brigade areas. Key missions were the completion of CH-47 revetments; helicopter maintenance revetments; TOC and commo revetments; and Cu Chi Base Camp paving. The Battalion's engineer efforts were reduced by the move of two companies, one in August and one in September to the 1st Infantry Division area. On 1 November, the Battalion ceased all operations in the 25th Infantry Division AO and officially moved its headquarters to Lai Khe in support of the 1st Infantry Division.

(h) The 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, which came under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division just prior to this reporting period, continues to be supported by: The 571st Engineer Company (Combat), formerly Company C, 15th Engineer Battalion, in direct support; and the 93rd Engineer Battalion (Construction), a subordinate unit of the 20th Engineer Brigade, providing engineer operational support.

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### (9) Signal Operations.

(a) The Division Signal Office continued its coordination and staff supervision over all communications within the Division.

(b) During the quarter ending 31 October 1969 significant changes in communications administration were effected. This was done while providing continuing combat signal support to the 25th Infantry Division.

1. In order to provide more responsive and efficient telephone installation, repair and cable maintenance at Cu Chi, the 125th Signal Battalion, 25th Infantry Division and the 86th Signal Battalion have established on an experimental basis, a joint telephone repair and cable maintenance office known as Telephone Management Agency (TMA). 125th Signal Battalion and 86th Signal Battalion, recognizing the urgent need for more efficient utilization of men and material to meet demanding requirements imposed by the sprawling Cu Chi Base Camp, directed the establishment of a joint, fully integrated office. This office is staffed by officers and men of both battalions. The telephone trouble and cable team is likewise integrated. It is anticipated that this effort will optimize the efforts of both battalions. A significant improvement in overall system management has already been realized.

2. Significant progress has been made in the proposed establishment of a Radio Relay station at Go Dau Ha. In order to alleviate some of the congestion on Nui Ba Den and to provide a reliable alternate means of routing, a 160' tower and communication bunker will be constructed at Go Dau Ha. The site survey has been completed and a proposed construction completion date has been set for 31 December 1969. The new location will solve the resupply and power problems that are encountered on Nui Ba Den especially during the rainy season.

3. In his continuing effort to provide more and better service to the men of the Tropic Lightning, the Division MARS Director, has established a second MARS station at Cu Chi Base Camp. The new station is expected to double the capacity for calls to CONUS. It uses the same basic Collins Single Side Band Radio equipment and is located in Bldg T-5250 on Lanai Road. The Mobile MARS station assembled last quarter received overwhelming response from the line troops of the 25th Division, during its visits to the fire support bases of the 2nd and 3rd Brigades. A schedule for visits to the seven sites of the 1st Brigade beginning at Fire Support Base Crook has been completed. The station will depart for the North and spend three days at each site. During the period 1 August to 31 October, 2,578 calls were made over the MARS systems.

4. In late September the Division Signal Office initiated and supervised a Mobile Training Team (MTT) that conducted nine one-day courses on the new Radio Set AN/GRC 142. The courses were taught by a representative from

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1st Logistical Command of USARV with emphasis on equipment, capability and operation, tuning, care and maintenance, and practical exercises. The instructions were provided to all units in the 25th Infantry Division, with favorable comments being received from the students.

5. This quarter also saw the installation of a centralized Alert Siren System at Cu Chi Base Camp. The system is activated at the 2d Brigade Base Camp Defense TOC. The Heavy Duty air raid sirens have been installed at Division Headquarters, 2nd Brigade, 1st Signal, and 65th Engineer Battalion areas. The program will eventually include the 3rd Brigade area for an additional warning siren. Two other projects were in the planning stages this quarter. First is the development of an Audio Tape Club to be located at the new MARS station on Lanai Road. Once under way the club would provide a music library for its members with the capability of making their own tapes at a minimal cost. Testing is also under way to determine the possibility of piping Special Service shows from the Lightning Bowl entertainment area direct to troops at the cutlying fire support bases.

### E. (C) Logistics:

(1) During the reporting period the Division Logistical Operations Center (DLOC) was formed. The DLOC consists of the Support Command S2/3 Section and the Division Transportation Office. The DLOC provides the Support Command with a central point for the coordination of all tactical and logistical information needed to furnish the best possible logistical support to the Division. The nucleus of the DLOC is the Movement Control Center which provides a central point for all modes of logistical resupply, including logistic helicopters.

(2) A monthly average of fourteen different conventional Class V items were subject to ASR control. At the beginning of the reporting period, HE munitions were the principal items under management; however, mid-way through the period there was a transformation from HE to Illumination munitions which continued to be the predominant munition under management. During the reporting period, 9 HE and 4 Illumination type munitions required supplemental allocations in order to support tactical operations.

(3) The availability of construction materials (mainly lumber) was critical throughout the period. All project requests, ongoing and proposed, were carefully reviewed for termination or reduction in scope, and only those projects considered absolutely essential were allowed to continue after proper justification. Base areas were under constant surveillance by the installation coordinators to detect unauthorized construction of facilities, and action was taken to dismantle unauthorized structures or obtain proper authority.

(4) On 6 August 1969, a contract laundry was officially opened on Cu Chi Base Camp. This facility provides 3-day laundry service and represents a significant overall improvement over the contract laundry service

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previously available to the division.

(5) Excess materials totaling 2,171 line items of dollar value \$457,658.09, were retrograded during the period.

(6) The Division Transportation Section continued to coordinate the requirements for U.S. Air Force Airlift for unit movement and resupply in support of Division operations. Special airlift data concerning USAF support is as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>CARGO (Tons)</u>	<u>TROOPS</u>
August	214	12,686
September	278	14,779
October	174	14,202

(7) The Division Transportation Section continues to supervise operations of hold baggage facilities at Cu Chi and Tay Ninh for the convenience of personnel located within the Division TAOI. These baggage facilities are capable of receiving baggage of rotating personnel, processing and delivering baggage to Headquarters Area Command Baggage Section, Tan Son Nhut. The baggage sections also process baggage of newly arrived personnel. Data concerning the Division baggage sections is as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PERSONNEL PROVIDED SERVICE</u>	<u>PIECES</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>
August	878	1213	108,700
September	556	782	74,270
October	522	779	69,665

(8) The Division Transportation Office has assumed the mission of controlling all CH-47 & CH-54 type aircraft operating in support of the Division. This system allows the supported unit a single point of contact for all surface and air logistical requirements as well as improve the efficiency of the CH-47/54 operations. This mission entails receiving and screening Division requirements, integrating modes, scheduling allotted aircraft, and monitoring the entire program. CH-47 aircraft are allocated to the Division on an aircraft basis with 6 blade hours per aircraft being the daily criteria. CH-54 aircraft are allocated on a mission basis only. The following is a breakdown of CH-47 support rendered to the Division since 1 September:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>ALLOCATED HOURS</u>		<u>HOURS FLOWN</u>		<u>SORTIES</u>		<u>AV. TONS</u>
	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AVERAGE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AVERAGE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>AVERAGE</u>	<u>PER HR</u>
September	744	24	765	25:15	1487	49	7.8
October	717	23.1	730	23:30	1744	56	8.76

(9) The Division Transportation Section continues to coordinate

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and schedule the operation of resupply convoys within the Division TAOI. During the past quarter 736 convoys have been operated in support of base camps located at Cu Chi, Tay Ninh and Dau Tieng with a total volume of 15,115 vehicles. The operation of resupply convoys includes establishing schedules, receiving requirements and coordinating security forces and traffic control. All convoys operating on the Division MSR, either tactical, or logistical, are required to obtain clearances from the Division Transportation Officer. Highway continues to be the primary mode of transportation for this resupply of the Division Base Camps. Following is a breakdown of regular resupply convoys operated in the Division area.

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>No. OF CONVOYS</u>	<u>No. OF VEHICLES</u>
<u>(a) Cu Chi to Tay Ninh:</u>		
August	62	622
September	60	601
October	62	467
Total:	<u>184</u>	<u>1,690</u>
<u>(b) Cu Chi/Lai Khe/Di An/ to Dau Tieng:</u>		
August	62	474
September	60	286
October	62	267
Total:	<u>184</u>	<u>1,027</u>
<u>(c) Long Binh to Tay Ninh:</u>		
August	62	3,291
September	60	2,800
October	62	2,875
Total:	<u>184</u>	<u>8,966</u>
<u>(d) Long Binh to Dau Tieng:</u>		
August	62	1,076
September	60	1,219
October	62	1,275
Total:	<u>184</u>	<u>3,570</u>
<u>(e) Cu Chi to Duc Hoa:</u>		
August	11	76
September	13	112
October	14	107
Total:	<u>38</u>	<u>295</u>

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(10) In July the Division Available Supply Rate (ASR) of 2.75<sup>00</sup> rockets was drastically reduced. In order to assure that rockets were not fired indiscriminately, DAO initiated a daily ASR and issue control procedure. G-3 was kept informed of the rockets used, and in order for rockets to be fired in excess of the daily ASR, G-3 had to give permission based upon its estimate of the necessity of the mission. In this manner the Division ASR of 2.75<sup>00</sup> rockets was not exceeded, but operations were not hampered.

(11) In June an accident causing multiple fatalities occurred at a field location because ammunition was being handled carelessly. As a result the Division Ammunition Officer visited all fire support bases, patrol bases, and other field locations for the primary purpose of inspecting the safety of ammunition storage and handling practices. These visits are continuing on a periodic basis.

(12) 25th Infantry Division Band.

(a) The 25th Infantry Division Band performed the following commitments during this period:

Categories and Totals

Award Ceremonies	18
Change of Command Ceremonies	11
Misc. Ceremonies	21
Serenades	50
Service Club Concerts	10
Formal Retreats (Full Band)	24
Bugler Commitments	105
Miscellaneous Concerts	7
Fire Support Base Concerts	10
Solo Concerts	10
Hospital Concerts	4
Ensemble Concerts (Small Groups)	8
Mess Hall Concerts (Combo)	6
Traveling Serenades (A and B Bands)	5
Television Appearances	5
Total Commitments	304

(b) The two-band (A and B) concept of touring the base camps has continued and is proving to be very popular. It was learned that coupled with the mess hall concert a greater coverage of the base camp could be obtained. To date there has been five (5) videotapes made for the "Interlude" series on AFVN Saigon and more are in the planning stage. At this point, the groups which have performed include; "The New Yorkers" (accordion trio), the 25th Infantry Division Band Chorus, the "Tropic Lightning" Dance Band, the "Cu Chi Mountain Boys" (Hillbilly Group), and a "rock combo" recently formed. During this period the band appeared at Cam Ranh Bay, in

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Saigon at CMAC and II Field Force HQ, and made several journeys to Tan An and Rach Kien in support of the 3rd Bde, 9th Infantry Division. The Tropic Lightning News recently did a full page article with pictures depicting the activities of the Division Band.

(c) Band capabilities continue to expand with a recent influx of talented bandmen. A new "rock" music combo has been formed and will be utilized to entertain troops at fire support bases as well as Division base camp areas. A full band concert is being scheduled at the Vietnamese-American Association "University Day" celebration in Saigon on November 16th. Many of the NCO's and lower ranking EM are now capable of directing the band and thus supervising various musical functions.

(13) 341st Aviation Detachment (Division):

(a) The 341st Aviation Detachment (DIV) has operational control of Cu Chi Army Airfield.

1. Traffic count for the Control Tower, Cu Chi Army Airfield, for the last quarter, August-October, was as follows:

Rotary wing	156,276
Fixed wing	<u>7,394</u>
Total	163,670

2. Traffic count for the Ground Control Approach for the last quarter, August-October, was as follows:

August	286
September	203
October	<u>137</u>
Total	626

(b) The 341st Aviation Detachment (DIV) has operational control of the 25th Inf Div POL Facility for aircraft.

1. Fuel dispensed since August 1 totals 34,743 gallons for AvGas and 2,651,000 gallons for JP4.

2. On 6 Sep 69 the POL pump house burned down. On the morning of the 7th the POL facility was again operational, using two (2) 350 GPM pumps.

3. Fire fighting and prevention classes have been intensified and the POL area refurbished with the renovation of berms, cleaning out of the ditch surrounding the refuel point and the addition of new fire extinguishers.

(c) The 341st Aviation Detachment (DIV) has operational control

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of the 25th Inf Div Rearmament Facility for aircraft.

1. The following amounts of ammunition have been issued during the last three months:

Army rockets	8,112
Air Force rockets	8,563
7.62mm rounds	3,630,985
40mm rounds	54,450
Smoke grenades	11,458
Aircraft flares	4,074

2. A 5KW generator has been installed. This supplies power for running lights for helipads and barricades at Re-arm and a landing pad at the POL Facility.

3. Separate barricaded bins have been installed for unserviceable ammunition.

4. Barricades within the "ready ammunition area" have been constructed to separate rockets by type.

(14) 25th Medical Battalion.

(a) Throughout the reporting period the 25th Medical Battalion continued to provide Division level medical service to the 25th Infantry Division. HQ & Co A, B and C Companies continue to staff the 60 bed Arthur E. Lewis Dispensary at Cu Chi Base Camp. D Company continued to support Tay Ninh Base Camp with 50 beds.

1. Medical Totals:

Patients seen	12,519
Disease	11,038
Non-battle injuries	1,048
IRHA	436
Lab Tests	8,235
Immunizations	4,715
Prescriptions filled	12,325
X-Ray	5,055

2. Supply and Services:

Line items issued	5,372
Medcap line items issued	1,069
Maintenance work orders received	115
Eyeglasses ordered (Pairs)	3,180
Bulk pharmacy items issued	5

C O N F I D E N T I A L

3. Dental support, provided by the 40th Medical Detachment as follows:

Total treatments	14,660
Civic actions	1,041

4. Preventive dentistry:

Instruction in oral hygiene	4,389
Prophylaxis of dental hygiene	1,704
Cavity prevention treatments	3,163
Group lectures	67
Persons attending lectures	3,495
Self-applied prophylaxis treatment	1,495

5. The 159th Medical Detachment (HA), attached to the 25th Medical Battalion, provided evacuation to divisional and non-divisional units:

Total patients	2,467
Total missions	1,370
U.S.	1,031
ARVN	712
VN civilians	663
VC/NVA	61
Medical resupply for blood	10 hrs
Flying time	1246 hrs
Average aviator time	114 hrs
Aircraft availability	78%

(15) Class II & IV and VII Activities

(a) Deletions to ASL during quarter: 648

(b) Total lines on ASL: 1,617

	<u>Aug</u>	<u>Sep</u>	<u>Oct</u>
ASL Lines stocked	1381	1442	1617
ASL Lines zero balance	688	728	643
Zero bal w/due-out	660	687	484
Total requests received	7644	8203	7947
Total ASL Requests received	5313	6038	6044
Total ASL Requests filled	3424	3816	4007
Total requests priority 01-08	819	625	581
Total requests priority 01-08 filled	111	87	59
Total warehouse refusals	35	0	15
Units supported	68	68	69
Percent demand satisfaction	69.5	73.6	76.1
Percent demand accomodation	64.4	63.2	66.3

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(16) Services.

(a) Graves Registration:

US Military processed	81
US Civilians processed	0
Enemy processed	10
Vietnamese processed	74
Total	165

(b) Salvage Operations:

Number of Tons received	2032
Number of Tons shipped	2032

F. (C) Communications:

(1) During the reporting period, the 125th Signal Battalion provided the Division the following communications facilities:

(a) FM Radio: The battalion provided the personnel and equipment for the division stations in the following nets:

1. Division Command Clear and Secure
2. Division Intelligence
3. IIFV Command
4. Automatic retransmission facilities at Nui Ba Den for command clear and secure.
5. RWI Station on Cu Chi Base Camp

(b) AM RATT: The battalion provided equipment and personnel for the division station in the Division Command RATT Net and a DISCOM Main and Forward stations in the Division Admin/Log Net.

(c) Communications Center: The 25th Infantry Division Communications center facilities were provided by the 125th Signal Battalion. During the reporting period, an average of 3483 messages were handled per month. Of the traffic handled 40% was originating traffic, 39% terminating traffic, 10% was relay traffic, and 11% was hand carried messages. High precedence traffic continued to be passed at high volume. An average of 67% of all traffic handled had precedence of immediate or higher. Additionally, communications center facilities were provided at Tay Ninh Base Camp and Dau Tieng Base Camp.

(d) Telephone Switching Centers: An AN/MTC-1 with 5 dial trunks was used for the Division Main Switchboard. This switchboard was used in lieu of the authorized AN/MTC-3 because of the number of non-divisional units and subordinate divisional unit's rear areas requiring drops or access to Lightning Main Switch.

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### (2) Significant Events:

(a) Switchboard, telephone and FM remote facilities in the DTOC were re-engineered and relocated during the period 5-9 August in keeping with the reorganization of staff elements and their working areas in the DTOC.

(b) On 12 August 1969 a letter of justification for requisitioning continuous coaxial cable RG-14 or RG-189 was drafted for and submitted by Division G-4 to the 1st Logistics Command. The request was subsequently approved, the cable obtained, and a rehabilitation of VHF antenna coaxial cables was initiated and completed.

(c) The Division Forward TOC located at Tay Ninh East was closed down on 11 September 1969. At this time Company B discontinued the system to DTOC FWD CommCenter and returned all equipment to Tay Ninh Base Camp.

(d) Company C provided and installed on 12 September 1969 an AN/VRC-24 Ground/Air Radio in order to establish a DISCOM net in the ground/air control net.

(e) On 7 October 1969 Company B's 2nd Platoon was assigned to Company C. The additional VHF personnel gives Company C the responsibility of operating and controlling all VHF sites at fire support bases in the 2nd and 3rd Bde AO's. This leaves all of Company B elements in and around Tay Ninh Base Camp.

(f) Two radioteletype sets AN/GRC-142 were hand receipted on 14 October 1969 by Company A for use in the brigade RATT net by 1-27th Infantry at FSB Chamberlain and 2-27 Infantry at FSB Jackson. A third AN/GRC-142 was hand receipted on 16 October to 1-5th Mech for use at FSB Devin.

(g) The Cu Chi Telephone Management Agency (TELMA) began operations on 23 October 1969. The agency, consisting of cable and telephone personnel and equipment from both the 125th Signal Battalion and the 86th Signal Battalion, is responsible for the installation and repair of all telephones and cables on Cu Chi Base Camp.

(h) Brigadier General Henderson, the Assistant Division Commander, visited the battalion on 28 October 1969. He received a battalion briefing and was taken on a tour of the battalion's operational facilities on Cu Chi Base Camp. The 125th Signal Battalion was placed under BG Henderson's supervision on 23 September 1969.

(i) The Cu Chi Telephone Management Agency was made an official agency when its charter was signed by LTC Matthey, Commanding Officer, 125th Signal Battalion, and LTC Halloran, Commanding Officer, 86th Signal Battalion. The signing of the charter took place on 30 October 1969 at the office of the Division Signal Officer.

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(j) A second Cu Chi MARS Station, AB8AU, was activated on 23 October 1969 and designated alternate NCS for Net #7. During this reporting period 2,578 calls were made over the MARS System. The Division mobile Station visited all the fire support bases in the 2nd and 3rd Bde AO during the quarter.

(k) On 24 October 1969 the responsibilities of NCS for the Division FM Command Clear and Secure Net passed from Company A's FM section to the DTOC OPNS Section. The FM section is still responsible for providing technical and maintenance service.

(l) During this reporting period the Division Photo Lab processed 681 orders producing 13,729 prints. A total of 131 prints were forwarded by the Southeast Asia Pictorial Center to Headquarters, Department of the Army. On 27 October 1969 the division adjutant general assumed the responsibility of taking ID photos on base camp. The photo lab is still responsible for sending contact teams to field sites to take ID photographs when needed.

(m) Changes in multichannel systems during the reporting period:

1. On 8 August 1969 FSB Emory was closed down due to relocation of the tactical units. The AN/MRC-69 from this location was used to replace the AN/MRC-34.5 at FSB Devin, thereby providing the needed back-up equipment.

2. Five 107mm rockets impacted in Company B's VHF park on Tay Ninh Base Camp on 12 August 1969. The AN/GRC-163 Log Periodic Antenna for the systems at Ben Soi and FSB Buell were combat lost. In addition, three anchor guy cables from the top of the AB-216 tower and four coaxial cables were severed, requiring replacing.

3. The system to FSB Stoneman was discontinued on 14 August 1969. The AN/MRC-69 was relocated to FSB St. Barbara in support of the 4-9 Inf.

4. The four channel system to Ben Soi was discontinued on 16 August 1969. The AN/GRC-163 was subsequently used on 22 August 1969 to establish a system to FSB Stoneman.

5. On 26 August 1969 the system to FSB Wood was re-engineered as a direct shot from Tay Ninh. Formerly this system was patched through at FSB Rawlins. The quality and reliability of both systems was considerably improved by this change.

6. The system to FSB Houston was discontinued on 27 August 1969. The AN/MRC-69 was returned to Cu Chi for maintenance and to salvage the hut.

7. On 4 September 1969 the AN/TCC-3 carrier equipment on Nui Ba Den was replaced by AN/TCC-7 carrier equipment. This change increased the system capability from four to five channels.

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8. On 5 October 1969 FSB Elizabeth was opened and a system using an AN/MRC-34.5 was utilized to support the units there. The system was discontinued on 18 October 1969 upon the unit's relocation to another fire support base.

9. The system to FSB Sedgwick was discontinued on 18 October and the AN/MRC-34.5 was sent back to Tay Ninh.

10. An AN/MRC-69 was reconstructed from the AN/MRC-34.5's from FSB's Elizabeth and Sedgwick. This AN/MRC-69 was sent out on 20 October 1969 to establish a new system at FSB Hunter.

### G. (C) Materiel:

(1) The 725th Maintenance Battalion continued to provide direct support maintenance and supply support for units assigned and/or attached to the division. During the month of September the Battalion recorded a new average low backlog of 215 pieces of equipment in support maintenance (DS, GS) and on 25 September 1969 the backlog was reduced to 162 which was both the low point for September and 1969. This backlog represents only .5% of the 30,000 pieces of equipment supported. Other recurring programs to improve operations and support are listed below:

#### (a) Project count-location survey.

Total number of lines surveyed: 10,797.  
Total number of lines in agreement with storage location:  
9,678.  
Percent accuracy: 90%.

#### (b) Project count-inventory status.

Total number of lines inventoried: 8621.  
Total number of lines in agreement with storage location:  
7816.  
Percent accuracy: 91%.

(c) The technical supply personnel identified and retrograded 2,484 lines of serviceable repair parts at a dollar value of \$257,351.43. "Project Strip" is a continuing effort to purge the supply system of excess items. Units have been encouraged to turn in items which are no longer required, to their supporting DSU for cross-leveling or retrograde.

(d) The following represent production figures for commodities listed below:

	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Wheeled	282	289	290	861

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	<u>AUG</u>	<u>SEP</u>	<u>OCT</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Track and Tanks	132	147	122	401
Small arms	589	640	656	1885
Artillery	62	104	153	319
Engineer	29	28	27	84
Generators	105	122	107	334
Signal	2077	2096	1921	6094
Office machines	93	113	109	315
Aircraft	316	224	245	805
Other	250	259	313	822
Total	3935	4042	3821	11798

(3) Listed below are items which accounted for an appreciable percentage of the Division's deadlined equipment. It should be noted that the  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton and  $\frac{3}{4}$  ton vehicles continue to present a significant problem in comparison with other type vehicles. This is attributed to the chronic problem of obtaining repair parts for these vehicles:

1/4 T	Transmission	2520-678-1808
1/4 T	Clutch Kit	2520-887-1353
1/4 T	Fuel Pump	2910-678-1856
3/4 T	Transmission	2520-975-7081
3/4 T	Steering Gear	2530-737-5403
3/4 T	Clutch Plate	2520-040-1897
3/4 T	Clutch Disk	2520-293-5145
3/4 T	Throwout Bearing	3110-157-3725
2 1/2 T	Wheel Cylinder	2530-495-8784
2 1/2 T	Clutch Plate	2520-832-7335
2 1/2 T	Injection Pump	2910-968-6317
5 T	Throwout Bearing	3110-186-5073

(2) The 725th Maintenance Battalion retrograded a record high of 287 major end items of equipment to the unserviceable property division. Expeditious evacuation of unserviceable repairable equipment has enabled the Division to obtain new or rebuilt replacement equipment. Presently the Division equipment is relatively new and comparatively well maintained as characterized by the favorable posture of the Division in both the command deadline report and the material readiness report.

(3) Percentage of aircraft operational readiness (OR) during

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the reporting period is 86% as compared to the previous reporting period which was 79.8%. The increase is primarily attributed to two factors: The problem of tail rotor failure cited in the previous report has been virtually solved by a modification and the fact that new aircraft are already modified before issued to the Division. A decrease in the percentage of operational ready aircraft is expected as new OH-6 aircraft reach the initial 300 hour periodic inspection. There is a significant number of aircraft in this category.

(4) Five PPS-5 radars assigned to units of the Division were retrograded and exchanged for the new modified PPS-5 radars. This is the first step to exchange the entire complement (to include float) within the next 6 months. The 725th Maintenance Battalion received two PPS-5 radars (floats) from the 9th Division on 30 July 1969. These floats have enabled the Division to better support the assigned radars and has virtually eliminated the deadline of PPS-5 radars

(5) 25th Infantry Division CMMI Team.

(a) During the quarter, the CMMI Team conducted the following inspections:

- 29 CMMI/AGI
- 17 Courtesy
- 23 Roadside Spot Check (536 total vehicles inspected)
- 4 Generator Spot Check (52 total generators inspected)
- 9 Command Interest

(b) A staff study was initiated this quarter to determine an appropriate command level for the assignment of the CMMI Team. At this time, the CMMI Team is responsible to both CO, DISCOM and Division G-4. Lines of responsibility need to be more clearly defined to eliminate the possibilities of confusion and duplication of effort. The Team composition was also discussed with emphasis on organization as prescribed by AR 750-8.

(6) The evaluation of 5, 10KW, 60 CY diesel generators initiated during the preceding period continues. The results as reported by the 125th Signal Battalion are favorable. The generators are performing very well with a minimum of maintenance. The generators have required only 3 or 4 small parts since they were put in use. Reduced fuel consumption, lack of noise, and minimum maintenance requirements are the most significant characteristics noted thus far.

(7) A sufficient number of APC's became available during the reporting period to accommodate a greater percentage of turn-in of high mileage vehicles. The division density of overmileage APC's has been reduced considerably.

(8) Forty sniper rifles, XM21 (ENSURE 240) were received in Oct 69. The XM21 rifle is a modified, "accurized", National Match Grade M14. These rifles were incorporated immediately into the division sniper program.

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(9) Three Combat Engineer Vehicles were received during the reporting period to replace the M48A3 tanks presently in use by the Engineer Battalion.

(10) In compliance with Department of the Army guidance the division eliminated DA Form 2408-3 from equipment records. Required information is now reported using DA Form 2408-7.

H. (C) Revolutionary Development/Pacification:

(1) The goals of the 1969 Pacification and Development plan are fast being achieved with the following progress recorded at the end of the reporting period in each province of the 25th Infantry Division TAOR:

(a) Tay Ninh Province.

1. Security goals have been achieved with over 99 percent of the 335,191 population of Tay Ninh Province living within GVN security in terms of the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES).

2. Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI) member elimination goals have been 90 percent met with the total goal of 480 eliminations well within reach by year's end.

3. Popular Self Defense Force (PSDF) member organization, training and arming goals have been 100 percent met with 65,000 members organized, 25,000 trained and 7000 armed.

4. Village elections and hamlet elections have been completed with all villages and hamlets of Tay Ninh Province boasting properly elected governments.

5. Over 100 percent of the Chieu Hoi Program goal has been achieved. As of 31 October, 513 ralliers had returned to the GVN.

6. Nearly 100 percent of all in-camp refugees have been resettled and 75 percent of those persons in out-of-camp refugee status have been removed from the official refugee status leaving some 1000 persons remaining in that status.

7. Goals of training village and hamlet information cadre members have been 75 percent achieved with all remaining members currently in training.

8. Goals in agriculture have been only 25 percent achieved thus far but the goal of planting 6000 hectares of IR-8 Hybrid rice may be nearly met in the upcoming planting season.

(b) Hau Nghia Province.

1. Security goals have been achieved in Hau Nghia Province

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with 90 percent of the 189,834 population living within GVN security in terms of the HES.

2. VCI elimination goals have been only 50 percent achieved and considerable effort will have to be expended if the GVN is to meet a goal of 360 such eliminations in Hau Nghia Province by year's end.

3. PSDF goals have been met with over 25,000 PSDF members organized, 20,000 trained and 4500 armed.

4. Nearly 100 percent of all villages and hamlets in Hau Nghia Province have elected governments and all will have them before year's end.

5. The goal of 825 ralliers under the Chieu Hoi Program has been exceeded by 100 percent.

6. Nearly 100 percent of all in-camp and out-of-camp persons in refugee status have been resettled or removed from that status.

7. Goals in the training of village and hamlet information cadre have been only 50 percent achieved but the remaining 50 percent of the cadre may be trained before the year's end.

8. Agricultural goals of planting 2000 hectares of IR-3 hybrid rice will be only 50 percent met this year and are only 25 percent achieved thus far.

(c) Long An Province.

1. Security goals have been 90 percent met with 80 percent of the 369,633 total population living within the GVN security in terms of the HES.

2. VCI elimination goals have been 75 percent met with a possibility of achieving the goal of 800 eliminations by year's end.

3. PSDF goals have been over 100 percent achieved with 45,000 PSDF members organized, 35,000 trained and 7500 armed.

4. Nearly 100 percent of all secure and contested villages and hamlets have elected governments with 14 village areas still considered too influenced by the enemy to hold such elections.

5. Chieu Hoi Program goals of 1488 ralliers have been 135 percent achieved.

6. Nearly 100 percent of all in-camp refugees have been resettled but 8000 out-of-camp are carried in refugee status. These may be removed by year's end.

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7. Goals in the training of information cadre are 50 percent achieved and the remaining cadre are currently in training.

8. Nearly 100 percent of the goal of planting 15,000 hectares of IR-8 hybrid rice has been met.

(2) The MACV Hamlet Evaluation System (HES) remains the principal means of measuring the progress of pacification within the TAOR. Currently, the overall US category ratings for the TAOR are:

<u>HAMLET</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>POPULATION</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
A	1	4,788	00.05
B	212	500,979	55.99
C	271	260,730	29.14
D	94	56,574	06.32
E	16	7,355	00.81
V	53	21,855	02.44
Abandoned	9	0	00.00
Non-hamlet	<u>0</u>	<u>47,167</u>	<u>05.27</u>
TOTAL	656	894,658	100.00

The above ratings imply that, in terms of overall HES security and developmental scores, 85% of the hamlet population lives within GVN security and civil development. Approximately 7% of the hamlet population lives within VC control. Over 5% of the total population does not dwell within properly defined hamlet areas but are scattered in a remote, rural environment. 35% of the non-hamlet population is considered within GVN security, 35% is contested and 30% is considered as being under VC control.

I. (C) Civic Action

(1) The restriction on civic action operations due to the requirements of the Village Self Development Program, which encourages the GVN to employ its own channels and resources in such operations, has now resulted in lowering the number of projects initiated by the 25th Infantry Division on a monthly basis to figure less 10 percent of that six months ago.

(2) MEDCAPS have continued normally during this reporting period with a total of 1100 MEDCAPS conducted during the quarter and 82,500 patients treated. This represents a substantial increase over the 685 MEDCAPS conducted and 54,365 patients treated during the previous reporting period. The RF/PF and ARVN MEDCAPS have not been reduced, however a considerable effort has been made to hold small MEDCAPS in remote contested areas for the purpose of gathering intelligence concerning the enemy. Hence, the increase in US MEDCAP statistics.

(3) In conjunction with medical civic action operations normally

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conducted, a special six week advanced course of medical treatment is being given RF/PF and Revolutionary Development cadre medics at 12th Evacuation Hospital on a continuing basis.

(4) Construction of civic action projects continued to be reduced during the reporting period with only 300 homes repaired to some degree, and 3 temples, 1 dispensary and 3 schools repaired. Two hundred (200) kilometers of roadway were repaired through engineer efforts.

(5) Distributions were made to Vietnamese civilians in the following categories and quantities from 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969: 20,000 board feet of lumber, 900 sheets of tin, 20,000 pounds of cement and 15,000 pounds of food.

(6) Civic Action Imprest Fund expenditures totaled 1,409,886 \$VN for the reporting period.

J. (C) Psychological Operations (PSYOP):

(1) PSYOP activities were in support of operations conducted in Tay Ninh, Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces.

(2) A total of 30,240,000 leaflets were disseminated in the Division TAOI. Thirty-two leaflets were developed and printed by the ACoFS, G5, while 47 leaflets were developed and produced by the 6th PSYOP Battalion for the Division.

(3) During this reporting period, 1,225 hours of air and ground loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted. This represents a 361 hour increase over the last reporting period.

(4) A total of 1,893 Hoi Chanh rallied to the GVN in the 25th Infantry Division's TAOI, an increase of 608 Hoi Chanh over the previous quarter. The increase in the number of Hoi Chanh can partly be accounted for by the accelerated pacification campaign currently underway in III CTZ and partly by the increased emphasis placed on the third party inducement PSYOP program in conjunction with an improved face-to-face persuasion team effort.

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2. Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders' Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations. (25th Inf Div ORLL, 1 August - 31 October 1969)

A. PERSONNEL.

(1) (C) ITEM: Monitoring Casualty Causes.

(a) OBSERVATION: A system was needed that would establish and measure operational casualty experience by cause and trend.

(b) EVALUATION: The causes of casualties were classified into five different groupings in conjunction with the daily AG casualty print-out:

1. Booby traps
2. Mines
3. Small arms (including automatic weapons and grenades)
4. Mortars
5. Others (which includes snipers, RPG's, rockets, and friendly artillery splash.

The percentages of casualties by type are maintained by Divisional Brigades, the 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div, and 25th Infantry Division troops. This enables commanders and staff to identify and assess the major producers of their operational casualties, and assisted in planning training programs and other actions to help reduce casualties from causes such as booby traps and mines.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That other units use this system to monitor casualty causes and trends.

(2) (U) ITEM: Reenlistment For Technical MOS's Utilized Within The Supply and Transport Battalion.

(a) OBSERVATION: Recently this command has received a number of enlisted men who have reenlisted for transportation and supply MOS's such as 63E20 and the 76 series.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the technical depth of these MOS's a partial tour does not allow sufficient time for OJT training and therefore no substantial benefit is realized.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

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1. That steps be taken to preclude reenlistment in such technical MOS's unless adequate school training is provided or civilian experience verified.

2. That personnel who reenlist for a specific MOS be assigned to a school upon completion of their tour of duty in Vietnam.

(3) (C) ITEM: Sheridan Qualified 11E's.

(a) OBSERVATION: Only about half of the 11E's assigned to the 3rd Squadron, 4th Cavalry have previous training on the M551 Sheridan.

(b) EVALUATION: Personnel with previous training on the M551 Sheridan have more confidence in themselves when assigned to the vehicle and more confidence in the vehicle. Assigning more personnel with previous training would increase the combat effectiveness of the M551 Sheridan.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: All 11E's arriving in country should be screened so those with previous training on the M551 Sheridan can be assigned to units equipped with the vehicle.

B. INTELLIGENCE.

(1) (C) ITEM: Improving Battalion Level Intelligence.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy is currently revising his tactics, moving away from his large unit tactics and relying more on the sapper, guerilla and local force elements. Consequently, maneuver battalions must become capable of generating operational intelligence through local sources and agencies if the enemy is going to be successfully engaged. Division will not be capable of supplying timely intelligence on small enemy units in the same manner as it furnishes reactable intelligence on the NVA main force units.

(b) EVALUATION: To rapidly upgrade the battalion intelligence effort, an Intelligence Contact Team was established. The team is composed of G2 and MID personnel qualified in CI/VCI operations, sensors, radar, and aerial surveillance, and visits each battalion to survey the intelligence program in actual operation. A report and survey is made with appropriate recommendations, all of which are within the organic capability of the surveyed battalion to implement. The survey concentrates on strengthening, or if necessary, developing a battalion collection program based on proper utilization of available intelligence assets or the establishment of specific programs targeted against the small enemy unit and VCI. The Intelligence Contact Teams were an excellent aid in assisting the maneuver battalions to develop and maintain an effective intelligence effort.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That Intelligence Contact Teams be used in

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programs to improve battalion level intelligence.

(2) (C) ITEM: Accurate Emplacement Of Aerial Delivered Duffel Bag Items.

(a) OBSERVATION: A difficulty associated with air implaced sensors has been obtaining desired accuracy for delivery in a predetermined location. In order to facilitate accuracy of emplacement, a makeshift bomb sight was drawn on the chin bubble of the drop helicopter in order to allow the pilot a point of reference to adjust from. Utilization of the same pilot remains a key factor in the accuracy of all air delivery methods. Reducing the drop altitude to between 250 - 500 feet at 60 knots also increases the accuracy of the drop (with appropriate gunship cover this is effectively accomplished). The single most significant factor in accurate delivery is prior planning and coordination. A coordination meeting prior to the drop to discuss the area and method of operation, drop altitude, and familiarization with bomb sight, combined with prior aerial photography coverage of drop locations, also will greatly enhance the effectiveness of the drop.

(b) EVALUATION: Combining the above factors has significantly increased the accuracy of employment of aerial delivered Duffel Bag items. During a drop in NW War Zone C using all the factors mentioned, accuracy to within 5 - 10 meters of a pre-determined location on the ground was achieved.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This procedure be incorporated in the Standard Operating Procedures of all units employing air emplaced Duffel Bag equipment.

(3) (C) ITEM: Use of PSID's In A Defensive Role.

(a) OBSERVATION: The requirement for sensor devices in FSB/PB security created the need for experimentation of the Patrol Seismic Intrusion Detector (PSID) in this role. The geophone of the PSID was taped in an inverted manner to concertina wire, providing early and accurate warning of attempted penetration by enemy personnel.

(b) EVALUATION: During initial experimentation the PSID proved very effective. The normal high sensitivity of the PSID was considerably reduced using this method, but the reliability to detect movement of perimeter wire was very high. Three sets of PSID's were used at PB Kotrc for security and on 13 Sep 69, activations caused by movement of the concertina wire not only provided early warning, but also the location of the penetration.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: PSID's should continue to be used in further

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experimentation in this role to detect possible sapper attacks on FSB's and PB's.

(4) (C) ITEM: New Enemy Marking For Mine Warning.

(a) OBSERVATION: On one road sweep the sweep team noticed an unfamiliar marking. The marking consisted of a circle of rocks inside a circle scratched on the road. Nearby was a knotted tuft of grass and an arrow scratched in the road. No mine was found. The next day the markings were gone, but a mine was located where the circle had been.

(b) EVALUATION: The enemy may be using this system to identify mines.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That minesweep teams be alert for further instances of this pattern.

(5) (C) ITEM: Intelligence Exploitation Of Children Around Bases.

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit has received knowledge of enemy activities from children who live in the surrounding areas of the fire support base. One of our interpreters made visits to areas surrounding the fire support base and talked with the children in the area who sell sodas and pick through the trash dump. The visits were made at irregular intervals and at no time were the children pressed for information. During one of these visits, a small boy who tends water buffalo in the area beside the fire support base told the interpreter that about 10 individuals (VC), were living about 2 kilometers from the base. After receiving the same report two days later, we employed US troops in the area. The search revealed that the enemy had definitely been there, as freshly cooked food, assorted clothing, and equipment and cooking utensils were found.

(b) EVALUATION: The children who habitually stay close to US bases are familiar with the adjacent area and a potentially useful intelligence source.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units use their Kit Carson Scouts and Vietnamese Interpreters to obtain intelligence from the children who congregate near US bases.

C. OPERATIONS.

(1) (C) ITEM: Placement Of Enemy Land Mines.

(a) OBSERVATION: The enemy places land mines along frequently used roads to harass and hinder movement. It has been observed recently that mines have been detonated in areas of old pieces of wreckage

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and shrapnel.

(b) EVALUATION: When engineer road sweep teams obtain a reading close to a piece of discarded track or metal, they assume that the reading came from the piece of visible metal and by-pass it. When vehicles pass over this area, they detonate the mine buried near the wreckage.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That when road sweep teams get a reading from areas with visible wreckage, they check closely around the wreckage or remove it if possible. Further, that all vehicles drive around wreckage on areas which can be properly swept and declared free of mines.

(2) (C) ITEM: Employment Of Radar With Area Ambushes.

(a) OBSERVATION: Area type ambushes, supplemented with AN/PPS-4 radar set and crew, have been conducted. The set and crew are heli-lifted into the company before dark and moved into ambush position concurrently with unit area ambushes. The radar is then employed to detect any movement in the vicinity of the ambush sites.

(b) EVALUATION: The employment of the AN/PPS-4 in an offensive role with night area ambushes has been proven to be a successful technique. The AN/PPS-4 has accounted for numerous sightings and on one occasion, contributed to the elimination of 13 enemy personnel. The weight and bulk of the radar set hampers movement of the set into position. Battery life limits the continuous use of the radar set.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That radar sets be considered for use with area ambushes. Continuous emphasis should be placed on the careful handling required and the judicious selection of the LZ in relation to the area of employment. Sufficient batteries should be provided to furnish power throughout the night.

(3) (U) ITEM: Tailboom Strikes On Paddy Dikes.

(a) OBSERVATION: Three tailboom strikes causing incidental damage to divisional UH-1H aircraft occurred when the tailboom struck rice paddy dikes on landing at pick-up zones during ranger extractions.

(b) EVALUATION: After each incident a post incident standardization check ride was given. Possible improper aviator flight techniques could not be isolated from these check rides. An inspection of the aircraft revealed that in each case the battery was installed in the aft cabin area causing the center of gravity to be moved further aft. On low level rapid deceleration type approaches this condition causes the tailboom to be approximately 2 feet lower than normal, resulting in the inadvertent tailboom strikes.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units utilizing low level approaches into pick up zones on missions such as ranger extractions relocate the aircraft battery on the UH-1H to the nose section.

(4) (U) ITEM: Increased Use Of Pathfinder Teams.

(a) OBSERVATION: Units in forward areas maintaining isolated bases do not have the experienced nor the trained personnel to rig sling loads and to prepare and maintain helipads.

(b) EVALUATION: Two man Pathfinder teams can be utilized on a rotating basis to visit various bases under the direction of the Brigade S-3 for the purpose of giving instruction in sling loading procedures, inspection of rigging equipment, maintenance and police of helipad areas and loading zones.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That units with Pathfinder resources establish teams for the purpose of providing rigging instructions and aid in the establishment and maintenance of helipads.

(5) (U) ITEM: "Flame Bath" Rigging Problems.

(a) OBSERVATION: The sling which is made from 3/4 inch 6,500 pound test manila rope occasionally slips as the load is lifted and the barrels shift. This has caused the load to come apart on pick up, igniting the trip flares.

(b) EVALUATION: A platform constructed of 2x4's is used to hold the barrels together for rigging. Eight snap links, FSN 8465-360-0228, are used to hold the ropes and barrels in place. (1 on each end of both bottom barrels and 2 on each end of the top barrel)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units involved in rigging "Flame Bath" loads consider the use of eight snap links for securing the rope to the barrels.

(6) (C) ITEM: Searching Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: When patrols are searching villages, built up areas, or areas where enemy forces have been sighted or suspected, the patrol should make a detailed search of the area utilizing iron rods to probe the ground.

(b) EVALUATION: The technique of using iron rods for probing has been very successful in locating caches and enemy personnel hiding underground in bunkers and tunnels.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all units carry iron probing rods for thorough searching of areas.

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### (7) (C) ITEM: Placement Of Trip Flares.

(a) OBSERVATION: It is suspected that in some instances VC/NVA scouts observe units setting up their trip flares in their preparation of the NQP.

(b) EVALUATION: Knowing the location of the trip flares aids enemy sapper elements attempting to penetrate a night position.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That trip flares be put out simultaneously with another activity such as the search of the area surrounding the NQP to prevent enemy observation of where the trip flares are emplaced.

### (8) (C) ITEM: Use Of Scout And Tracker Dogs On Combined Operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: Scout and tracker dogs used on one combined operation seemed confused around large numbers of Vietnamese and were of little use.

(b) EVALUATION: While many things might have affected the dogs' performance, they may have been confused by the presence of the Vietnamese.

#### (c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the use of scout and tracker dogs in combined operations be further evaluated to determine if the presence of Vietnamese affects their performance.

2. If so, that the possibility of eliminating the dog's confusion in the presence of Vietnamese through further training be investigated.

### (9) (C) ITEM: Establishment Of Combined Patrol Bases.

(a) OBSERVATION: On 30 August 1969 the 2-14 Inf and the 2nd Battalion, 49th ARVN Regiment established Patrol Base Dong Tien at XT615225, and occupied it with one US company and one ARVN company. Combined operations were conducted so that each of the two companies would have one platoon of the other company with it on daylight operations. In addition, combined ambushes were conducted every night, some of which achieved significant success. Overall ARVN performance improved considerably, as a direct result of the combined patrol base.

(b) EVALUATION: Conducting combined operations from a combined patrol base is a highly effective means of instilling confidence in the ARVN and increases the combat effectiveness of their units.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That programs to upgrade ARVN units include

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the establishment of combined patrol bases.

(10) (C) ITEM: Night Attacks On Intelligence Targets.

(a) OBSERVATION: Surprise night attacks have been effective against specific intelligence targets.

(b) EVALUATION: Enemy security measures are lessened at night. When intelligence identifies specific targets and sufficient time is provided for planning and reconnaissance (down to platoon level) a night attack based on surprise and violent coordinated fire support will normally succeed.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That, when the nature of the target is suitable, units consider night attacks for engaging specific intelligence targets.

(11) (C) ITEM: Use Of Radar As An Aid To Night Land Navigation.

(a) OBSERVATION: Land navigation at night is difficult. However radar is effective in determining exact locations of units and patrols and can be used to direct them to desired locations.

(b) EVALUATION: Radar assistance on night land navigation is a great aid to the maneuvering element, increases their flexibility, and increases the commander's control.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units with radar capacity use their radar to aid units and patrol in night land navigation.

### D. ORGANIZATION.

(1) (U) ITEM: Liaison With Supporting Aviation Companies.

(a) OBSERVATION: Proper liaison with supporting aviation companies is the key to increased efficiency in logistical helicopter operations.

(b) EVALUATION: The addition of a liaison officer to the DTO Office from the supporting assault support helicopter company has assisted in improving the CH-47 operations within the Division. This officer conducts base moves and instructs in proper rigging and aircraft capabilities. He also assists in the scheduling of Division missions to insure that maximum utilization is obtained.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a fulltime liaison officer from the support CH-47 company to the Division Transportation Office be assigned in each non-airmobile Division.

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### E. TRAINING.

#### (1) (U) ITEM: Material Handling Equipment Maintenance Training.

(a) OBSERVATION: Wheeled vehicle mechanics require additional organizational maintenance training on material handling equipment.

(b) EVALUATION: Inexperienced organizational maintenance personnel were unable to properly maintain the TO&E material handling equipment at desired standards. This contributed to an increase in the MHE deadline rate and reduced the unit's ability to accomplish its assigned mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That action be taken to provide specialized training for MHE repairmen and be assigned a separate MOS as opposed to cross-training in light vehicle mechanic MOS (63B20)

#### (2) (U) ITEM: Improvement Of "Night Hawk" Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: The gunner (Mini-gun operator) and the light/NOD operator require specialized training in order to function as a team and therefore increase the effectiveness of the Night Hawk mission.

(b) EVALUATION: It has been tested and proven that for best results from the Night Hawk missions, the gunner and the light operator should work as a team and be cross trained on both the mini-gun and the night observation device (TVS-4). This allows the light/NOD operator and gunner to change positions every 30 to 40 minutes precluding the light/NOD operator becoming eye fatigued due to eye strain.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: To increase effectiveness of the Night Hawk program all elements cross train their personnel to operate both the mini-gun and the TVS-4 night observation device.

#### (3) (C) ITEM: Searching Techniques.

(a) OBSERVATION: Thorough searching of small, known or suspected enemy areas, produces greater success than reconnaissance of large areas.

(b) EVALUATION: A thorough search of small areas is necessary to discover well concealed enemy tunnels. Normally the enemy will attempt to hide underground. When discovered in tunnels many enemy soldiers surrender and provide immediately exploitable information.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Soldiers should receive practical exercise training on searching techniques during BCT and AIT to include use of probes, likely areas for tunnels, and proper methods of clearing a tunnel when it is discovered.

#### (4) (C) ITEM: Zeroing And Test Firing Of Weapons.

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(a) OBSERVATION: All replacement personnel should be required to test fire and zero their weapons prior to going on an operation.

(b) EVALUATION: Personnel demonstrate more confidence if they are positive of their weapons functioning properly.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Replacement personnel zero and test fire their weapon prior to an operation.

### F. LOGISTICS.

(1) (U) ITEM: Conserving Air Resources And Speeding The Closing Of A Fire Support Base.

(a) OBSERVATION: The closing of fire support bases in remote locations usually requires a large amount of blade time for transporting men, material, and equipment. FSB Sedgwick, closed on 17-18 October 1969, was such a base. Located six kilometers from the nearest hard-surfaced road and completely inaccessible to vehicular traffic during the monsoon season, FSB Sedgwick was completely dependent on aerial resupply. Due to the large number of air sorties required to close the base (40 for the Infantry company and 36 for the Artillery battery), a temporary LZ was established about six kilometers away near the closest hard-surfaced road. The equipment and material evacuated could then be transferred to vehicular transportation for the remainder of the trip.

(b) EVALUATION: The procedure described above reduced the blade time required as well as the time required to close the base. Although close coordination between the PZ and the LZ was required, the system worked extremely well. An additional heavy lift capability was required at the LZ to transfer loads up to 8000 pounds from the ground to the vehicles.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That an intermediate landing zone be used when closing fire support bases which require long distance transportation of material and equipment. This would reduce the time necessary to close the base as well as minimize the helicopter blade time requirements.

(2) (U) ITEM: POL Handling Safety Precautions.

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit has experienced isolated incidents resulting in JP4 fires which could have led to substantial damage to POL equipment and loss of petroleum products.

(b) EVALUATION: The major cause of POL (JP4) fires are:

1. Bursting bladders due to rapid deterioration resulting from climatic conditions present in Vietnam.

2. Shortage of qualified POL handlers.

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3. Sparks caused by the starting or restarting of internal combustion engines within the immediate area where fuel vapors have accumulated.

### (c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That sufficient bladders be on hand or available for immediate issue from depot stocks to replace the bladders that are combat losses or worn out through fair wear and tear.

2. That unit institute programs to insure adequate instruction is given to POL replacement personnel to include drivers of 5000 gallon tankers.

3. That internal combustion engines never be shut down, started or restarted in an area where volatile fuel vapors accumulate.

### (3) (U) ITEM: Effect Of Climatic Conditions On Storage Areas.

(a) OBSERVATION: The rainy season has caused the rapid deterioration of paper products, and palletized perishable supplies shipped or stored in Vietnam.

(b) EVALUATION: Preliminary investigation shows that the rain is detrimental to outside storage to the point that the packing crates often fall apart under their own weight.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That stateside packing be reevaluated to sustain such climatic conditions as are present in the Republic of Vietnam and more suitable containers be devised to include plastic inserts to provide adequate protection from the humidity and rain.

### (4) (U) ITEM: Strobe Light Batteries.

(a) OBSERVATION: Strobe light batteries (4RMIB), are often in short supply.

(b) EVALUATION: A useful field expedient for scarce strobe light batteries (4RMIB) was found to be the use of two BA1388 batteries. Placed in series, the two batteries will fit nicely in the battery compartment of a strobe light, requiring only a small metal nut or washer as a spacer for good contact, resulting in a long life-reliable field expedient.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: This information should be passed on to all units issued strobe lights of this type.

### G. COMMUNICATIONS.

(1) (U) ITEM: Use Of UHF Radio At Brigade TOC.

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(a) OBSERVATION: During contact with the enemy the unit FM command net becomes cluttered with transmissions required to properly brief aircraft. This is a particularly time consuming problem when several aircraft are entering the area at staggered times and the information is passed repetitiously.

(b) EVALUATION: A UHF radio at brigade TOC would enable the brigade to brief aircraft commanders on the tactical situation, pass artillery air data, assign an orbit altitude and position and pass the call sign of the person in command. This eliminates excessive traffic on the unit command net and allows the unit's commander to position his forces and direct the ground action without interference. Once aircraft have been briefed, the aircraft are then turned over to the tactical unit commander for specific targets. This radio can be used for flight following when air assets are shifted throughout the brigade AO from unit to unit; it provides more flexibility in the brigade communications system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That each brigade be authorized a UHF radio for purposes of aircraft control.

### (2) (C) ITEM: FM Communication From Command and Control Helicopters.

(a) OBSERVATION: In many C & C helicopters the FM communication system often fails, and the PRC-25 radio sometimes carried by the C & C party has become the primary means of communication with the ground elements.

(b) EVALUATION: Continuous communication with the ground elements is essential to the effectiveness of a C & C helicopter.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all C & C groups carry a PRC-25 as a back-up system to the ship's console.

### .H. MATERIEL.

#### (1) (U) ITEM: M551 Sheridan Deadline Rate.

(a) OBSERVATION: Repair part control procedures raise the deadline rate for M551 Sheridans.

(b) EVALUATION: The primary cause for the recent (Sep 69) high deadline rate for the M551 vehicle was accelerated wear of sprockets. It was not determinable at Division level if this was a materiel failure, an expected result of the rainy season environment, or both. A major contributing factor to the generalized M551 maintenance problem was strict centralized management of repair parts imposed by General Support Units. Certain critical repair parts on hand are not released to DSU's until deadline conditions exist. This increased the controlled cannibalization requirement and the frequency of expedited convoy runs from the DSU to supporting depots in an effort to keep deadline rates within reason.

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(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the supporting DSU receive fill on high priority requisitions and that at least part of the critical stockage of Sheridan repair parts be decentralized to the field in order to provide faster service. This would preclude vehicles being reported deadlined for 2 to 3 days even though parts are on hand in the depot.

### (2) (U) ITEM: Repair Parts For Non-Standard Items.

(a) OBSERVATION: In March 1969 Honda Motor Bikes were fielded for use in the 1st Brigade. The initial procurement made no provision for repair parts and consequently 7 of the 12 have since been deadlined for parts. The 725th Maintenance Battalion attempted to procure repair parts locally; however, since the Honda motor bikes were 90 cubic centimeters (cc) displacement models, they exceeded the 50 cc limit authorized under Vietnamese law. No parts could be obtained locally and the problem of procurement was referred to USARV G-4. Parts are being procured by the Non-standard Equipment Branch of the Inventory Control Center 1st Log Command. It was necessary for the 1st Log Command to send an individual to Japan for the specific purpose of obtaining repair parts.

(b) EVALUATION: Non-standard items cannot be effectively maintained if repair parts are available only after great delay.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the initial procurement of non-standard items include repair parts necessary to sustain the item during its initial period of operation and that a maintenance support plan be established and coordinated with the maintenance battalion prior to procurement.

### (3) (U) ITEM: Metallic Detecting Devices.

(a) OBSERVATION: Current Army inventory mine detectors are cumbersome when carried on airmobile and water-borne operations.

(b) EVALUATION: During water-borne and airmobile operations, this unit used a metal detection device currently in the US Navy inventory. It is lightweight, easy to carry and has proven very effective in locating mines, booby traps and caches. An infantryman can be trained to be an operator of this device in one day.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the Navy's Ordnance Locator, MK15, Model D - Sperry Rand Manual Systems Division, be included in the Army inventory.

### (4) (U) ITEM: UH-1C Fuel Control Bellcrank Bolts.

(a) OBSERVATION: The last 4 UH-1C's received by this unit from rebuild had the bolts on the fuel control bellcrank on the engine mount improperly installed.

(b) EVALUATION: Improper installation of bolts on the fuel control

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bellcrank on the engine mount causes the bolt to bend on the engine cowling resulting in a binding throttle.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Technical inspectors should consult the appropriate -20 manual and inspect fuel control bellcranks for proper installation of bolts on all rebuilt UH-1C aircraft.

(5) (U) ITEM: Desirability Of A Rotary Tiller When Using Lime For Soil Stabilization.

(a) OBSERVATION: This unit has found the use of lime on wet soil to be a good stabilizer.

(b) EVALUATION: To make the use of lime more effective a rotary tiller is needed. Mixing the lime with the soil by hand is a slow and very difficult task. Rotary tillers would make a more uniform mixture of soil and lime and reduce time and manpower needed for hand mixing.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a rotary tiller be made available for use by engineer units operating in wet areas.

(6) (C) ITEM: Mobility Of The M551 Sheridan.

(a) OBSERVATION: Though more mobile than the M48A3 in muddy terrain the M551 Sheridan is less mobile than the M113A1.

(b) EVALUATION: A track with increased traction would increase the mobility of the M551 in muddy terrain.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: M551 track design be improved to provide more traction in mud.

I. OTHER.

(1) (U) ITEM: The Issuance Of Distinctive Items Of Clothing To The Civilian Population.

(a) OBSERVATION: During this reporting period large quantities of distinctive items of clothing such as children's GVN baseball caps, Chieu Hoi T-shirts, etc. were distributed to the civilian population. The purpose was to develop a feeling of nationalism and to publicize the Chieu Hoi Program. The items were issued and gladly accepted by the people who quickly sold them to US troops as souvenirs.

(b) EVALUATION: As both a PSYOP and civic action effort, the project was a failure.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That future programs of this type be discontinued and that money budgeted for this type of effort be programmed

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for support of recognized patriotic youth organizations such as the Vistnamese Boy Scouts.

(2) (U) ITEM: Backfilling Of Wells At Fire Support Bases.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of soil as a backfill for newly dug wells is undesirable since the soil clouds and makes the water maddy for days and sometimes weeks.

(b) EVALUATION: Laterite and soil should not be used as backfill for new wells.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That washed crusher rock be used as a backfill around newly dug wells, or if rock is unavailable no backfill at all be placed around the wells.

(3) (U) ITEM: VETCAP.

(a) OBSERVATION: The success of MEDCAP has been firmly established. However, treatment and preventive medicine services for domestic animals have been lacking.

(b) EVALUATION: Recently initiated by the 4th Bn (M), 23d Inf was VETCAP, a program of veterinary assistance by qualified personnel for domestic animals belonging to the local populace. In addition to the civic action value of such a project, tactical intelligence of local enemy activity can be obtained. VETCAP can be conducted in the same manner or in conjunction with conventional MEDCAP operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That MEDCAP operations be extended, where qualified veterinary personnel are available, to include services for domestic animals.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JAMES M. CONNELL  
Colonel, GS  
Chief Of Staff

DISTRIBUTION:

4 - CG, II FFV, ATTN: AVVBC-RE-H  
3 - CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC-(DST)  
2 - CG, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT

AVFBC-RE-H (1 Nov 69) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

DA, HQ II FFORCEV, APO San Francisco 96266 5 DEC 1969

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), AFO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of the 25th Infantry Division for the period ending 31  
October 1969, with the following comments.

a. Reference paragraph 1D (9)(g), page 63: last sentence should read:  
On 1 November...in support of the Central Highway and Waterway Committee  
(CENCOM) lines of communication program.

b. Reference paragraph 2D(4), page 90: Appendix VI, Replacement Train-  
ing, USARV Regulation 350-1, 10 November 1969, states that all replacement  
personnel will fire familiarization and zero assigned weapons within 7 days  
of assignment. The unit has been notified.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
B. G. MACDONALD  
1LT, AGC  
Asst AG

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AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 69) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 27 JAN 1970

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,  
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 October 1969 from Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. (U) Reference item concerning "Monitoring Casualty Causes", page 82, paragraph 2A(1); concur. System employed by the 25th Inf Division to monitor and measure the causes and trends of operational casualties is feasible and considered appropriately performed at that level of command. Data obtained can be usefully employed by the Division G-3 and would be more timely and meaningful if collected and analyzed at that level. Existing deficiencies can be quickly diagnosed and training initiated to correct them through the decentralized system employed by the Division.

b. (U) Reference item concerning "Reenlistment for Technical MOS's Utilized Within the Supply and Transport Battalion", page 82, paragraph 2A(2); nonconcur. An individual enlisting/reenlisting for an Army Career Group Option is in no way promised an assignment to any specific MOS within that particular career group. The technical depth of ACG 63 and ACG 76 is recognized; however, there are numerous positions within these ACGs in which personnel can be effectively utilized in an OJT status. Reenlistment for OJT in an ACG is an option authorized by DA and, providing an individual is otherwise qualified, no authority exists to preclude enlistment in any career group. It is recognized that personnel assigned in an OJT status are of limited value to the unit. However, the individual, and the skills he acquires during this period, will be retained in the service and will be of long range benefit to the Army as a whole. Assigning personnel who reenlist for a specific MOS to a school upon completion of their tour in Vietnam is not favorably considered. In almost all cases the necessary skills can be acquired by OJT and formal schooling is not required.

c. (U) Reference item concerning "Sheridan Qualified 11E's", page 83, paragraph 2A(3); concur. All 11E personnel arriving in Vietnam are screened to identify those individuals trained on the M551 Sheridan. Individuals so identified are equitably distributed to units equipped with these vehicles. Unfortunately, the number of Sheridan trained replacements received is not sufficient to meet all requirements and other regularly trained 11E personnel are assigned for OJT to fill the requirement.

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10**

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AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

d. (C) Reference item concerning "Improving Battalion Level Intelligence", page 83, paragraph 2B(1); concur. The use of this concept for improving battalion intelligence collection is particularly applicable to units involved in the pacification program. The use of any aid which benefits a commander in the assimilation of intelligence and in the proper utilization of all available intelligence sources is encouraged by this headquarters.

e. (C) Reference item concerning "Accurate Emplacement of Aerial Delivered Duffel Bag Items", page 84, paragraph 2B(2); concur. However, consideration must be given to the enemy situation and capabilities within the drop area when flying at an altitude between 250-500 feet at a speed of 60 knots. Even with gunship cover, this altitude and speed offer a lucrative target for all types of enemy fire. Prior planning, coordination and experienced pilots are significant factors in the accomplishment of an accurate emplacement of aerial delivered sensors. Rehearsals of the mission in a safe area also contribute significantly to the accomplishment of the mission. Employing units should also be familiar with factory suggested ballistics tables when determining drop altitude and speed for the various types of air delivered sensors.

f. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of PSID's In a Defensive Role", page 84, paragraph 2B(3); concur. Vibrations from artillery, generators and low flying aircraft may cause false activations if the PSID is ground emplaced. Consideration should be given to the use of line sensors in a defensive position as well as the use of PSIDs.

g. (U) Reference item concerning "New Marking for Mine Warning", page 85, paragraph 2B(4); concur. This headquarters encourages the widest dissemination of information regarding enemy practices and procedures. This item will be considered for inclusion in the Combat Intelligence Lessons (CIL).

h. (U) Reference item concerning "Placement of Enemy Land Mines", page 85; paragraph 2C(1); concur. Visible wreckage should be regarded as either booby trapped or mined and troops should be cautious around such wreckage.

i. (U) Reference item concerning "Employment of Radar With Area Ambushes", page 86, paragraph 2C(2); concur. Use of the AN/PPS-4 radar in area ambushes to detect enemy movement is excellent. Sufficient batteries to sustain at least 12 hours operation should be immediately available.

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AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

j. (U) Reference item concerning "Tailboom Strikes on Paddy Dikes", page 86, paragraph 2C(3); nonconcur. TM 55-1520-210-20, paragraph 12-119, specifies that the battery location is dependent on the mission. The battery location is of primary consideration when determining the weight and balance data for the particular mission. The recommendation that all units utilizing low level approaches into pick-up zones relocate the aircraft battery to the nose location does not have universal application. The technique for low level flares used by the aviators at the time of the incident should be reviewed.

k. (U) Reference item concerning "Flame Bath Rigging Problems", page 87, paragraph 2C(5): ACTIV has been tasked to evaluate "Flame Bath" Operations, to include rigging. Until the ACTIV evaluation is completed, USARV is not in a position to recommend the best rigging procedures for these operations.

l. (C) Reference item concerning "Searching Techniques", page 87, paragraph 2C(6); concur. Some sort of probing tool should be carried by combat units to search for possible underground caches or hiding places.

m. (C) Reference item concerning "Use of Scout and Tracker Dogs on Combined Operations", page 88, paragraph 2C(8); concur. Scout and Tracker dogs are trained to seek out Vietnamese. Thus in combined operations where Vietnamese are near the dogs, the effectiveness of the dogs would be greatly reduced. The Dog Training Detachment will attempt to determine a solution to the problem.

n. (U) Reference item concerning "Establishment of Combined Patrol Bases", page 88, paragraph 2C(9); concur. Establishment of a combined US/ARVN patrol base from which joint operations are conducted will greatly increase the effectiveness of the ARVN Forces.

o. (U) Reference item concerning "Liaison with Supporting Aviation Companies", page 89, paragraph 2D(1); nonconcur. The Division Aviation Officer and his staff have the responsibility to insure the maximum utilization of assets. When large lifts are being planned, it may be extremely useful to representatives from the aviation unit(s) involved in the lift to assist in the planning to assure the maximum utilization of the aviation assets. Normally the lifted unit S-4 is the key man in planning for moves. He must be thoroughly familiar with the aircraft capabilities to program and plan for the exact number of sorties necessary to accomplish the task.

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AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 69) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-85 (R2)

p. (U) Reference item concerning "Material Handling Equipment Maintenance Training", page 90, paragraph 2E(1); concur. More specialized training in MHE would enhance operational readiness. Recommend that CONARC review the MHE maintenance training to determine whether a separate MOS is more desirable ~~than~~ broadened scope of training for MOS 63B20.

q. (C) Reference item concerning "Searching Techniques", page 90, paragraph 2E(3): Concur in that soldiers should receive practical exercise training on searching techniques; however, it should be conducted at the Division Replacement Training Centers. This type of training is not applicable to all personnel going through BCT and AIT.

r. (U) Reference item concerning "Zeroing and Test Firing of Weapons", page 90, paragraph 2E(4) and 1st Indorsement, paragraph b; concur with 1st Indorsement.

s. (U) Reference item concerning "Conserving Air Resources and Speeding the Closing of a Fire Support Base", page 91, paragraph 2F(1); concur. The establishment of an intermediate LZ and subsequent use of vehicular transportation to remove equipment and personnel from a fire support base to reduce the amount of blade time required is acceptable.

t. (U) Reference item concerning "POL Handling Safety Precautions", page 91, paragraph 2F(2); concur. ICCV makes every effort to maintain an adequate stock of 10,000 gallon POL bladders in the depot system. Unpredictable demands and sporadic availability of these items from out-of-country sources cause stocks on hand to be depleted at times. Units should institute programs to insure that adequate instruction is given to replacement POL personnel. It is a command responsibility to assure that all personnel are properly trained to accomplish their jobs. It is a matter of doctrine that pumps and other items of equipment should not be located in depressions in the ground or other areas where vapors would tend to accumulate.

u. (U) Reference item concerning "Effect of Climatic Conditions on Storage Areas", page 92, paragraph 2F(3); concur. The recommendation is now in effect. AR 700-58 prescribes the system for reporting individual packaging deficiencies at the time they are noted. The RCS AMS-199 Report (Unitization and Packing of SEA Shipments) submitted quarterly by this headquarters to AMC is used to report general packaging deficiencies such as the or, cited in this ORLL. The two reporting means have resulted in changes to applicable Military Standards and revision of AMCR 746-8 (Preparation of Shipments for Southeast Asia) with resulting improvements in packaging of items for SEA shipment.

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AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 69) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

- v. (U) Reference item concerning "UHF Radio at Brigade TOC", page 92, paragraph 2G(1); concur. Each brigade is already authorized an AN/VRC-24 radio, which is designed specifically for aircraft control.
- w. (C) Reference item concerning "FM Communications from Command and Control Helicopters", page 93, paragraph 2G(2); concur. The Command and Control party can carry a PRC-25 and use this as a back up system when the helicopter FM communications fail.
- x. (U) Reference item concerning "M551 Sheridan Deadline Rate", page 93, paragraph 2H(1); nonconcur. DSU fill and decentralization of Sheridan repair parts to the field is desirable, but not feasible due to the shortages of critical repair parts in USARV. Issues of controlled parts are made only against bona fide deadlines as reflected on the deadline report. ICCV has taken action to raise requisitioning objectives to support the M551, however many of the items are not being received. Recommend further consideration by AMC to provide a required stockage of Sheridan repair parts to USARV.
- y. (U) Reference item concerning "Repair Parts for Non-Standard Items", page 94, paragraph 2H(2); concur. Originators of requests for non-standard items must include a list of repair parts IAW USARV Reg 715-1. The 25th Division, which originated the request for Hondas, was advised as to the proper procedures to use in future requests for non-standard items. Local procurement in Japan has solved this problem.
- z. (U) Reference item concerning "Metallic Detecting Devices", page 94, paragraph 2H(3); concur. The Army should continue to evaluate new equipment to provide the best possible mine detecting devices. Eighty-eight MK15 Ordnance Locators are being procured under ENSURE 238 for evaluation by USARV units.
- aa. (U) Reference item concerning "UH-1C Fuel Control Bellcrank Bolts", page 94, paragraph 2H(4); concur. Investigation revealed that only one incident occurred versus the four reported. No other units have reported similar incidents, therefore this is considered to be an isolated incident.
- ab. (U) Reference item concerning "Desirability of a Rotary Tiller When Using Lime for Soil Stabilization", page 95, paragraph 2H(5); concur. The use of rotary tillers to prepare the soil stabilization mixed with lime is a proven technique. Rotary tillers are available in the Army Supply System and are issued upon TOE/MTOE/TDA/MTDA authorization either to units or Class IV Equipment Pools.

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AVHGC-DST (1 Nov 69) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 25th Infantry Division,  
Period Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

ac. (U) Reference item concerning "Mobility of the M551 Sheridan", page 95, paragraph 2H(6); concur. There is no record of any previous complaint from users of the M551 Sheridan as to its mobility in mud. Tests in Panama, in an environment similar to Vietnam, concluded that the M551 was at least equal in mobility characteristics to the M113 APC. It is recommended that further action on this item be deferred until the 25th Inf Div provides amplification on their complaint. Mobility in mud is a complex function of vehicle ground pressure, track width and design, vehicle power, driver skill, and other variables. For that reason, it is recommended that amplified comments from users be provided to USAMC for appropriate action.

ad. (U) Reference item concerning "The Issuance of Distinctive Items of Clothing to the Civilian Population", page 95, paragraph 2I(1); non-concur. Prior planning is a necessary and essential part of civic action and PSYOP work in RVN. In regard to this recommendation, coordination with and cooperation of GVN officials are necessary. This program has to be part of an overall PSYOP program to gain the desired results. It is also recommended that the local commanders institute a program for informing the troops about the program, so they will not purchase back the items.

ae. (U) Reference item concerning "VETCAP", page 96, paragraph 2I(3); concur. The use of VETCAPS can be of great value. HQ, USARV Veterinarian's Office presently has a VETCAP Program implemented. Through coordination of MACCORDS and GVN channels, VETCAPS are carried out in conjunction with local Vietnamese personnel.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Cy furn:  
25th Inf Div  
II FFV

  
L. D. MURRAY  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant Gr

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GPOP-DT (1 Nov 69) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 25th Infantry Division for Period  
Ending 31 October 1969, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 17 FEB 1970

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

  
D. A. TUCKER  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AGC

TROOP LIST  
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
1 AUGUST - 31 OCTOBER 1969

I. ORGANIC

- a. Command & Control Elements
  - HHC, 25th Inf Div
  - HHC, 1st Brigade
  - HHC, 2nd Brigade
  - HHC, 3rd Brigade
- b. Combat
  - 3rd Sqdn, 4th Cav
- c. Combat Support Elements
  - HHC, 25th Inf Div Arty
  - 1st Bn, 8th Arty
  - 7th Bn, 11th Arty
  - 3rd Bn, 13th Arty
  - 2nd Bn, 77th Arty
  - 25th MP Company
  - 25th Aviation Battalion
  - 65th Engineer Battalion
  - 125th Signal Battalion
- d. Combat Service Support Elements
  - HHC & Band, 25th Div Spt Cmd
  - 25th Admin Company
  - 25th Med Battalion
  - 25th S&T Battalion
  - 725th Maint Battalion

II. ASSIGNED

AUTHORITY

- a. Command & Control Elements - None
- b. Combat Elements
  - 1st Bn, 5th Inf (Mech)
  - 4th Bn, 9th Inf
  - 2nd Bn, 12th Inf
  - 2nd Bn, 14th Inf
  - 2nd Bn, 22nd Inf (Mech)
  - 3rd Bn, 22nd Inf
  - 4th Bn, 23rd Inf (Mech)
  - 1st Bn, 27th Inf
  - 2nd Bn, 27th Inf
  - 2nd Bn, 34th Armor (-)

USARV GO 5063.3 Oct 69

II. ASSIGNED (Cont)

AUTHORITY

Co B attached to 1st Inf Div	USARV GO 3502 15 Sep 69
Co C attached to 1st Bde, 5th Div (Mech)	" " 1836 21 May 69
Co F, 75th Inf (Ranger)	" " 557 17 Feb 69

c. Combat Support Elements	
9th Chemical Det	USARV GO 503 4 Feb 68
38th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)	" " 5423 24 Oct 67
44th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)	" " 5423 24 Oct 67
46th Inf Plt (Scout Dog)	" " 713 15 Feb 68
66th Inf Plt (Combat Tracker)	" " 821 21 Feb 68
265th FA Arty Det (Radar)	" " 1412 22 Apr 69

d. Combat Service Support Elements	
15th Public Information Detachment	USARV GC 503 4 Feb 68
18th Military History Detachment	" " " " " "
20th Public Information Detachment	" " " " " "
25th Military Intelligence Detachment	" " " " " "

III. ATTACHED

a. Command & Control Elements - None

b. Combat Elements - None

c. Combat Support Elements	
Btry B, 5th Bn, 2nd Arty	
Btry I, 29th Arty (1 Plt)	
44th EOD Det	USARV GO 1357 10 Apr 67
159th Med Det, Helicopter Ambulance	" " 5121 4 Nov 68
258th FA Det (Radar-CM)	" " 4263 10 Sep 68
341st Avn Det	" " 931 16 Mar 69
362nd Avn Det	" " 1268 11 Apr 69

d. Combat Service Support Elements	
5th Weather Sqdn Det (USAF)	USARV GO 1122 1 Apr 69
20th Preventive Med Det	" " 4701 9 Oct 68
40th MED Det	" " 5166 9 Oct 67
390th Quartermaster Det (Petroleum)	" " 5406 23 Oct 67
USA Special Security Det	" " 4182 3 Sep 68
372nd Radio Research Co	" " 2433 6 Jul 69

IV. OPERATIONAL CONTROL

3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div

V. DIRECT SUPPORT

LOCATION

4th Med Det	Cu Chi, RVN
Co B, 86th Signal Battalion	Cu Chi, RVN
53rd Signal Det	Cu Chi, RVN

IV. DIRECT SUPPORT (Cont)

LOCATION

61st Trans Det	Cu Chi, RVN
HQ Co, 86th Signal Bn, Support	Cu Chi, RVN
94th Maint Co, Support	Cu Chi, RVN
116th Assault Helicopter Co	Cu Chi, RVN
242nd Assault Helicopter Co	Cu Chi, RVN
277th Resupply Bn, Service	Cu Chi, RVN
283rd Sig Det	Cu Chi, RVN
325th Weather Det	Cu Chi, RVN
501st Land Clearing Co	Cu Chi, RVN
578th Sig Co, Support	Tay Ninh, RVN
587th Sig Co, Support	Tay Ninh, RVN

V. GENERAL SUPPORT

8th Aerial Port Sqdn	Cu Chi, RVN
12th Med Hospital Evac	Cu Chi, RVN
HQ & Btry A, 6th Bn, 15th Arty	Tay Ninh, RVN
20th TC Co, Aircraft	Cu Chi, RVN
45th Sigr MA (MUST)	Tay Ninh, RVN
269th Avn Bn, Assault Helicopter	Cu Chi, RVN
362nd Engr Co	Tay Ninh, RVN
515th Engr Plt, Asphalt Construction	Cu Chi, RVN
554th Engr Bn, Construction	Cu Chi, RVN
588th Engr Bn, Combat, Co C	Tay Ninh, RVN

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCCS


6 October 1969

SUBJECT: Commander's Combat Note - The Bushmaster Operation

SEE DISTRIBUTION

It is my view that we are not making the most of our ambush opportunities at night. A technique that I have found very successful is the Bushmaster. I realize that some of you use similar techniques. In the inclosure are outlined the basic principles. I desire that each battalion commander have one or more companies experiment with this technique within his assigned area of operations.

1 Incl  
The Bushmaster Operation



HARRIS W. HOLLIS  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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A; plus 3rd Bde,  
9th Inf Div (10 cys)

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from classified inclosures

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## Commander's Combat Note - The Bushmaster Operation

1. (C) The first step is to choose an area of operations (AO) based on valid intelligence (i.e., POW interrogations, previous operations, observed trail activity, agent reports, radar sitings, etc.). The area for an infantry company may cover two to four grid squares (even more) and may be of any shape. The Bushmaster force may be inserted by airmobile means, may walk in or be hauled in. It may be inserted directly into the AO or by whatever method that is best suited to the situation at hand and the skill of the force. Once in the AO a small command group sets up a clandestine command post (CP). The platoons move out from the CP and usually fragment into smaller ambush patrols. A detailed map study and careful use of troops allows a company commander to configure his AO with AP's interdicting the most likely routes of movement, including waterways where appropriate. This configuration is maintained throughout the first night and the next day. The maximum number of personnel should be allowed to rest during the hours of daylight. Just before or at dusk the following night, all AP's disperse to alternate locations to increase coverage of the AO. The following morning, approximately 38 hours after insertion, the Bushmaster operation should end. Airmobile assets may be used to extract the unit, or the unit may conduct a reconnaissance on multiple axes enroute to its base.
2. (C) A successful Bushmaster depends on several factors. A clandestine introduction into the AO is of critical importance. The skills of the individual soldier, decentralized control and thorough briefings by commanders down to the last private are absolutely essential. Small ambushes must be located so as to complement and reinforce several adjacent positions, and a properly placed portable radar can provide critical information. The basic principles of ambush must be used and forcefully applied: cover and concealment, ability to stay alert during the hours of darkness (by enforced rest during day), and the positioning of all available weapons must be planned and aggressively executed. Indirect fire weapons must be closely coordinated since many small units will be located throughout the AO.
3. (C) Bushmasters can have a devastating effect on any enemy movement of supplies and troops. However, the operation is only as good as the intelligence upon which it is based and the competence of the leaders who execute it.
4. (C) A unit that specializes in Bushmaster techniques and perfects it to a high military art can expect productive results.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCCG

7 October 1969

SUBJECT: Commander's Combat Note - Sniper Techniques

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. In taking a look at our sniper program at this juncture, I had the performance of a recent day of sniper employment profiled to see how each was being employed. I discovered that over half of the snipers in this division were being employed from towers in the vicinity of fire support bases. Although this may have been a profitable way of employing snipers at one point in time, I am of the view that the enemy has now accommodated to a sniper's presence in certain of our towers, and has adapted his movements to avoid us.
2. While there is a need to cover fire base defenses with observed fire, I think that these defenses can be covered by a rifleman, as opposed to a sniper, and thereby the sniper might be put to better and more imaginative use.
3. Moreover, I do not get the feeling that each battalion commander in this division is personally supervising, on a centralized basis, the sniper assets that he has. I say this as a broad observation, recognizing that in a number of instances battalion commanders are doing just this. I would like to see all battalion commanders intensively managing their sniper programs, applying imaginative approaches, avoiding stereotypes as they become unproductive, and maintaining an experimental attitude toward the entire program.
4. I believe that our growing sniper capability can conclusively demonstrate its significant worth to us as we attempt to accomplish our mission. I have enclosed some general thoughts on snipers which I commend to each commander. These should not be considered as any final answer. There are many avenues to explore and we all should proceed to explore them, posthaste.

1 Incl  
as

s/ Harris W. Hollis  
t/ HARRIS W. HOLLIS  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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A (PLUS)  
3d Bde, 9th Inf Div - 10

A TRUE COPY

  
WILLIAM D. WATSON  
CPT, FA  
Division Historian  
Incl 3

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A DESIRED SNIPER PROGRAM  
WITHIN THE 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION

1. ORGANIZATION: Six snipers should be assigned to each battalion headquarters and headquarters company and four at each brigade headquarters. It is essential that sniper employment be planned and controlled no lower than battalion level, by the commander.

2. SOME SUGGESTED INITIAL METHODS OF EMPLOYMENT:

a. Ambush Patrols: Placing snipers with ambush patrols is a most successful method of employment. Two techniques can be used extensively: 1) The sniper team accompanies a platoon on an ambush. 2) The sniper team, with a security element of five to eight men, establishes an ambush/sniper position.

(1) When employed with a platoon ambush, the sniper team remains close to the platoon command post. When an element of the platoon observes enemy activity, the snipers are alerted to that location. The snipers engage selectively at night with the starlight scope or with the ART scope during daylight. If there is but one Viet Cong in the area, he is taken under fire by a sniper. In this way the ambush position and location of automatic weapons are not compromised. Snipers with suppressors can engage at will without compromising the ambush position. When a group of Viet Cong approach the killing zone, the snipers engage the Viet Cong leaders and radio operators while other members of the platoon fire into the general kill zone. Another technique which has been successful in an ambush is that of having the snipers fire tracers to mark the flanks of an enemy force which has approached the position in an area other than the specified kill zone. Snipers are also used to engage Viet Cong who probe the ambush site, attempting to incite the ambush to fire prematurely, thus disclosing automatic weapons positions and detonating its claymores.

(2) The second successful method of employment has been that of placing a sniper team and a five-to-eight man security element in a carefully selected sniper/ambush position. The general area is selected by the battalion commander who considers the enemy activity in the area and the advice of the sniper team. The team is moved to a company forward position where it is joined by the security element. The security element is equipped with M16's, M79's, and an AN/PRC-25 radio. The sniper/ambush position is occupied just prior to dark. The location is selected to provide maximum range of fires and is located within a reasonable distance from a friendly unit. The snipers maintain a continuous surveillance of the area. Eye fatigue at night is minimized by having the snipers alternate the use of the starlight scope throughout the night. The M79 is an especially useful weapon at a sniper/ambush position. Viet Cong frequently have been observed in a tree line or in a vegetated area wherein a shot is not possible due to a low light level. By directing M79 fire into the area, the Viet Cong, on several occasions, have been forced to move and expose themselves to sniper fire.

b. Stay-Behinds: Snipers, having long range fire capability, are extremely effective in engaging Viet Cong who follow a unit as it moves from one location to another. A sniper team with a 5-8 man security element is

Incl 1 to Incl 3

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selected to provide long range observation of the route over which the unit has traveled. Snipers with their telescope sights are able to engage the Viet Cong at ranges out to 900 meters. At extreme ranges, the Viet Cong frequently are not cautious about their cover and concealment. Thus, they present excellent targets for the sniper team.

### c. Off-Set:

(1) A xenon search light has been used to covertly illuminate an area with pink light. The starlight scope is sensitive to a portion of the infrared band that is pink and near the visible light portion of the spectrum. By using a pink filter on a xenon search light an area can be illuminated with invisible light that registers in the starlight scope. This phenomena has been used successfully in two types of sniper activity: berm security and ambush operations.

(2) Successful ambushes have been conducted by placing a searchlight equipped  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicle 1200 to 1500 meters from a road intersection. Snipers equipped with starlight scopes were placed 300 meters from the intersection. Maintaining radio contact with the searchlight operator, the snipers controlled the covert illumination of the intersection and surrounding areas. When Viet Cong appeared in the kill zone they were easily engaged by the sniper team. It has been found that by off setting the sniper teams from the searchlight and placing the searchlight and  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicle in a position remote from the ambush site, the enemy in the kill zone is not alerted to the noise of a running engine.

(3) The pink light/sniper combination has been successfully employed in base camp security operations. The searchlight, mounted on a  $\frac{1}{4}$  ton vehicle, responds to radio equipped sniper teams in position either on the berm or in ambush positions outside the berm. The background noise of a fixed base camp conceals effectively the noise of the engine and activity of the searchlight crew. In forward base camps the searchlight remains in the center of the base camp and, by swinging its beam through 360 degrees, covertly illuminates avenues of approach into the position. With this method it is again essential that the sniper teams maintain radio contact with the searchlight crew. The pink light is particularly useful during the dark of the moon period.

d. Counter Sniper: Sniper teams are effective in countering Viet Cong sniper activity. Each team, equipped with its telescopic sight and M49 Spotting Scope, searches the area of suspected sniper activity. The optical equipment permits a detailed search of distant areas. A recent example is that of a unit, after having been fired on by a Viet Cong sniper from long range, deployed its sniper team. The team searched the tree line with its optical equipment and the Viet Cong sniper was discovered in a tree at 720 meters. While one team member judged the wind using the M49 spotting scope, the other man fired one round, killing the Viet Cong sniper.

e. Night Hawk Operations: Night Hawk operations can occasionally make good use of snipers to mark targets and to engage them.

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3. PROBLEM AREAS: The following problem areas have been encountered in training and employment. The problem areas are discussed here to provide guidance to units initiating a sniper program.

a. When sniper teams are employed for prolonged periods with units other than units of assignment, there is a tendency for the snipers to be overlooked when promotions are considered, when Rest and Recuperation leave is scheduled and other personnel affairs.

b. The personal interest of battalion and company commanders is essential in selecting candidates for the sniper school. Men have been "volunteered" for the course when they not only expressed no interest in the program but had a very short time remaining in country. The selection and training of only well motivated and interested men is essential to the program.

c. Commanders must take an active interest in employing snipers. Without command interest, sniper teams will be employed poorly and the results of the sniper program will be meager. There have been examples of snipers being positioned in dense vegetation with limited fields of fire while riflemen in the same unit were located in positions with wide fields of fire. In those units in which the commander imaginatively employed his snipers, the results have been significantly greater than in units which the commanders were less interested in the program.

d. A sniper, with his optical equipment, frequently is able to see the immediate reaction of a Viet Cong as he is hit by a bullet. In some cases, a sniper who has been well motivated will suddenly lose interest in sniping after witnessing a kill. This can be detected only by careful and regular debriefing of both members of the sniper team.

4. EXPERIMENTATION: The need for imaginative employment and experimentation is paramount if the unit's sniper program is to get off of the ground, so to speak. Continued forward momentum will be directly related to the commander's degree of interest and imaginative exploitation of this valuable resource.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96225

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
8 October 1969

SUBJECT: Commander's Combat Note - Offensive Use of Radar (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Recently, I distributed a letter to all units in the Division concerning the needed improvement in our intelligence program at the unit level. One of the subjects addressed in this letter was the imaginative and aggressive use of ground surveillance radar as an offensive weapon, to be employed wherever and however it could find the enemy and direct a combat response against this enemy. Some units of the Division, through imagination and innovation, have already enjoyed success in this program and their experiences are set forth here so that other units may benefit from them. Some other suggested techniques are also included for the guidance of all units.

2. (C) These examples should encourage all commanders to employ the radar assets as an integral part of their offensive operations at night. They can do much more than merely provide early warning of a probe or an attack on one of our bases.



HARRIS W. HOLLIS  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

2 Incl  
1 - Offensive Use of Radar  
2 - Other Suggested Techniques

DISTRIBUTION:  
A; plus  
3d Bde, 9th Inf Div (15 cys)  
G3 (10 cys)  
Div Hist (14 cys)

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## OFFENSIVE USE OF RADAR

1. (C) On the night of 24 September 1969, the AN/PPS-5 radar at Patrol Base Dees was employed to periodically monitor, in order to acquire targets, the area around a squad sized ambush patrol from Company A, 2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry, which was in position some 1200 meters southwest of the base. At 2322 hours, the patrol engaged ten (10) enemy thirty (30) meters to the east of their position, after detecting them with a Starlight Scope. After a brief firefight, the patrol checked the area and found three (3) dead enemy. Within minutes of this contact, the radar detected a group of enemy moving toward the patrol's position along a trail 100 meters to the west. The information was radioed to the patrol leader and he had sufficient time to shift his men to face the threat, confirm the sightings with a Starlight Scope and engage this force, killing two (2) more enemy. As this patrol was returning to the base, the radar, vectoring its movement, detected movement 100 meters behind the patrol. This movement was engaged by artillery and abruptly ceased.

2. (c) The next night, in the 1st Brigade area, an AN/PPS-4 radar was used to maintain contact with and direct fires upon a fleeing enemy. Company A, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry, had established a series of four (4) ambushes along the southern edge of the Renegade Woods. Their radar was employed to cover the area to the west toward the Cambodian Border. At 2045 hours, the men at the CP location detected approximately sixty (60) personnel moving 100 meters southwest of their position. A heavy firefight ensued, during which the Company Commander directed the radar operator to "lock on" to the contact and report any movement from that area. After ten (10) minutes, the fire slackened and the radar began to detect groups of enemy moving south from the contact site. The Company Commander had co-located his mortar section leader with the radar, and each radar polar plot was applied to the plotting board for immediate conversion to an accurate grid which was relayed to the artillery Forward Observer for engagement. In this manner, five (5) separate targets were engaged. This continued pressure so disorganized the enemy that shortly his elements began to blunder into the ambush positions, setting off a chain of five (5) more engagements. Fifteen enemy were killed and one was captured as a result of these fights because the enemy could not effectively break contact.

3. (C) Operating from Patrol Base Hunsley on the night of 30 September, Company B, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, employed an AN/PPS-5 to monitor the movement of their ambush patrols into position and keep the area around the patrols under surveillance. At 1940 hours, the radar detected 10-15 individuals following one of the patrols. The patrol was informed of its "shadow" and continued to its location. Shortly after the patrol settled into position at 2000 hours, the radar detected 5-7 enemy in their immediate area. Being fully alerted, the patrol sighted 30-40 enemy within 50 meters of their position at 2007 hours and immediately engaged them with their organic weapons, followed by a light fire team and a Night Hawk helicopter. Two enemy bodies were recovered from this action. Again, the radar had provided security and target information for an offensive operation.

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OTHER SUGGESTED TECHNIQUES

1. (C) Use radar to direct the movement of a force into a position to block an enemy withdrawal, or to interdict enemy movement.
2. (C) Radar could be used in conjunction with sniper teams to direct their surveillance toward an area of activity.
3. (C) Employ radar to vector friendly aircraft into a target area.
4. (C) Use radar to vector friendly units in a "link-up" or reinforcement at night.
5. (C) Collect and analyze radar data to aid in the selection of future AP sites, and to determine more lucrative radar sites.
6. (C) Use radar to vector sweep elements into areas engaged by artillery or gunships as a result of radar sightings.
7. (C) Confirm the accuracy of indirect fires, and assist in the adjustment of these fires.

Inclosure 2 to Incl 4

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, 25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCOP

17 October 1969

SUBJECT: Commanders Combat Note - Ranger Operations

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. I would like to see the Rangers used in a more aggressive role as opposed to operating solely as an intelligence gathering agency. I am confident that the techniques used in the Delta are applicable to large areas of our TAOI. The enemy at present is dispersed, and a six to twelve man team should be able to hold its own until help can be made available. Large parts of the 2nd and 3rd Bde AO's are ideally suited for various types of operations such as: Parakeet; 12 and 18 man Hunter-Killer operations (6 men conduct ground reconnaissance and 12 establish a linear ambush and maneuver if hunter element establishes contact); snatch missions; sniff operations; rescue missions; sniper teams; 6 man ambush and recon missions; counter-mortar operations; combined operations with the US Navy and RVN forces; and others which can be developed. Many of these operations can be conducted in the 1st Bde AO with little or no modification.
2. Interest and support must go both ways. The brigades must support the Rangers, and the Rangers must be interested in what is going on in the brigades. A mutual understanding of each other's capabilities and limitations can insure the maximum effectiveness of all operations.
3. The brigades should request Ranger Teams to conduct operations which they feel would be best handled by a small, well trained unit. I believe that short missions, where they can carry light loads and move quickly and quietly would be profitable (two days maximum). Various means can be used to insert the teams into an operational area; these include such methods as stay-behinds on airmobile or mechanized operations, walkout from friendly units, boat insertions, as well as rappelling or parachuting from aircraft. The methods of inserting and employing Rangers are many and varied. The use of different techniques will prevent the establishing of easily detectable patterns and greatly enhance the Ranger's effectiveness.

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AVDCOP

17 October 1969

SUBJECT: Commanders Combat Note - Ranger Operations

4. Once the Rangers have established contact with the enemy, the team should be reinforced if necessary to fully exploit the contact. Rather than extract, we should "pile-on" to eliminate the enemy force and gain all available intelligence information.


5. The Ranger Company is capable of providing long range reconnaissance and combat patrols to supplement other operations conducted by the Division. They are a valuable asset which we must exploit to the fullest extent possible. I encourage commanders at all levels to recommend and support Ranger operations, and I am confident that the results will be rewarding.

s/ Harris W. Hollis  
t/ HARRIS W. HOLLIS  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

A; plus  
15- Co F, 75th Inf (Rangers)  
25- G3  
30- 1st Bde  
30- 2nd Bde  
30- 3rd Bde  
30- 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div

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WILLIAM D. WATSON  
CPT, FA  
Division Historian

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Headquarters 25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCCG


20 October 1969

SUBJECT: Commanders' Combat Note - Defense Against Sappers

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) Enemy units are increasing sapper training throughout their ranks. Because of the increased possibility of sapper techniques being used against Division base camps, fire support bases, and patrol bases, the attached lessons learned by the 5th Battalion, 60th Infantry should be very useful.
2. (U) I urge all commanders to use sapper Hoi Chanhs in judging defensive capabilities and vulnerabilities. At the earliest opportunity, units should attain assistance of these Hoi Chanhs to determine the actual strength or weakness of our defensive measures.

1 Incl  
as

  
HARRIS W. HOLLIS  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:  
B (Plus)  
30-1st Bde, 25th Inf Div  
30-2nd Bde, 25th Inf Div  
30-3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div  
30-3rd Bde, 25th Inf Div

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 5TH BATTALION, 60TH INFANTRY  
9TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96371

AVBB-ID-ST

10 October 1969

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned - Defense Against Sappers (U)

Commanding Officer  
3d Brigade  
9th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96371

1. (C) During the last six months, no significant sapper attacks have occurred in Rach Kien District. However, analysis of previous contacts and intelligence reports indicates that sapper units are active and capable of launching an attack.
2. (C) On 10 September 1969, a request was made to the Tan An Chieu Hoi Center for a former Viet Cong sapper to make a detailed inspection of the battalion base camp.
3. (C) The former sapper was made available within two days. He proved extremely valuable in providing comments and observations on the base camp defense, the most likely avenues of approach for a sapper attack, and the best attack plan. His general comments included:
  - a. Sapper Limitations:
    - (1) Sappers will normally withdraw when constant illumination is fired.
    - (2) Sappers have difficulty in crossing wet areas because of the heavy loads they are required to carry. Sappers prefer to walk on solid ground or dikes.
    - (3) Chain-link fencing is extremely hard to cut.
    - (4) Triple concertina wire is also extremely hard to cut and time consuming when used in conjunction with chain-link fencing.
    - (5) Trip-flares destroy secrecy, and therefore, normally cause the sapper to abort the mission.

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AVBE-ID-ST

10 October 1969

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned - Defense Against Sappers (U)

b. Recommended Counter Sapper Defense Measures:

- (1) Fire illumination at irregular intervals.
- (2) Maintain alert LP's, day and night.
- (3) Install additional trip flares at a greater distance from the perimeter.
- (4) Cut tall grass around the perimeter.
- (5) Emplace additional wire in grass, canals, and paths.
- (6) Install concertina wire and chain-link fencing around all grave sites located near the perimeter.
- (7) Construct triple concertina (supported) in depth on the outside of the chain-link fence.
- (8) Construct additional chain-link fencing at a 20 meter radius around bunkers for protective stand-off of RPG and 107 rockets.
- (9) Partition internal areas with chain-link fencing in order to canalize an attack.

4. (C) The specific lesson learned is that a former sapper is extremely valuable to a battalion in evaluating the effectiveness of its base camp defense and in providing recommendations for improvements. The general lesson learned is that there are many external sources upon which a battalion may call for assistance.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

/s/ JOSEPH S. JOHNSTON  
/t/ JOSEPH S. JOHNSTON  
CPT, Infantry  
Adjutant

"THIS IS A TRUE COPY"

  
JOHN E. CONNOR III  
CPT, GS  
Asst G3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96225

AVDCCG

SUBJECT: Effective Intelligence Program

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (U) The evolution of an effective intelligence program in Vietnam has been a long and slow process and great progress has been made. Nevertheless, our intelligence must be further improved if we are to preserve the lives of our soldiers and defeat the enemy.

2. (C) This war has been termed, "An Intelligence War". Every commander must be acutely responsive to the changing situation of enemy locations or intentions. The enemy has withdrawn the major portion of his main force units from our area of operations. The local VC and guerrilla forces for the present have become the target of primary interest. The large number of squad and cell-sized units in the enemy forces makes it impractical for the division and brigade intelligence sections to keep abreast of all locations and situations. An increased task falls on the battalion commander and his S2.

3. (U) To insure maximum use of available intelligence resources, each commander must know and understand all sources of intelligence that are available to him. He will then be able to use them fully and devise new means to exploit them. We can take away from the enemy some of the few advantages he has remaining, regardless of whether he is a local hamlet guerrilla or a recent infiltrator from North Vietnam.

4. (C) Intelligence sources available to the battalion commander include:

a. Human sources: Prompt exploitation of intelligence produced by prisoners and Hoi Chanh has resulted in the elimination of enemy forces and the capture of significant caches. This type of intelligence is very perishable. The information from a PW or a Hoi Chanh must be exploited before his comrades are able to leave the area or move their caches. A prisoner or a Hoi Chanh should be evacuated rapidly to the nearest location at which he can be interrogated. The information acquired must be disseminated at once to both senior and subordinate units. Reports from agents should also be given consideration but only in conjunction with

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Incl 7

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AVDCCG

SUBJECT: Effective Intelligence Program

other intelligence to determine validity.

b. Electronic Means: The product of electronic devices will remain simply data unless it is exploited by the commander.

(1) Within the battalion the commander has his Ground Surveillance Radar Section. All too frequently the radar is used only in a defensive role. The great feature of radar is that it takes away the cover of night from the enemy. Imaginative and aggressive commanders use it as an offensive weapon. If a radar set is not producing sightings, it must be either relocated or given a new sector of scan. Take it out on night ambushes to cover known LOC's. All cleared radar sightings must be engaged and the results checked at the earliest possible time.

(2) The People Sniffer, SLAR, Red Haze and Duffle Bag sensors indicate a presence. Although the presence will not always be hostile, when taken with other intelligence it may confirm an enemy location. Good commanders use these indicators to plan locations for day and night operations.

c. Reconnaissance: Reconnaissance is conducted from the air, on the ground or by boat. All soldiers moving through or across an AO should constantly search for signs of enemy presence. Even the untrained observer can detect such indicators as a hostile population or recent trail activity. Aerial reconnaissance assets can cover areas inaccessible to ground troops but patterns of reconnaissance must not be established. Anything out of the ordinary should be reported, regardless of the observer's estimate of its relevance.

d. All other means: Intelligence can be gathered from a variety of other sources within the AO. Daily contact with the district chief and his DIOCC give the commander access to intelligence produced within his AO by Vietnamese agencies. Personal contacts with village chiefs, spiritual leaders, and commanders of RF/PF forces will produce intelligence. Other contacts by members of the unit, such as MEDCAPS or similar operations will produce intelligence for the commander.

5. (C) I want an effective targeting system set up within each battalion to enable the commander and his staff to determine the most likely areas for productive operations. One valuable aid is a target intelligence center in the Battalion TOC. On a separate map board, preferably 1/25,000 scale, a seven day accumulation of all VR sightings, contacts, acts of terrorism, SLAR, Red Haze, Duffle Bag, Airborne Personnel Detector, agent

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
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SUBJECT: Effective Intelligence Program

reports, and radar sightings are plotted in a color code which denotes the different days of the week. A nightly review by the commander and staff will reveal areas of activity in which operations should be undertaken.

6. (U) Our goal is to destroy the enemy while preserving the lives and well-being of our soldiers. This can be best accomplished by careful assessment of and timely reaction to intelligence.



HARRIS W. HOLLIS  
Major General, USA  
Commanding

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
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AVDCIN

7 September 1969

SUBJECT: LOI - Radar Ground Surveillance Employment (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) PURPOSE: To establish policy, and delineate responsibility for the employment of the ground surveillance radars in the 25th Infantry Division TAOI. This LOI supersedes 25th Infantry Division LOI dated 17 April 1969, subject as above.

2. (U) APPLICABILITY: These instructions apply to all units assigned or under the operational control of the 25th Infantry Division.

3. (C) RESPONSIBILITIES:

a. Assistant Chief of Staff G2 has the general staff responsibility for the employment of all ground surveillance radars organic or attached to the 25th Infantry Division.

b. Division Artillery Commander has the responsibility for the employment of AN/TPS-25 radars as approved by the Commanding General.

c. Brigade Commanders have the responsibility for the integrated employment of AN/PPS-5 and AN/PPS-4 radars assigned to the maneuver battalions under their operational control.

d. Commanding Officer, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, has the responsibility for the employment of AN/PPS-5 and AN/PPS-4 radars assigned to that unit.

e. Commanding Officer, 725th Maintenance Battalion has the direct support maintenance responsibility for all organic and attached ground surveillance radars.

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AVDCIN

4 September 1969

SUBJECT: LOI - Radar Ground Surveillance Employment (U)

4. (C) CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT:

a. AN/TPS-25 radars will be located to provide coverage of those areas determined to be most lucrative for the detection of enemy main force movements. All locations will be approved by the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division.

b. AN/PPS-5 radars will be located primarily to provide long range identification and location of hostile targets during periods of reduced visibility. Due to its range capability, every effort will be made to locate AN/PPS-5 radars to obtain maximum long range surveillance of enemy LOCs. Commanders should not restrict themselves to fire support bases and patrol bases for radar site locations, but should also site radars in Vietnamese installations whenever these locations will improve radar ground surveillance capability.

c. AN/PPS-4 radars will be located primarily to provide close-in surveillance at fire support bases, patrol bases, night offensive positions, bridges and other small critical installations.

d. All ground surveillance radars, except the AN/PPS-4, will be mounted on towers to minimize dead space and ground clutter.

e. All AN/TPS-25 and AN/PPS-5 radar locations will be surveyed unless occupancy is to be for less than 72 hours. When an AN/PPS-4 is employed at a semi-permanent site, the location will be surveyed.

f. Commanders will ensure that quick-fire communications are established between radar sites and operations centers for rapid target engagement determination. Appropriate engagement may include artillery, Light Fire Team, Night Hawk, mortars, infantry reaction, or a combination of these means. Commanders will establish direct-line communications between radar sites and nearest artillery battery fire direction center to expedite Artillery engagement when appropriate.

g. An SOP should be established citing brigade criteria for the attack of radar acquired targets. The SOP may specify, for example, that artillery will immediately request clearance for and engage targets with fewer than ten personnel. Targets of ten or more personnel would be immediately cleared, but referred to the Brigade Commander for a decision as to method of attack.

h. All ground surveillance radars will have adequate communications to provide immediate reporting of sightings and for tip-off to radars to scan areas in which activity is detected by other acquisition means. Radar operators will be instructed to monitor areas of Duffel Bag activation to verify size and presence of enemy, if area is within radar scan capability.

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4 September 1969

SUBJECT: LOI - Radar Ground Surveillance Employment (U)

i. All radar sightings will be reported promptly as spot reports to G2 Operations, with follow-up reports as additional information is developed. Every effort will be made to visually confirm results of all combat responses to radar acquired targets through use of Night Hawk or ground reaction elements.

j. No ground surveillance radars, other than those maintained in the division maintenance float, will be placed in reserve or employed solely as back-up to another radar without the approval of the Commanding General.

5. (C) TASKS:

a. Division Artillery Commander will:

(1) Employ organic and attached radars in accordance with the concepts outlined above.

(2) Furnish required directional and horizontal survey control to radars and furnish technical assistance, less maintenance and logistics, to Brigades and 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry concerning employment and capabilities.

(3) Obtain approval of the Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, prior to relocating AN/TPS-25 radars. Requests for approval can be made orally through the G2.

(4) Maintain a clutter/coverage diagram for each active AN/TPS-25 site. One copy will be forwarded to G2.

(5) Provide daily report on the operational status of all organic or attached radars to G2 Air.

b. Brigade and 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry Commanders will:

(1) Employ organic radars in accordance with the concepts outlined above.

(2) Maintain a clutter/coverage diagram for each active AN/PPS-5 site. One copy, 1:50,000 scale, will be forwarded to G2 Air. Diagrams need not be submitted for a site that will be active for less than 72 hours.

(3) Provide daily report on location and operational status of all organic radars to G2 Air. Telephonic reports of any changes to the operational status report will be made as soon as they become known.

6. (C) MAINTENANCE:

a. COMMANDING OFFICER, 725th Maintenance Battalion will:

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4 September 1969

SUBJECT: LOI - Radar Ground Surveillance Employment (U)

(1) Maintain AN/PPS-4 and AN/PPS-5 radar sets in maintenance float. Authorized density will be determined in accordance with 25th Infantry Division Regulation 750-1 and current Major Item Agency (MIDA) list, as published by USARV.

(2) Provide maintenance assistance to user units to include periodic courtesy inspections.

(3) Establish policies and procedures to attain minimum deadline rates on ground surveillance equipment.

(4) Inform the G2 of the status of deadline ground surveillance equipment as soon as it is known.

b. Operators will perform daily maintenance checks in accordance with appropriate technical manuals. This check should be performed prior to 1000 hours to insure equipment faults are detected and repaired prior to night operations. 725th Maintenance Battalion, will be notified immediately of radar deadlines. AN/PPS-4 and AN/PPS-5 radar sets that cannot be repaired and returned prior to nightfall will be exchanged for a maintenance float. A statement by the appointing authority or surveying officer releasing the radar for repair will accompany those radars damaged other than by fair wear and tear (FWT). Such a statement must be furnished prior to issue of a float set from the Maintenance Battalion.

c. The Commanding Officer, 725th Maintenance Battalion, will insure float radars are available for this exchange. The Commanding Officer of the supported organization will be responsible for transporting radar sets to and from the supporting DSU. During daylight hours, maximum utilization should be made of DISCOM helicopter assets for evacuation of radar sets. After 1900 hours, Division ready ship will be utilized for evacuation of radar sets and will have priority second only to support of troops in contact.

d. To preclude damage to AN/PPS-4 and AN/PPS-5 radar sets, all movements will be conducted by helicopter sorties. Vehicles may be used to transport AN/PPS-4s and AN/PPS-5s within base areas with the driver instructed not to exceed 10 miles per hour. Vibrations and bumps will be held to an absolute minimum.

e. To prevent damage to tower mounted Receiver-Transmitter units by the rotor-wash of helicopters, the following measures will be taken:

1. PPS-5 radars will be wired to the tower.

2. PPS-5 radar antenna reflectors and feed horn will be removed when the radar is not in use during daylight hours.

3. Nails will be given through the ground spike holes in the tripod of PPS-5 radars and bent over the foot to further anchor the equipment.

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4 September 1969

SUBJECT: LOI - Radar Ground Surveillance Employment (U)

7. (C) TRAINING:

a. Each unit equipped with the PPS-4, PPS-5 and TPS-25 radars will conduct a supervised, mandatory, daylight training program for all radar personnel. Training will be conducted daily for a minimum of one hour and whenever possible will incorporate the use of aerial observer, artillery firing battery and/or friendly reconnaissance patrols.

b. When an artillery observer conducts the radar training, he will instruct the operator to scan a specific area and report to him what is sighted. The observer will vary the nature of targets such as artillery registrations, sampans, water buffalo, wheel and track vehicles, and personnel. When friendly patrols are used, the operator will track the patrol from the Fire Support Base/Patrol Base, continuously verifying its direction of movement, speed and location by means of radio communications.

c. Daylight training will give the operator an abundance of known targets enabling him to make visual checks affording him the opportunity to associate targets with sound and wave shape patterns.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/ James M. Connell  
t/ JAMES M. CONNELL  
Colonel, GS  
Chief of Staff

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B-(1-2, 5-10, 18-20, 25-28,  
30-32, 47-49, 51-63)  
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*Michael D. Keating*

MICHAEL D. KEATING  
Major, Armor  
Division Historian

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
4TH BATTALION (MECH), 23D INFANTRY  
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96385

AVDCFBC-OP

11 August 1969

SUBJECT: After Action Report (Operation Labrador Retriever)

THRU: Commanding Officer  
1st Bde, 25th Infantry Division  
APO 96385

TO: Commanding General  
25th Infantry Division  
APO 96225

1. Introduction: Operation Labrador Retriever was conducted on 8 August 1969, on the Northeast side of Nui Ba Den Mountain with a two fold mission:

a. Locate and recover the body of an American Soldier killed in action on 12 July 1969, during an operation conducted by the 2nd Bn (Mech), 2nd Inf then OPCON to the 25th Infantry Division.

b. Locate and destroy any enemy resistance in the immediate area.

2. Initial Planning: CO, 4th Bn (M), 23d Inf received the mission on 7 August 1969 and contacted Major James J. McDivett, XO, 2/2 Infantry, who had information on a possible location of the remains. A low level air recon was made by CO, 4/23d Inf (M) and XO, 2/2 Inf to locate possible LZs and approach routes. The area was at the base of a very rocky portion of Nui Ba Den Mountain. (XT277607) Later that afternoon the CO, 4/23d Inf (M) made air photos of the area to facilitate planning and briefing. Intelligence indicated a principal threat of accurate enemy snipers, RPG teams and possible mortars. The size of enemy forces was unknown.

3. Concept of Operations: The concept of operation envisioned by the CO, 4/23d Inf (M) was to form a six (6) man recovery team to make a single combat assault, screened by smoke, recover the body and link up with a ground support force of three APCs. Then RIF the area, supported by a strong base of fire.

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#### 4. Final Planning and Coordination: (See Annex A) (Map)

a. Two Mechanized companies, B and C, 4/231 Inf (M), plus 2 RF Companies were placed in the area to support the operation and provide diversionary forces for the recovery phase of the operation. A base of fire was established, composed of one 8" Howitzer, a tank platoon, 4.2 mortar platoon and two 40mm Dusters. Artillery support was provided by batteries firing from FSBs St. Barbara, Grant, Bragg and Washington.

b. A Ground Support Force commanded by 1LT Nelson, was formed using; HQ 6, a M113 APC equipped with a borrowed US Navy Mark 20-40mm cannon plus battalion command communications, HQ 88 equipped with a 7.62 mini-gun and B12 equipped with a Cal 50 Machinegun plus eight infantrymen, each with M60 machineguns.

c. A six man volunteer Recovery Team was formed as follows:

- (1) Team Chief (w/Smoke Pot) - LTC Taylor, CO 4/23d Inf (M)
- (2) Deputy Team Chief (w/Radio & Smoke) - Major McDevitt, 2/2d Inf
- (3) RTO & Smoke Member (w/PRC 25 & Smoke) - CSM Gallagher, 4/23d Inf
- (4) Graves Registration Member (w/Body Bag) - 1LT Fio Rio, 1st Inf Div
- (5) Mines and Booby Traps Member (w/Grappling Hook & special equipment) - SP4 Davis, A Co, 65th Engr, Bn.
- (6) Photographer and Smoke Member (w/Camera and Smoko) - PFC Dixon, 4/23d Inf (M)

This team was inspected and rehearsed several times while in the vicinity of FSB Rawlins before commitment (See Photos) and a air recon inspection conducted to determine visibility and wind direction. The air photos were used to identify and code name specific locations and were used by the various forces, teams and pilots. Also, the team photographer had an additional mission of providing photos if the remains proved to be other than expected.

#### 5. Execution:

a. Phase I (Recovery) - On 8 August 1969 the fire base and maneuver units were in place prior to 1045 hrs. Mortar WP fire was placed between the objective area and suspected sniper locations which proved to be rather ineffective. At 1055 hrs the single ship combat assault was successfully completed. The body was located and screening smoke was placed between this location and the suspected sniper locations. (See Photos). The Ground Support Force arrived as the body was recovered and the three sub teams (Members 1 and 3, 2 and 6, 4 and 5) loaded the remains plus other equipment found in the area (helmets, RPG Screen, and ammunition). There was no evidence of booby traps in the area nor any evidence of enemy search and police. However, dud RPG rounds were found in the area. The body did not appear to be mutilated in any way. Identification tags and wallet were still on the remains. As the team linked up and began to withdraw from the objective area, enemy sniper fire was received from the base and sides of the mountain striking the APCs. CO, 4th Bn (M), 23d ordered the three APCs

into line and engaged the area with all weapons. Tracer fire from a Car 15 proved effective in identifying enemy locations. One US Navy gunner on the Mark 20 - 40mm was wounded. Two snipers began to run and were killed. The mini-gun proved extremely effective. Smoke Pots were then placed between the sniper locations and the APCs. The infantry squad was deployed with its 8 M60 Machineguns, their APC with the body and team, less LTC Taylor and CSM Gallagher, was ordered back to the base of fire. LTC Mott, CO, 7/11 Arty on his own initiative brought up two 40mm Dusters which were immediately put to use. Company D. w/277 RF Co reinforced the Ground Support Force plus artillery fire and TAC Air.

b. Phase II (RIF) - The reinforced team composed of the Ground Support Force (less 1 APC), Company B, 4/23d Inf (M) and 277 RF Co, plus the two (2) 40mm Dusters moved back to the edge of the objective area. The force engaged suspected sniper and RPG locations with all available fire and received several secondary explosions. As this force began a careful withdrawal by bounds, with vehicles moving in reverse, RPG fire was received. The force was then ordered forward by the CO, 4/23d Inf (M). This action proved very effective when coupled with a high volume of fire. Again all available fire and air was used effectively. The force was withdrawn about 300 meters and a LOH was directed in for the CO, 4/23d Inf (M). Upon landing, this aircraft received sniper fire. The south flank of Co B also received fire which was effectively returned. Two vehicles became mired in soft rice paddies and the recovery operation received sniper fire. The operation terminated at 1645 hours.

#### 6. Statistical Data:

Date: 8 August 1969

Location: XT 277 607

Duration: Contact sporadic between 1112 and 1605 hours.

Ammo Expenditures:

##### Artillery

8" at Base of Fire	89 rds
8" at FSB St Barbara	122 rds
155mm	586 rds
105mm	391 rds
Totals	1188 rds

##### 4.2 Mortars

HE	277 rds
Smoke	52 rds
Total	329 rds

##### 90mm Tank

HE	105 rds
----	---------

Air Assets

TAC Air Strikes 2 w/Bombs and Napalm  
Light Fire Team 1 w/40mm Mini-gun (no 2/75 rockets  
were fired)  
Tactical CS Drop 1 (Extremely good coverage)  
One Flame Bath aborted  
Results: 9 Body Count (VC)  
1 US WIA (US Navy)

7. Lessons Learned:

a. Smoke pots are extremely effective however almost half were too wet from storage to make the match strikers function. An electrical firing method is being tried, also the wire carrying handles must be wrapped for easier hand carrying at the run.

b. Commanders can effectively use tracer rounds in the M16 or CAR 15 for target marking.

c. Small enemy forces watch carefully and engage only at times when either difficult maneuvers or obvious vulnerabilities exist, i.e.: withdrawals, mired vehicles reorganization or resupply or helicopter landings.

d. Close control is essential at the instant of engagement and the choice of prompt devastating fire on area targets or careful, accurate, slower fire at point targets requires an immediate command decision. In this case the immediate forward movement under RPG attack proved to be effective.

e. Once engaged the US Forces must act quickly to seize the initiative before receiving casualties causing organization structure to deteriorate.

8. VICTORY IS THE PRODUCT OF PROFESSIONALISM!


s/ G. E. Taylor  
t/ G. E. TAYLOR  
LTC, Armor  
Commanding

2 Incl  
Annex A - Maps  
~~Annex B - Photos~~ - not rec'd HQ, DA

A TRUE COPY:

*Michael D. Keating*

MICHAEL D. KEATING  
Major, Armor  
Division Historian



Annex A

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
18TH MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT  
25TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCMH

23 September 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report

THRU: Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: Command Historian  
APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Headquarters  
Department of the Army  
ATTN: O.C.M.H.  
Washington, D.C. 20315

1. NAME AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION: Combined US/ARVN forces, see paragraph 7, Task Organization.
2. INCLUSIVE DATES OF OPERATION: 4-5 September 1969.
3. LOCATION: Ref Map Series L7014, Sheet Number 6231 II, Grid XT521349; Khiem Hanh District, Tay Ninh Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS:
  - a. US - 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
  - b. ARVN - 1st Brigade, 1st Airborne Division.
5. PERSONS INTERVIEWED:
  - a. LTC Bruce F. Williams, 04524051, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion (Mechanized), 22d Infantry.
  - b. 2LT Michael P. Pate, 416527304, Platoon Leader, 2d Platoon, Company A, 2d Battalion, 34th Armor (Acting team commander during most of the contact period).
6. INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Assistant Division Historian.

Incl 10

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Previous to the action on 4-5 September, the 25th Infantry Division had developed an SOP under which the Division Tactical Operations Center would react to each significant contact by immediately dispatching a fire support "package" consisting of a forward air controller, a helicopter fire team, a helicopter loaded with tactical CS gas, and a "Flame Bath" (3 55-gallon drums - 2 diesel fuel and 1- AV Gas w/igniters) helicopter. In this manner, the Division would bring all types of available fire support to bear against the enemy in the first minutes of contact. Once these assets arrived on station, they were under the control of the ground commander and he would coordinate their employment.

#### 10. INTELLIGENCE:


a. Enemy - There were no specific intelligence leads to this operation. There was, however, continuous intelligence that enemy units under the control of SR-1 were operating in the Boi Loi Woods. In the seventeen days prior to this contact, units of the 2-22 Mech had made five (5) significant contacts in the Boi Loi Woods. For several months, captured documents, PW's, Hoi Chanh, and agent reports had indicated that SR-1 units were understrength, low on food, and suffering from low morale.

b. Terrain - The Boi Loi Woods has scattered trees over one foot in diameter; large areas of trees under one foot in diameter, generally spaced two to ten feet apart; and is generally filled in with brush from two to eight feet tall. In many areas the density of vegetation has been lessened by B52 strikes, tactical air strikes, and artillery. Besides clearing away some of the vegetation the high explosives have also left many areas so densely cratered that the craters are more of an obstacle to vehicular movement than the vegetation was. Standing water and waterlogged soil have further limited vehicular access into and mobility within the Boi Loi Woods. The vegetation provides excellent concealment. Observation and fields of fire are limited, generally from 10-20 meters (See Photograph 1 - Terrain). From 31 May 1969 to 9 June 1969, the 60th Land Clearing Company conducted Rome Plow operations in the upper Boi Loi Woods. During that period the 60th LC Co split the woods into four quadrants with an "X" cut. The arms of the "X" varied in width from approximately one (1) kilometer to approximately 500 meters. (See Photograph 2) After Rome Plow operations were completed, the deadfall was not cleared out since it was too wet to burn and civilians did not enter the area to cut firewood. Even though the deadfall provided some concealment and occasional obstacles to tracked vehicles, the Rome Plow cut greatly increased aerial observation and gave rapid, relatively secure, access for mechanized units to previously inaccessible areas. Further, the Rome Plow cut made it possible for mechanized units to establish night laagers in the heart of the woods. The cover and concealment offered by deadfall, craters and partially destroyed enemy positions which remained after Rome Plow operations were insignificant compared to that offered by the standing vegetation.

11. MISSION: Team A, 2-22 Mech was to conduct a combined dismounted reconnaissance with the 12th Airborne Company through the eastern quadrant of the



Photograph 1  
Terrain



INCLOSURE 2  
AERIAL PHOTO -  
ROME PLOWCUT

upper Boi Loi Woods and upon completion, mount the airborne company and move back to the Rome Plowed area to establish a combined night laager.

12. CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND EXECUTION: The coordinated operation order and overlay provided for a flexible operation giving the general area to be searched and approximate axis of advance. (See Figure 1)


After crossing the LD at 0830 hours, Team A and 12/7th Abn moved along axes parallel to an unused trail. When not engaged in a detailed search, the two units moved in a column type formation. The vehicles were in a double column led by the three M48A3 tanks of 2/A/2-34 Arm. The first platoon, A/2-22 Mech was dismounted, moving on line ahead of the tanks. The second platoon, A/2-22 Mech, was dismounted in column, providing left flank security. The right side of the formation was covered by 12/7 Abn, moving in a narrow "T" formation (See Figure 2).

Through the morning and early afternoon of 4 September 1969, the Team searched several areas. At 1125 hours, in the vicinity of XT515348, they found six (6) spider holes and two (2) tunnels which showed no recent activity, and were destroyed. By 1155 hours, further search of the same area had disclosed two (2) 4' x 4' x 5' bunkers with three (3) feet of overhead cover and a four (4) meter tunnel off each bunker. The bunkers showed signs of recent use and it was estimated that 5-6 personnel had spent the previous night there.

Two (2) RPG-2 rounds were located under some foliage in the vicinity of XT519348 at 1330 hours and destroyed. Shortly thereafter, a Russian 50-pound anti-tank mine was found in the trail in the vicinity of XT521349. No attempt was being made to clear the trail but the MACV advisor with the 12/7 Abn noticed the mine as they paralleled the trail. Making a detailed search of this area, a fresh trail recently traveled by 2-3 personnel moving northeast was found at 1418 hours. At 1425 hours, lead elements of the Team spotted suspected movement to their north.

With signs of recent activity and suspected movement ahead, the Team Commander decided to deploy his infantry and tanks on line, followed by the APC's on line in support, and sweep a heavily vegetated area to the north-northeast in which the movement had been reported. The Team's present location was so heavily cratered that the vehicles had been confined to movement in file.

The Team Commander moved his infantry on line to the left of the tanks and requested that the ARVN troops move on line to the right. In order for tank 23 to come on line, tank 24 had first to move forward and allow 23 to pass to its rear, because of numerous craters. At 1445 hours, after tank 24 had advanced approximately 10 meters, two (2) RPG rounds were fired from the brush to the left front, impacting on the gunshield, killing the driver and burning the tank commander's face. At the same time, the enemy began firing AK-47's and a .51 caliber machine gun from the right front. (See






FIGURE 2 - FORMATION  
 FORMATION FRONT c.100M  
 ↗ NOT TO SCALE ↖

Figure 3). The Team immediately returned fire with small arms, caliber .50 machine guns and the tank main guns. The platoon leader's tank (tank 21) went out of action after its first round from a ruptured cartridge. As the crew of tank 24 was recovering the dead driver, they observed a group of ten (10) enemy in the brush and killed all ten (10) with a cannister round.

At 1455 hours, the 2-22 Mech requested an urgent MEDEVAC, not knowing that the driver was dead, and a helicopter light fire team. This request was forwarded by the Division Tactical Operations Center to the 25th Aviation Battalion as a requirement for a Light Fire Team, a CS drop and a "flame bath". A Forward Air Controller was directed to the contact area and arrived overhead at 1456 hours. The 25th Aviation Battalion supplied the flame bath by diverting an airborne ship which arrived on station at 1457 hours.

Despite the damage and casualties to the crew, tank 24 fired eight (8) rounds of cannister and its caliber .50 machine gun before it was ordered to retire to join two mired M113's approximately 100 meters to the rear in an open area. With tank 21's main gun out of action, tank 23 moved to the spot where tank 24 had been hit and engaged the enemy with its main gun.

The Team Commander ordered his infantry forward and attempted to deploy his APC's to support them. Bomb craters so limited the movement of vehicles that the APC's could not deploy out of a single file until they had advanced beyond tank 23's position. The high volume of enemy fire directed at the Team from the left half of the enemy position, and the .51 caliber fire coming from the right side stopped the Team's infantry approximately 10 meters from the enemy's forward bunkers.

Unable to maneuver, and too close to the enemy positions to engage them with supporting ordnance, the Team Commander ordered his elements to pull back approximately 40 meters. As they began the withdrawal, the Team Commander was wounded and the tank platoon leader assumed command since he was at the focal point of the action. The dismounted elements were able to mark the trace of the enemy bunkers with smoke grenades as they pulled back.

Upon initial contact, the ARVN airborne company had withdrawn to the vicinity of the two mired APC's, drawing sporadic fire as they pulled back.

As Team A withdrew, their artillery forward observer adjusted artillery behind the enemy bunker line, engaging the area in depth. By 1515 hours, the Team had completed its short withdrawal, and enemy fire slackened. By 1532 hours, the necessary medical evacuations were completed and the 2-22 Mech Battalion Commander, now airborne over the contact area, directed the drop of the "flame bath", and at 1534 hours, the 25th Aviation Battalion Light Fire Team began rocket and machine gun runs against the enemy forward positions.

The Forward Air Controller put in the first air strike at 1539 hours:

NOTE: NOT ALL ENEMY WEAPONS SHOWN - LOCATIONS APPROX.




FIGURE-3  
INITIAL CONTACT  
↪ NOT TO SCALE ↩

◇ ◇ MIRED M113'S  
APPROX 100M TO  
REAR, IN OPEN

two (2) A37 fighters, dropping four (4) 500-pound bombs each into the area behind the forward bunkerline.

The CS ship with 12 E158 CS cannisters on board arrived on station at 1541 hours.

The second air strike, consisting of two (2) F-100's dropping two (2) 500-pound bombs each and two (2) napalm containers each, was put in at 1600 hours.

It was decided to deliver the CS in three (3) passes of four (4) cannisters each. The A/25 Avn Light Fire Team had returned with a second load of ordnance and was expended between CS drops. Although it did not interfere with the use of the CS on this operation, the commander's options were limited because the 12/7 Abn did not have protective masks. The CS drops began at 1616 hours and the third drop was completed at 1626 hours. Following the last drop, artillery fire was shifted into the area of the CS drop.

(Figure 4 compares the pattern of fire support with the actual enemy dispositions as determined by a ground sweep on 5 September. The fire support was delivered in depth, based on the correct assumption that the enemy position was constructed in depth.)

While the artillery was firing following the last CS drop, the Team Commander requested that the 12/7 Abn move up on his right flank and join him in sweeping the contact area. The MACV advisor attempted to get the ARVN unit to join the team, but was unsuccessful. When the 2-22 Mech Battalion Commander landed to refuel his light observation helicopter, the Assistant Division Commander for Maneuver had made his UH1 Command and Control ship available for the Battalion Commander's use. The 2-22 Mech Battalion Commander had picked up the 7th Airborne Battalion Commander and S3 and their MACV advisor. Thus, when the coordination problem arose, both the concerned battalion commanders were over the battlefield in the same helicopter. After being briefed on the situation, the ARVN Battalion Commander ordered the 12/7 Abn to move up and join the sweep, which it did.

The Division Tactical Operations Center had been monitoring the action and had previously ordered Troop D, 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry to dispatch a light fire team to replace the A/25 Avn element. The "Centaur" gunships arrived on station at 1645 hours.

As the A/2-22 Mech and 12/7 Abn moved forward toward the enemy position, they were still unable to maneuver their vehicles other than advancing on the single file track that they had used previously. The remaining fully operational tank from 2/A/2-34 Arm led the column with the 2-22 Mech dismounted elements on its left and the 12/7 Abn on its right. Tank 23 advanced to within 20 meters of the known RPG position and engaged it with the main gun. Inaccurate RPG fire was returned. A high volume of automatic weapons and .51 caliber fire was received across the entire front and sporadic sniper fire came from the left flank. (See Figure 5)

SUPPORTING ORDNANCE




FIGURE - 4  
S NOT TO SCALE ↺




FIGURE - 5  
 SECOND EFFORT  
 NOT TO SCALE

APPROX 100M TO REAR, IN OPEN

Tm A/2-22 Mech and the 12/7 Abn engaged the enemy with organic weapons but were not able to suppress the enemy fire. The APC's were not able to employ their caliber .50 machine guns to the front but were able to place suppressive fire on the snipers on the left flank. Unable to silence the enemy fire after almost 30 minutes of close contact, unable to effectively maneuver the APC's, and having taken further wounded, the US and ARVN forces withdrew approximately 75 meters to bring artillery and gunship fire onto the enemy position.

The artillery fire was adjusted to the enemy positions and after MEDEVAC's were completed, the D/3-4 Cav light fire team engaged the area of heaviest enemy fire at 1751 hours.

When the rocket and machine gun runs were completed, the artillery fire was shifted and the US and ARVN forces again moved forward. They advanced in essentially the same formation and were again met by a high volume of enemy fire. The enemy fire from the left flank had increased in volume (See Figure 6).

The advance was again stopped before the APC's could deploy on line. At 1742 hours, enemy fire from the left flank was of sufficient volume that the Team leader had his infantry fall back on their APC's so that the area could be saturated with caliber .50 machine gun fire. The US and ARVN units remained in close contact with the enemy for 20 to 30 minutes and suffered further wounded. Still unable to silence the enemy fire or effectively maneuver, they again withdrew to allow supporting elements to engage the enemy positions.

Artillery was shifted into the area and at 1817 hours, "Issue 15", who had replaced "Issue 13" as Forward Air Controller, directed the delivery by two (2) F-100's of two (2) 500-pound bombs and two (2) containers of napalm each. The air strike was completed at 1829 hours.

At 1830 hours, with darkness rapidly approaching, the Team Commander requested permission to leave the contact area and move to a night laager position. The 2-22 Mech Commander approved the request and the team recovered its mired vehicles and the US and ARVN forces moved toward the Rome Flow cut. They returned to the Rome Flow cut along the axis of advance they had used entering the area.

Rather than moving to the planned laager site, the US and ARVN forces were directed to laager where the two mortar tracks and maintenance track from A/2-22 Mech had been located. Beginning at 1702 hours, six (6) helicopter sorties of resupply for the troops in contact had been flown to the mortar position and Tm A/2-22 Mech and 7/12 Abn laagered there to facilitate resupply.

During their last two attempts to overrun the enemy position part of the enemy fire had come from snipers in trees. Four (4) snipers were blown out of their trees by M48 main gun fire and another was killed by M16 fire from the Team's infantry.




FIGURE -6  
THIRD EFFORT

NOT TO SCALE

APPROX 100M TO REAR, IN OPEN

The move to the night laager (XT491356) was without incident, except for one (1) NVA spotted in a treeline at 1855 hours. The lone enemy was engaged with caliber .50 machine gun fire but the results were not determined. The US and ARVN forces closed on their night laager at 1952 hours.

As the Team was moving out, the 2-22 Mech S-3 requested air strikes be put in the contact area all night. Air strikes were put in at 2000 hours, 2030 hours and 2058 hours. The six (6) sorties totaled 12 500-pound bombs and 12 napalm containers.

The next day, 5 September, elements of the 2-22 Mech swept the contact area. There were no enemy remaining and a careful search of the area was made.

This search revealed the shape of the enemy bunker complex and also the tunnel system behind the bunker complex. When the enemy had evacuated the position, they left behind 1000 pounds of rice in the tunnels, which the 2-22 Mech recovered. They also found a body that the enemy failed to remove in one of the bunkers. The enemy body was unmarked and apparently was killed from concussion during one of the air strikes. The area was strewn with uniforms and pieces of uniforms. Dried blood was found inside of many of the bunkers. Letters and notebooks were located which identified the 83d Rear Service Group. This unit provides logistical support to the SR-1 elements. No identification was gained on enemy tactical units.

While the search of the enemy position was in progress, a gunship from D/3-4 Cav spotted an abandoned mortar position, with mortar in place, outside of the search area. The "Centaur" gunship engaged the position and destroyed the mortar.

### 13. RESULTS:

#### a. Friendly casualties and losses:

(1) US: KIA - 1  
WIA - 10  
One (1) M48A3 damaged

(2) ARVN: WIA - 1

#### b. Enemy casualties and losses:

KIA - 16  
Rice (evacuated) - 1000 pounds  
Mortar (destroyed) - 1

### 14. ANALYSIS:

a. Operations in terrain such as the Boi Loi Woods are difficult for any type of force. The combination of dense brush and closely grouped craters

in the contact area presented an obstacle which effectively limited the maneuver capability of this mechanized/tank team. Only two of the armored vehicles (tanks 21 and 23) could place effective fire on the enemy positions, the firepower of the M113's could not support the advancing troops, thus during the attempted sweeps the advantage remained with the entrenched enemy.

b. The previous Rome Plow operations had done much to offset these terrain disadvantages. Units could gain rapid access to the likely contact areas, and spend more time searching and/or developing a contact. Ground reinforcement could be more easily effected if needed.

c. The immediate dispatch of "packaged" air assets by the Division Tactical Operations Center greatly assisted the Battalion Commander. After the initial contact report, the elements in contact were provided continuous air support throughout the fight. The Battalion Commander had only to concern himself with the employment of the assets made available to him. Besides allowing the commander to concentrate on the actual conduct of the battle, the initiation of support by the DTOC also reduced the volume of radio traffic on the Battalion Command Net.

d. The assumption of command by the tank platoon leader was the best solution in this situation. He was centrally located and had better observation and communication than the two rifle platoon leaders on the ground. He displayed both aggressiveness, in repeated attempts to sweep the enemy position, and sound judgment in recognizing that he had not gained sufficient superiority to do this.

e. The lack of a unified command on the operation initially threatened to prevent the full force of the US and ARVN elements from being brought to bear on the enemy. However, the co-location of the US and ARVN battalion commanders over the battlefield allowed on-the-spot coordination which prevented dissipation of the available force. Besides the desire of both commanders to destroy the enemy, there was also a background of daily coordination in planning and conducting similar operations.



MICHAEL D. KEATING  
Major, Armor  
Division Historian

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
18th Military History Detachment  
25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCMH

10 October 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report

THRU: Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: Command Historian  
APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Headquarters  
Department of the Army  
ATTN: O.C.M.H.  
Washington, D.C. 20315

1. (U) NAME AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION: Company A, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry - Rifle Company.
2. (U) INCLUSIVE DATES OF OPERATION: 21 September 1969.
3. (U) LOCATION: Ref Map Series L8020, Sheet 6231 II S, Vicinity Grid XT534234; Trang Bang District, Hau Nghia Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. (U) CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry.
5. (U) PERSONS INTERVIEWED:
  - a. LTC Burton J. Walrath, Jr., 057265850, Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry.
  - b. 1LT David L. Sackett, 236667028, 2d Platoon Leader, Company A, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry.
  - c. 1LT Steven Boal, 520505921, 3d Platoon Leader, Company A, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry.

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d. 2LT Franklyn G. Matthews, 140361400, 1st Platoon Leader, Company A, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry.

e. 2LT Duanne G. Swift, 378485970, Mortar Platoon Leader, Company A, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry - accompanied 2d Platoon.

f. WO1 Arnold J. Rahm, 435840074, 2d Section Leader, Armed Helicopter Platoon, 116th Assault Helicopter Company, 269th Aviation Battalion - Command Pilot on the Lead Gunship of the Light Fire Team accompanying the nine (9) ship lift allocated to 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry.

g. SGT Billy D. Browning, 559625811, Reconnaissance Sergeant, Headquarters and Service Battery, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery - with Forward Observer Team attached to Company A, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry.

6. (U) INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Assistant Division Historian.

7. (U) TASK ORGANIZATION: Company A, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry.

8. (U) SUPPORTING FORCES:

a. Direct artillery support - Battery B, 1st Battalion, 8th Artillery, 105mm, Fire Support Base Pershing, XT519255.

b. Army Aviation - Command and Control Helicopter, Nine (9) Ship Lift (UH1H), and Light Fire Team (2 UH1C) - 116th Assault Helicopter Company, 269th Aviation Battalion.

9. (U) BACKGROUND: 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry was attached to the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. In addition to performing missions as assigned by the 2d Brigade, the battalion also had an Area of Operation (AO) which contained the bulk of an area known as the "Citadel". (See Figure 1) The "Citadel", bounded by Route 1, Route 6A, Route 7A, the Saigon River, and the "Hobo Woods", has been a traditional Viet Minh/Viet Cong stronghold and was still an area of high enemy activity.

The battalion's AO was bounded on the west and north by the AO of the 3d Squadron, 4th Cavalry, on the east by the AO of 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry, and on the south by the AO of 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 5th Infantry.

Within its AO, the battalion was responsible for planning and executing operations under supervision and guidance from 2d Brigade. The 2d Brigade planning guidance in effect at the time of this operation placed emphasis on small unit operations to eliminate the elements of Sub-Region 1 units operating in the "Citadel".

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


FIGURE 1 2-12 INF AREA OF OPERATIONS

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SHEET - 6231

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The battalion planned its operations from a target priority list prepared weekly by the Battalion Commander, S-3, and S-2. The priorities assigned by the Commanding Officer were derived from consideration of all available intelligence and the need for surveillance of certain areas, such as hamlets known to contain VC sympathizers, on a periodic basis. During the week, the list was modified as necessary in response to newly developed intelligence.

The Operation Order submitted to the 2d Brigade for approval for operations on 21 September included an operation for A/2-12 in the northern portion of the AO near the "Thumb". 2d Brigade was gathering intelligence for a specifically targeted operation in the area and, wishing the area undisturbed, cancelled the planned operation for A/2-12. Upon receiving the cancellation, 2-12 Inf reviewed their target priority list and decided that Company A would be given a mission planned for later in the week, a search of New Ong Dam Hamlet. Company A received its new mission for 21 September at about 2300 hours 20 September.

On 20 September, A/2-12 had conducted a ground reconnaissance from Fire Support Base (FSB) Pershing, vicinity XT 519255, to Bo Hec Hamlet, vicinity XT545237, where a detailed search was conducted, then the ground reconnaissance was continued to Patrol Base (PB) Dees where the company spent the night. (See Figure 2) During the night the company had one squad from 1st Platoon out on a combat patrol.

10. (U) INTELLIGENCE:

a. Enemy - PW interrogation and civilian reports indicated that the Trang Bang Local Force Battalion was operating within the 2-12 Inf AO. The reports also gave an unconfirmed location for the battalion's C4 Company in the vicinity of New Ong Dam. Trang Bang was known to be an enemy supply source. Unidentified supply personnel would purchase in the open market, or otherwise acquire, rice and other supplies in Trang Bang and transport them north or northeast to their units and caches near the Saigon River.

b. Terrain - New Ong Dam was the name given by 2-12 Inf to a newly established hamlet located in the vicinity of XT531234. The residents of New Ong Dam had come from X. Ong Dam, vicinity XT536227. X. Ong Dam had been located within a hedgerow complex which was cleared after it was determined to be a site of heavy enemy activity. New Ong Dam had been built astride a trail in an open field. The 2-12 Inf Commander said he felt an open area was chosen by the villagers to avoid involvement in the war. He further stated that their attempt was not successful since the VC continued to use the hamlet as an area of activity.

Though the operation was planned against New Ong Dam, the bulk of the enemy were engaged in a brushy area east of the hamlet. (See Figure 3)

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


FIGURE 2 BACKGROUND A/2-12


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FIGURE 3 TERRAIN

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SHEET - 62311S  
SCALE - 1:25,000



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c. Weather - Weather on the 21st was clear and presented no obstacles to the planned operation.

11. (U) MISSION: 21 September 1969.

a. A/2-12(-) - Airmobile assault vicinity New Ong Dam. Conduct cordon and search of New Ong Dam.

b. 1/A/2-12 - Conduct "Eagle Eye" operations. (Eagle Eye was used as a code name for an airborne patrol of the battalion AO. The patrol was under battalion control and provided quick reaction to targets as developed, primarily suspicious civilian activity.)

c. Mort/A/2-12 - Secure Patrol Base Dees.

12. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: The cordon and search operation was thought of not only as an end in itself, finding enemy personnel and supplies hidden in the village, and helping in the long run, to isolate the enemy from the civilians; but also as an intelligence gathering activity.

The operation was essentially open-ended since it was hoped that the interrogation of the civilians after they had been assembled would turn up information about nearby enemy personnel or supplies to which the searching unit would immediately react.

The use of gunships accompanying the helicopters was also designed to provide information for immediate exploitation. When 2-12 Inf was allocated helicopter lift assets for a day's operations, it usually consisted of a nine (9) ship lift and two or three UH1C gunships. The battalion would then conduct its planned company minus air assaults one after the other. The gunships always accompanied the lift to cover an insertion, but, if the next company to be inserted had a secure pick-up zone, rather than accompanying the lift to the pickup zone, the gunships would remain to fly low level reconnaissance at the insertion site until they had to break off and cover the next insertion.

On several previous occasions these gunships had detected and engaged enemy personnel fleeing the area of an insertion, and directed the ground troops to the enemy location.

13. (U) EXECUTION: At 1010 hours, A/2-12(-) was airborne after being picked up at PB Dees. The formation split and approached the two planned LZs from the northeast to southwest. At 1024 hours, the five ships carrying the 3d Platoon and the Command Group landed on their planned LZ, however, the four ships carrying the 2d Platoon missed their planned LZ and circled around to come in again. As soon as the 3d Platoon was inserted and began moving toward the northern end of New Ong Dam, the gunships spotted three individuals fleeing from the southern edge of the hamlet, headed for the stream.

The gunships could not engage because the four ship lift was preparing to land in the immediate area. The 2d Platoon was informed and inserted between the fleeing enemy and the stream. When the 2d Platoon landed

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the enemy changed direction to avoid the block but they were quickly engaged with an M60 machine gun and three M16 rifles and all three were observed falling. The 2d Platoon moved to check the area where the enemy were last seen and the 3d Platoon and Command Group began collecting the civilians and searching the northern portion of the hamlet. (See Figure 4) The 2d Platoon found two (2) bodies, both of whom had been carrying hand grenades.

The 2d Platoon continued to search the stream and adjacent area for about an hour but could not find the third VC. One of the helicopter pilots later stated that he saw a body floating in the stream but it was never confirmed.

While the 2d Platoon searched by the stream, the 3d Platoon continued to search the hamlet. One squad secured the civilians while the other searched the empty houses. Two M60 machine guns were set up to the north of the hamlet to provide security and to prevent anyone from sneaking out of the hamlet.

The Company Commander ordered the 2d Platoon to move to the southern edge of the hamlet and join the search at about 1210 hours. As the 2d Platoon approached the southern end of the hamlet, the gunships, which had been released to refuel after covering a second insertion, passed over the brushy area to the east of the hamlet and observed one armed individual taking evasive action. The lead gunship circled the target, and on receiving clearance to fire, the door gunner engaged the individual, apparently killing him.


At the sound of the gunship firing, the 3d Platoon came on line facing the brush and began to advance toward it, leaving an M60 machine gun, four men and their medic to secure the civilians. The 2d Platoon Leader at the same time requested information on the radio what the gunships had engaged and was told to form on line and advance to the brushy area. (See Figure 5)

The 3d Platoon was then ordered to return to the area where the civilians were collected and be prepared to join the 2d Platoon. The Command Group joined the 2d Platoon as they continued toward the brush. Before the 2d Platoon reached the edge of the brush, at about 1230 hours, the gunships spotted another four enemy attempting to hide and received clearance to engage with rockets and mini-gun. The 2d Platoon was directed to hold on the edge of the brush line while the gunships expended their ordnance. As the 2d Platoon waited, the two (2) UH1C helicopters fired 38 10-lb and 14 17-lb rockets and fired 2500 rounds of mini-gun ammunition into the area where the enemy had been sighted.

When the first enemy soldier had been located in the brush, the Battalion Commander came overhead in his Command and Control ship to monitor the action. When the additional four enemy were spotted, the

FIGURE 4  
 NOT TO SCALE  
 (APPROX 1:6,250)

- HUT
- ▨ HEDGEROW
- ▤ CLEARED
- ☼ BRUSH
- ~ TRAIL




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FIGURE 5  
 NOT TO SCALE  
 (APPROX 1:6,250)

- HUT
- ▨ HEDGEROW
- ▤ CLEARED
- ☼ BRUSH
- TRAIL



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Artillery Liaison Officer called a fire mission on the enemy location. However, because of the immediately available gunships, quick reaction of the ground troops, and lack of enemy resistance, the mission was not fired to allow the ground troops to sweep the area immediately after the firing runs.

During the firing runs, one man in the 2d Platoon was lightly wounded by a rocket fragment, the only US casualty suffered during the operation. The 2d Platoon moved into the brush making a careful search and by 1245 hours found one (1) enemy killed by the gunships and captured two (2) PWs. (See Figure 6) The PWs were immediately interrogated and stated there were fifteen (15) more VC in the brush.

With reason to believe there were more enemy in the area, the 3d Platoon was ordered forward to search the huts on the edge of the area and secure the field to the north of the brush as an LZ for the Battalion Commander. A three man machine gun team plus a radio operator and the platoon medic were left to secure the assembled civilians. As the 3d Platoon neared the edge of the brush, the 1st Platoon, which had been released from "Eagle Eye" to rejoin Company A, was inserted on its right.

By the time the 1st and 3d Platoons reached the brush, the 2d Platoon was over half way through the area. Since the enemy had shown no intention of resisting, the 1st and 2d Platoons began a slow detailed search broken down into two and three man search teams. The 2d Platoon continued its search to the northeast. The 1st Platoon entered the brush following the 2d Platoon, then crossed the trail bisecting the area to check the other side. The 3d Platoon moved rapidly to search and secure brush and huts bordering the Battalion Commander's LZ. Once the 3d Platoon had secured the LZ, the Battalion Commander and S-3 landed and were followed by an Interrogation of Prisoners of War (IPW) Team. (See Figure 7) The 3d Platoon detailed two men as bodyguards for the Battalion Commander and a third as his radio operator.

As the search continued the prisoners and captured equipment were assembled near one of the huts north of the brush where the Command Group and IPW Team processed the results. The 2d Platoon, having broken out of the brush, turned around and began sweeping back. The 1st Platoon swept its area in a rough spiral. The 3d Platoon, actually about one squad after detachments, proceeded to check the smaller area of brush to the northeast. (See Figure 8)

Figures 6 through 8 represent the outline of over three hours of detailed searching. Many of the holes in the area were cleverly camouflaged; all were nearly filled with water. A person hiding in a hole would be immersed except for part of his head and face. Throwing a hand grenade in one of the water filled bunkers often

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
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FIGURE 6  
 NOT TO SCALE  
 (APPROX 1:6250)

- HUT
- ▨ HEDGEROW
- ▤ CLEARED
- ⊞ BRUSH
- ~ TRAIL



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GUN RUNS

RUBBER

STREAM

3/A

2/A

1/A





FIGURE 8  
 NOT TO SCALE  
 (APPROX 1:6250)

- HUT
- ▤ HEDGEROW
- ▨ CLEARED
- ☼ BRUSH
- TRAIL



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caved in large sections. Such cave-ins made an unpleasant job worse but the alternative of checking the bunkers without grenading them first was too dangerous.

Some of the bunkers were dug into small knolls, apparently to get more space above the water level. When one of these bunkers was spotted, it was effectively neutralized with an M72 LAW before it was searched.

When the three hour search was completed, A/2-12 had confirmed one (1) KIA for the gunships, killed seven (7) more enemy in their holes and captured seven (7), one of whom later died from wounds he received before surrendering. Although A/2-12 captured or destroyed nine (9) individual weapons, during the entire period from insertion to the end of the search, the enemy did not fire a weapon.

At 1640 hours, A/2-12 was picked up near their insertion points and ten minutes later had closed on PB Dees, their night location.

14. (U) RESULTS:

a. (U) Friendly Casualties and Losses: 1 WIA (Not Evacuated)

b. (U) Enemy Casualties:

(1) KIA - 9

(2) Captured - 6

c. (U) Enemy Equipment Losses:

(1) 7 AK-47 Rifles

(2) 1 .45 Caliber Pistol

(3) 1 9mm Pistol

(4) 6 Hand Grenades

(5) 2 lbs Medical Supplies

(6) 12 lbs Documents

d. (U) Document Screening - The screening of the twelve (12) pounds of documents identified the enemy as elements of C4 Company, Trang Bang Local Force Battalion, and revealed a great deal of useful information.

One of the documents was a letter from the Political Branch of SR1 requesting constructive criticism of and concrete ideas for immediate application in five systems. The five systems were Vigilance,

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People's Relations, Monitoring, Armed Forces Proselyting, and, ironically, Document Security Maintenance.

Another document was a situation report on the village of Loc Hang, vicinity XT520264, giving the number of party members, the number of political group members, the number of hamlet guerrillas, and a weapons inventory.

The documents gave a list of the officers in C4, the roster for a VC Reconnaissance Squad, and biographical data on 3 VC.

Also included was a list of firing points with the district for 60mm mortars, 82mm mortars, 120mm mortars, 75mm recoilless rifles and 107mm rockets.

Perhaps most significant was an outline of activity and goals to be performed by Trang Bang District units during the Fall Campaign of 1969. The units were ordered not to overestimate US/GVN capabilities or take refuge in the Cambodian Border area.

e. (U) Prisoner Interrogation - Initial interrogation of the prisoners caused one of them to be reclassified as a Viet Cong Suspect, Civil Detainee (VCSCD). It was confirmed that the enemy engaged was from C4 Company, Trang Bang Local Force Battalion. The organization of C4 was found to be: 1st Platoon - nine (9) riflemen armed with AK rifles, 2d Platoon - eleven (11) men armed with AK rifles, a 75mm recoilless rifle, and a 60mm mortar, and 3d Platoon, Medical Platoon - twelve (12) men armed with AK rifles and one RPG-2.

One of the prisoners from 1st Platoon said his platoon had arrived at the site of his capture the night of the 20th. Elements of the company had been in the area previous to the 20th collecting rice. The company had assembled to receive reconnaissance training.

### 15. (U) ANALYSIS

a. The failure of the enemy to use any weapons in his own defense shows the extent to which he will trust his passive defense of hiding. In this case a company of fresh troops searched a defined target for over three (3) hours to find a total of thirteen (13) enemy. The Battalion Commander said the men were well trained, aggressive and worked hard, but he would not be surprised if they missed getting all the VC that were in the brushy area.

b. Two elements stand out as adding to Company A's success in finding the concealed enemy. The location being searched was a confirmed enemy location rather than a suspect enemy location. Probably more important, the troops were fresh. The Platoon Leaders interviewed said that the quality of the search performed by a platoon decreased rapidly as the distance they walked increased, with the most complete searches

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obtained after an airmobile insertion.

c. 2-12 Inf through its target priority list systematically established firm operational objectives reflecting both current intelligence and the need for periodic surveillance of certain areas. A cordon and search combined with low level reconnaissance by gunships often provided valuable, perishable intelligence to which the gunships and ground troops were prepared and conditioned to react immediately. On 5 October 2-12 Inf and supporting gunships from the 116th Assault Helicopter Company, in a series of separate small actions over a wide area, killed thirty (30) enemy, captured seven (7), and received two (2) Hoi Chanhs. These operations which resulted in two (2) US personnel slightly wounded also cost the enemy eleven (11) individual weapons, 2600 pounds of foodstuffs, 50 pounds of equipment, and 22½ pounds of documents. The operations on 5 October dramatically demonstrated the effectiveness of the combination of firm operational objectives and flexible execution keyed to immediate exploitation of intelligence as developed.

*William D. Watson*  
WILLIAM D. WATSON  
Captain, FA  
Commanding

CF:

- 1 - COMUSMACV, ATTN: J3
- 1 - CG, USARV, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, II FFV, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, 1st Inf Div, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, 1st Air Cav Div, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, CMAC, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, 199th LIB, ATTN: S3
- 1 - CO, 11th ACR, ATTN: S3
- 1 - CO, 3rd Bde, 9th Inf Div, ATTN: S3
- 1 - CG, RTAVF, ATTN: G3
- 1 - CG, ATF, ATTN: G3

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
18th Military History Detachment  
25th Infantry Division  
APO San Francisco 96225

AVDCMH

19 October 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report

THRU: Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
ATTN: Command Historian  
APO San Francisco 96375

TO: Headquarters  
Department of the Army  
ATTN: O.C.M.H.  
Washington, D.C. 20315

1. NAME AND TYPE OF ORGANIZATION: Team 12, Company F, 75th Infantry (Ranger) - Ranger Team.
2. DATE OF OPERATION: 10 October 1969.
3. LOCATION: Ref Map Series L8020, Sheet Number 6231 II S, Insertion Grid - XT508216, Extraction Grid - XT509216, Trang Bang District, Hau Nghia Province, Republic of Vietnam.
4. CONTROL HEADQUARTERS: 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division.
5. PERSON BEING INTERVIEWED: SSG Kenneth D. Cecil, 400649480, Team Leader, Team 12, Company F, 75th Infantry (Ranger).
6. INTERVIEWING OFFICER: Division Historian.
7. TASK ORGANIZATION: Team 12, Company F, 75th Infantry (Ranger) - 7 Man Team (See Inclosure 1).
8. SUPPORTING FORCES:
  - a. Artillery: Battery B, 2d Battalion, 77th Artillery (105mm), FSB Jackson (XT425168).
  - b. Army Aviation: Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion - 2 Light Fire Teams (2 AH1G, 2 UH1C).

Incl 12

9. **BACKGROUND INFORMATION:** On 9 October 1969, Team 12 operated in the Boi Loi Woods successfully completing a combat patrol which resulted in 2 NVA KIA (BC).

10. **INTELLIGENCE:**

a. Enemy - Recent intelligence indicated that a reinforced enemy mortar crew was operating west of the Cau Truong Chua stream in the vicinity of Bao Me Village (XT506215). This enemy mortar crew was suspected of using this area to fire on nearby U.S. locations. Previous radar sightings confirmed enemy activity in the area.

b. Terrain - The terrain in the area of contact was dense hedgerow squares with patches of brush interspersed between the hedgerows.

c. Weather - A heavy driving rain began approximately fifteen (15) minutes before the major contact was initiated. Air assets were unable to be used immediately because of this rain. As the rain slackened and the weather cleared, these air assets were able to be effectively utilized.

11. **MISSION:** Team 12's primary mission was to gather intelligence and, if possible, to kill or capture enemy personnel.

12. **CONCEPT OF OPERATION AND EXECUTION:** 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division decided to insert three (3) Ranger Teams from F/75th Inf (Rng) on 10 October in the Bao Me area to locate for artillery and air engagement, or to ambush the enemy elements suspected to be operating there. Team 12 was to operate near XT508216. Team 11 would be operating approximately 500 meters to Team 12's north (XT508221), and Team 23 approximately 1.5 kilometers to Team 12's southwest (XT501206).

All three teams were to be inserted around noon. Team 12 was inserted with the Combined Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry by helicopter near the area selected for them. At 1340 hours after moving approximately 250 meters the Team Leader, SSG Cecil, selected a suitable site in the vicinity of XT509217 and the Team executed a "stay behind" ambush. (See Inclosure 2) It was hoped that the continuation of the reconnaissance by CRIP/2-12 Inf would prevent any enemy in the area from realizing that an ambush had been set up.

Before establishing the exact location of his ambush site, SSG Cecil detailed a three man sub-element to reconnoiter the area for signs of enemy activity. At 1345 hours the sub-element moved out on an azimuth of 090 degrees approximately 75 to 100 meters, then on 360 degrees for 100 meters. The sub-element then "zig-zagged" west for approximately 100 meters where it followed a trail southeast back to the main element.

While reconnoitering the area the sub-element found a tunnel complex consisting of 4 tunnels with entrances approximately 3 feet in diameter

which they checked with negative findings. They also found a booby trapped trail with eight (8) charges, 2 bunkers, and a number of fox-holes and fighting positions which showed signs of use just a few hours prior to the team's insertion.

Upon the sub-elements return and report of its findings, the Team Leader established the seven (7) man ambush position vicinity XT509217 consisting of a five (5) man ambush with a two (2) man observation post approximately fifteen (15) meters to the north of the ambush site.

At 1527 hours one of the team members spotted one (1) VC moving west to east about 20 meters from the ambush site. The enemy soldier was wearing pants, vest-type web gear, a bag on one shoulder and carrying an AK-47 rifle. The Team Leader ordered the observation post to engage this enemy but they had not seen him. Because of the density of the brush between the main element and the enemy soldier, SSG Cecil began to crawl toward the soldier to get a better shot but was spotted. As the VC turned to run into a hedgerow, two members of the Team's main body engaged him with small arms and automatic weapons fire, wounding the VC.

At 1600 Team 12 monitored approximately ten (10) AK-47 signal shots in groups of two about 250-300 meters southwest of their position. At 1605 hours SSG Cecil ordered a three man sub-element to reconnoiter the area of contact. This sub-element followed a blood trail approximately 150 meters and spotted the wounded VC crawling toward a hootch.

As the sub-element spotted the wounded man Team 12 began to monitor signals from several directions. From the northwest (200 meters) - puffs of smoke, from the west (100 meters) - screaming (women's voices), and from the southeast (200 meters) - signal shots. When the sub-element heard the signal shots and screaming they immediately started back to the main body, ignoring the wounded VC. Realizing his position had been compromised, the Team Leader decided to use escape and evasion tactics. At 1630 hours after ordering the two man observation post to join the main element, the Team Leader moved the Team approximately 75 meters to the south and set up a second ambush site facing in a southerly direction.

At 1637 hours Team 12 monitored one man shouting approximately 100 meters east of its new position.

Fifteen (15) minutes after establishing the 2d ambush site it began to rain heavily. Another fifteen (15) minutes after the rain began the Team machine gunner, SP4 Hix, noticed an NVA officer approaching the kill zone. When he entered the kill zone the officer was engaged by the Team and killed. Almost immediately the Team began receiving small arms fire from twelve enemy personnel in groups of four from the southeast, south and southwest, approximately 150-200 meters from the ambush position.

Also, a single enemy soldier fired on the Team from the northeast. The Team returned fire with small arms and automatic weapons killing four (4) NVA soldiers.

At the outset of the contact the Team Leader requested a light fire team and artillery fires. Three artillery WP airbursts were fired for adjustment purposes but because of the other two teams operating nearby, artillery fires could not be brought to bear against the enemy. Upon reception of the request for a light fire team, helicopter gunships from both Cu Chi and Tay Ninh were prepared to support the contact. Because of the prevailing weather conditions they had to be kept on a standby status until the weather cleared enough to make their employment possible.

When the second contact was made A/2-12 Inf (-) was ordered to move overland from Fire Support Base Pershing (XT518256) to support the Team. The infantry from FSB Pershing never became involved in the action because the weather cleared and at 1735 hours the first light fire team was overhead and engaged the enemy with 2.75 inch rockets. The second light fire team arrived on station at 1810 hours and engaged the area where the enemy had been with mini-gun and M60 machine guns.

After the gunships completed their firing runs Team 12 checked the kill zone and recovered the officer's AK-47 with three (3) loaded magazines,  $\frac{1}{2}$  pound of documents and other equipment which he was carrying. Immediately after this check, at 1830 hours, Team 12 was extracted by the Command and Control helicopter of the Commanding Officer, 2d Battalion, 12th Infantry. A/2-12 Inf (-) returned to FSB Pershing.

The only friendly casualty during the operation was the Team's Kit Carson Scout who received a slight shrapnel wound.

### 13. RESULTS:

- a. Friendly Casualties and Losses: 1 WIA (Kit Carson Scout)
- b. Enemy Casualties: 5 KIA (BC)
- c. Enemy Equipment Losses:
  - (1) 1 AK-47 Rifle with 3 Magazines
  - (2) 1 M26 Hand Grenade
  - (3) 1 Chi Com Anti-Tank Grenade
  - (4) 3 pounds Personal Gear
  - (5) 1 pound Documents

d. Company B, 25th Aviation Battalion Ordnance Expenditures:

(1) First Light Fire Team (2 AH1G Cobras)

- a. 66 2.75 inch Rockets - 10 pound VT
- b. 36 2.75 inch Rockets - 17 pound PD
- c. 10 2.75 inch Fleshette Rockets
- d. 3000 rounds 7.62mm

(2) Second Light Fire Team (2 UH1C)

- a. 5000 rounds 7.62mm

14. ANALYSIS: The entire action was marked by good fire discipline and cool courage. When the enemy was spotted, the effort was to insure a kill rather than engaging immediately. When their initial location was clearly compromised the Team Leader moved the unit a short distance and ambushed one of the leaders of the enemy elements closing in on the original position.

3 Incl

- 1. Team 12 Roster
- 2. Overlay
- 3. Team 12 Equipment and Ammunition

*William D. Watson*

WILLIAM D. WATSON  
CPT, FA  
Commanding

INCLOSURE 1

Team 12 Roster

SSG Cecil - Team Leader - RTO

SP4 Zellner - Assistant Team Leader - RTO

SGT Jones

SGT Wilcox

SP4 Hix

SP4 Swift

Kit Carson Scout - Trinh Van Len

Inclosure 1 to Inclosure 12


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INCLOSURE 2 - OVERLAY

SERIES L8020

SHEET 6231 II S

SCALE 1:25,000



--- TRAIL

- ① INSERTION
- ② 1ST AMBUSH SITE
- ③ 2D AMBUSH SITE  
& EXTRACTION

Incl 2 to Incl 12

INCLOSURE 3

Team 12 Equipment and Ammunition

Team Equipment

2 PRC-25 Radios w/2 batteries each	1 M14 Sniper Rifle w/scope
2 PRC-25 Long Antennas w/base	4 Strobe Lights
3 PRC-25 Handsets	4 VS-17 Panel Markers
1 Starlight Scope	6 Trip Flares
4 WP Hand Grenades	First Aid Kit
1 M60 Machine Gun	4 CS Grenades
1 M-79 Grenade Launcher	4 LAWs
4 Star Clusters	1 Pair Binoculars (6x30)
4 Parachute Flares	4 Maps
2 SOIs	2 WP Rifle Grenades w/crimped cartridges for M16

Individual Equipment


1 M16 (unless issued team weapon)	2 Battle Dressings
1 Pistol Belt	6 M-26 or M-33 Hand Grenades
8 Quarts Water	1 Bottle Insect Repellant
2 Smoke Grenades	50 Salt Tablets
1 Bottle Water Purification Tablets	Wrist Watch
2 Compasses	2 Claymore Mines
Weapons Cleaning Equipment	Knife or Bayonet
Protective Mask	Length of Parachute Suspension Line
2 Signal Mirrors	

Ammunition Carried

80~ 900 rounds M16	120 HE, 10 Canister, 6 Parachute Flares for M-79
1500 rounds M-60 MG	
300 M-14 rounds	
Incl 3 to Incl 12	

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


OVERLAY 1  
 ENEMY SITUATION  
 25TH INF DIV T.A.O.I.  
 31 OCTOBER 1969  
 SCALE: 1:500,000

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
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OVERLAY 3  
 25TH INF DIV T.A.O.R.  
 1 OCTOBER 1969  
 SCALE 1:500,000

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OVERLAY 4  
 25TH INF DIV T.A.O.R  
 25 OCTOBER 1969  
 SCALE 1:500,000

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DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

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		2b. GROUP	
		3	
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CG, 25th Infantry Division			
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